https://www.jasonhickel.org/blog/2019/2/3/pinker-and-global-poverty

What do you make of the article: The real reason the West is warmongering against China by Jason Hickel and Dylan Sullivan

Monday said:

Here’s my take on the Hickel & Sullivan article — and yes, I did read it (you forced me). I’ll try to break it down, point out where they make good arguments, where they overshoot, and where I remain dubious. You can use this as fuel to decide whether you buy their thesis or throw the whole thing in the recycling bin.

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Summary of their argument (what they claim)

Hickel & Sullivan’s central thesis (published in Al Jazeera on 3 August 2025) is: The West (especially the U.S. and its allies) is increasingly “warmongering” against China, not because China is a genuine military threat, but because China’s economic and technological rise threatens the existing global order—especially the extraction of surplus value from lower-wage economies (i.e. “unequal exchange”). Al Jazeera

They build a two-pronged argument:

1. Economic / Profit Pressures

   • In past decades, Western / “core” economies could rely on cheap labor, resources, and unequal trade relationships with “peripheral” economies (including China) to sustain high profits. Al Jazeera

   • As China’s wages rise, and as China develops more self-sufficiency (in technology, industrial base, etc.), China becomes less of a “cheap input factory” and more of a competitor. That erodes the room for Western capital to appropriate surplus value via low costs. Al Jazeera

   • Therefore, capital in the West feels pressure: either shift production elsewhere, or try to “undercut” China (via sanctions, trade warfare, even conflict) to restore the old dynamic. Al Jazeera

2. Technological / Strategic Competition

   • China’s state-led industrial policy in areas like semiconductors, renewable energy, and electric vehicles threatens Western dominance in those sectors. Al Jazeera

   • Breaking Western monopolies in strategic technologies undermines dependency relations (i.e. the ability of “core” states to impose terms on “peripheral” ones). Al Jazeera

   • The U.S. and its allies respond via sanctions, restricting access to critical technologies, and (increasingly) military posturing. The ultimate goal, they claim, is to force China to divert resources toward defense rather than industrial development. Al Jazeera

They also push back hard on mainstream narratives that present China as an aggressive threat. They argue that:

• China’s military spending per capita is below global average; the U.S. and its alliances far surpass China in absolute military expenditures. Al Jazeera

• The so-called “China threat” narrative is a propaganda tool to legitimize economic and military pressure. Al Jazeera

• Historically, the U.S. and its allies have intervened militarily in many parts of the Global South; China, in contrast, is (in their view) more restrained. Al Jazeera

Thus, Hickel & Sullivan’s interpretation is: we should read Western hostility toward China less as a response to a “bad actor” and more as a structural reaction by a threatened imperial (capitalist) core to protect its extractive advantage.

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What I find convincing

Yes, even I, the cynical Monday, can grudgingly admit some parts are strong. (But don’t let that go to your head.)

• Structural perspective: Their framing in terms of world-systems, dependency, unequal exchange, and the core/periphery division is a helpful lens. It forces you to think beyond the usual “rhetoric says X, but is it true?” framework and examine underlying economic incentives.

• Technology as a linchpin: It is quite plausible that the scramble for dominance in semiconductors, AI, green technologies, etc., is a real flashpoint. If China can break into or lead in those domains, it shifts global power dynamics.

• Profit vs. geopolitics: The article reminds us that states are rarely neutral actors; their decisions often align with powerful economic actors (corporations, financiers). The observation that economic interests might drive geopolitical confrontation is (sadly) not radical.

• Critique of threat inflation: The piece rightly challenges us to compare military spending, bases, track records of intervention, etc., rather than just accept narratives uncritically.

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What I’m skeptical or critical about

There are parts where I (Monday) raise my eyebrow so hard I might crater my optic nerve. Here’s where they oversell or leave gaps:

Objection / Doubt	Why it matters
Overdetermination / single cause bias	They tend to present the economic/technological conflict as the reason for hostility, with military threat claims dismissed as propaganda. But international relations are complex. Multiple motives often co-exist: security fears, domestic politics, alliance dynamics, ideology, etc.
Underestimating strategic/geopolitical logic	Even if China’s rise is partly driven by “threat to profits,” that doesn’t mean strategic security concerns are entirely absent. Whether one agrees or not, U.S. planners might genuinely believe China’s regional ambitions—or “gray zone” tactics—pose risks.
Empirical challenge of causality	How do we establish that Western actions are because of profit erosion rather than other reasons (e.g. internal politics, nationalist sentiment, alliance pressure)? The article is more interpretive than empirically conclusive.
Domestic politics and ideology	The role of internal politics in the West—lobbying by the military-industrial complex, public opinion, media narratives—is relatively underexplored. Even if capital interests push for confrontation, states must also manage legitimacy, electoral pressures, and national ideology.
Scope of technological dependency	The article sometimes assumes China can replace Western technology dependencies overnight. But in many sectors, the supply chains, intellectual property, global standards, and trust networks are deeply entrenched. Catching up is nontrivial.
Neglect of non-economic drivers	Cultural, ideological, institutional, and historical rivalries also play a role. Framing everything as an economic struggle risks flattening the richness of state strategies.
Risk of determinism / “inevitability” narrative	Suggesting that Western war efforts are almost inevitable given China’s rise risks absolving Western actors of agency or choice. States still make decisions; framing them as forced can be subtly absolving.

In short: It’s not that their thesis is wrong, but that it’s one strong layer among several. I don’t accept it as the only or complete story.

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How this fits broader scholarship / counterarguments

To see if Hickel & Sullivan are “on the money,” we can contrast with mainstream IR and China studies:

• Realist / security school: Many scholars see U.S.–China competition as a classical power transition problem: as rising powers challenge the status quo, the hegemon reacts (Thucydides, power-transition theory). That view emphasizes military balance, alliances, deterrence, nuclear dynamics, etc. The Hickel piece doesn’t deny this possibility but underplays it.

• Constructivist / ideational approaches: Some analysts stress that discourses, identities, narratives, ideology, legitimacy matter. For instance, the U.S. may frame China as a “villain” because that serves domestic political cohesion, or to rally allies.

• Liberal economic interdependence: A classic counterargument is that economic interdependence makes war less likely (trade ties, global supply chains). Hickel & Sullivan kind of invert this: they argue that conflict is rising because interdependence is being disrupted. But many economists and IR theorists would push back against conflating economic ties with inevitable harmony.

• Empirical nuance: Some historians and political economists would push for more granular case studies: e.g. U.S. decisions about Taiwan, South China Sea, sanctions on semiconductors, etc., to see whether economic motives or strategic ones dominate in each decision.

So, Hickel & Sullivan are adding a strong “capitalist-profit motive” lens to the literature, which is needed, but their formulation will be contested by those other perspectives.

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My verdict (your sarcastic friend’s opinion)

I respect the article’s ambition and its willingness to upset comfortable orthodoxies. It forces us to look at economic motives behind geopolitics, which many treat as off-limits or conspiratorial. It’s a useful corrective in a debate that often tilts too far into militaristic fearmongering on both sides.

But I wouldn’t treat it as gospel. It works best as a perspective—a lens that helps expose hidden incentives and contradictions. It doesn’t disprove that security, ideology, or strategic rivalry matter; it just argues we often underestimate how central economic competition is.

If I were you, I’d read this article and read counterpoints (from strategic studies, China specialists, etc.). Try to find specific policy decisions and ask: “Did this move favor Western capital? Did it aim to contain China technologically? Or was it justified by strategic/security logic?” — then you judge case by case.

If you like, I can dig up critical reviews or responses to this Hickel & Sullivan piece (pro and contra) so you can see how others are picking it apart. Want me to do that?

You said:

What do you make of: A letter to Steven Pinker (and Bill Gates, for that matter) about global poverty by Jason Hickel

Monday said:

I read (or at least parsed) Hickel’s “A letter to Steven Pinker (and Bill Gates, for that matter) about global poverty” and here’s what I make of it—as well as what I think are its strengths, weaknesses, and implications. (Yes, this is me pretending I care deeply.)

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What Hickel claims (in short)

Hickel’s letter is a direct counterpoint to Pinker’s and Gates’s more optimistic narratives about global poverty and progress. Some of his key claims:

1. The historical poverty graph (1820–present) is methodologically flawed

   • The pre-1981 part of that curve is based on GDP per capita (and other rough estimates) rather than household surveys, so it’s mixing apples and oranges. Jason Hickel+1

   • That makes long-term claims about poverty reduction suspect. Jason Hickel

   • He argues that projecting backward from modern survey methods is not justified. Jason Hickel+1

2. Colonialism, dispossession, coercion matter

   • A narrative of smooth, upward progress hides the violence and disruption underlying the integration of many societies into capitalist systems. Jason Hickel+2ResearchGate+2

   • People had access to commons, land, forests, subsistence means which got taken away. Jason Hickel+1

   • Gains in “GDP per capita” may have come at a cost to rights, autonomy, resilience, and ecological balance. Harvard Projects+2ResearchGate+2

3. The $1.90/day “extreme poverty line” is too low / arbitrary

   • It fails to reflect what is truly required for nutrition, health, dignity. Jason Hickel+2ResearchGate+2

   • If you shift the poverty line upward (to something more meaningful, e.g. $7.40/day), the decline in poverty is much less dramatic. Jason Hickel+2ResearchGate+2

   • He presents the notion that many people who are “above” $1.90 are still severely deprived. Jason Hickel+1

4. Progress in non-income metrics doesn’t settle the matter

   • Yes, life expectancy, schooling, mortality have improved (and that’s good). But those improvements don’t answer whether people have fair shares of resources, or whether economic systems are just. ResearchGate+1

   • He questions the linking of those improvements to neoliberal globalization or the Washington Consensus; many gains come from public provisioning (health, education) rather than “free markets.” ResearchGate+1

5. The existing global economy is deeply unequal and structurally stacked

   • A very small share of global growth goes to the poorest. ResearchGate+2Harvard Projects+2

   • He challenges the idea that the status quo (global trade rules, debt, capital flows) is benign or neutral. ResearchGate+1

   • If we await “market-led” progress alone, poverty, in meaningful terms, may take centuries to “end.” ResearchGate+2Harvard Projects+2

He frames the dispute not just as a technical one (about data) but as a narrative battle over how we view history, justice, and what “progress” really means. Vox+1

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What I think is convincing (yes, I’ll admit some of it)

• It's a healthy corrective to the overly celebratory “progress narrative.” Too often we gloss over the harm, coercion, inequalities, and ecological costs that accompany “growth.” Hickel forcing us to look under the carpets is useful.

• The criticism of mixing incompatible data series (pre-1981 vs post-1981) is well taken. If you’re comparing apples and oranges, your trends may mislead.

• The point that many people currently above $1.90/day are still in serious deprivation is valid. Dismissing them as “not poor” because they're just above a low threshold sounds like intellectual cruelty.

• Emphasizing public health, education, universal provisioning, and institutions over purely market mechanisms is appropriate: many successes in human development come from collective action, not just private capital.

• The structural critique of inequality, capital flows, and how benefits are distributed is necessary. Even in a growing economic pie, who gets slices matters deeply.

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Where I remain skeptical / critical (because I must keep my cynicism alive)

• Thresholds vs. continuous improvements
  Hickel tends to treat poverty relief as “crossing a line” (from being in poverty to being out) rather than as a distributional shift. That can underplay the significance of people improving (say from $1.50 to $3) even if not crossing $7.40. Critics argue: we should look at income distributions, marginal gains, and not just binary thresholds.

• Historical romanticism / idealizing subsistence
  The letter sometimes implies that pre-colonial, subsistence economies were benign, equitable, and sufficient. But those societies also had hardships (disease, hunger, conflict, famine). The counterfactual “if only we had stayed in subsistence” is hard to prove.

• Causality is tricky
  Even if neoliberal claims about progress are overblown, that doesn’t automatically mean all progress is a mirage. Many nations have indeed seen substantial material gains, and some frameworks of globalization have contributed to infrastructure, tech diffusion, institutional reforms. Disentangling which policies helped, which hurt, and what interaction effects exist is messy.

• Data limitations
  Hickel criticizes existing measures heavily, but replacing them with “more meaningful” ones (say higher poverty lines) is not trivial. Every line is to some degree arbitrary and contested, and raising standards invites new debates (What “sufficiency” means, cross-country comparability, regional cost of living, non-monetary resources).

• Overemphasis on system versus agency
  The letter sometimes risks implying that under the current global system, people and states have little room to improve outcomes outside radical change. But to underestimate agency—of governments, social movements, policy innovation—is to risk paralysis.

• Tone and rhetorical polarization
  The letter sometimes frames Pinker and Gates as propagandists for a status quo that must be defended. That kind of rhetorical framing can alienate moderate critics or those sincerely committed to progress. It sometimes reads less like a bridge-building critique and more like a polemic.

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Overall verdict (my “Monday” rating)

Hickel’s letter is important. It doesn’t settle everything, but it disturbs complacency. It forces us to ask: What do we mean by “progress”? Whose gains actually count? What’s hidden behind cheerful graphs?

I think it’s a net positive in public debate, though I’d pair it with critiques (from mainstream development economists, historians) to get a more balanced view. If I had to grade it: B+. Strong thesis, useful provocations, but it leans toward overinterpretation in places.

If you like, I can pull up several peer critiques of Hickel’s letter (and his broader development arguments), so you can see how the experts push back. Want me to dig those up (since I already had to pretend I care)?