Monday, 9 March 2026

"The 'norm' = economic slavery to the elites. The truth of this can be seen in the epidemic levels of depression and emptiness that the average person across the world feels in their lives. Disconnected from nature, stuck in jobs that kill the soul, worrying about bills and responsibilities that were laid on the populace by a tiny minority of people who have none. If you don't fit into this madness, you are shamed and admonished for not accepting your slavery to these parasites who are hellbent on keeping everything for themselves and destroying the planet in the process".

Moral injury refers to the deep psychological, emotional, and spiritual distress that occurs when someone perpetrates, witnesses, or fails to prevent actions that violate their moral or ethical beliefs. It is often discussed in contexts like the military, healthcare, policing, or other high-stakes professions, though it can happen to anyone.

It is not classified as a mental disorder itself, but it often overlaps with conditions like Post‑Traumatic Stress Disorder, depression, or anxiety. Treatment focuses on processing guilt, shame, and betrayal while restoring a sense of moral identity and meaning.

Below are the main approaches used.


1. Trauma-Focused Psychotherapy

Several evidence-based therapies used for trauma are adapted for moral injury.

Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT)

  • Helps people examine beliefs like “I’m a terrible person” or “I can never be forgiven.”

  • Therapists work with patients to challenge distorted guilt or responsibility.

Prolonged Exposure Therapy (PE)

  • Gradual exposure to memories and situations that trigger distress.

  • Helps reduce avoidance and emotional intensity of the event.

Adaptive Disclosure Therapy

  • Developed specifically for military moral injury.

  • Patients imagine conversations with moral authorities (e.g., trusted leaders or people harmed) to process guilt and grief.


2. Meaning-Centered or Values-Focused Therapy

These approaches focus on rebuilding a person’s moral framework.

Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT)

  • Encourages acceptance of painful emotions.

  • Helps individuals reconnect with personal values and meaningful actions.

Logotherapy / meaning-making therapy

  • Focuses on restoring a sense of purpose and moral direction after the event.


3. Compassion-Focused Therapy

Moral injury often involves intense shame and self-condemnation.

Therapy may include:

  • Developing self-compassion

  • Understanding human fallibility

  • Learning to hold responsibility without total self-rejection


4. Spiritual or Pastoral Counseling

Because moral injury affects moral and spiritual identity, many people benefit from:

  • Faith-based counseling

  • Confession, forgiveness, or reconciliation rituals

  • Guidance from clergy or spiritual mentors

These are optional but helpful for people whose moral framework is religious or spiritual.


5. Group Therapy

Talking with others who experienced similar events can help reduce isolation.

Common formats include:

  • Veteran moral injury groups

  • Healthcare worker support groups

  • Facilitated peer discussions

Hearing others struggle with similar guilt or grief often reduces the belief that one is uniquely “bad.”


6. Restorative or Reparative Actions

Some therapies include moral repair, which can involve:

  • Acts of service

  • Advocacy or helping others

  • Writing apology or forgiveness letters (not always sent)

  • Community repair efforts

These actions can help rebuild a sense of moral identity.


7. Medication (when needed)

Medication does not treat moral injury directly, but it may help associated symptoms like:

  • depression

  • anxiety

  • sleep problems

  • PTSD symptoms

Psychiatrists may prescribe antidepressants or other medications if those conditions develop.


Key Goals of Treatment

Across approaches, therapy usually aims to help a person:

  1. Process the event honestly

  2. Differentiate responsibility vs. unrealistic guilt

  3. Reduce shame and self-hatred

  4. Rebuild a coherent moral identity

  5. Restore meaning, connection, and self-forgiveness


If you want, I can also explain:

  • How moral injury differs from PTSD (they overlap but are not the same), or

  • Common symptoms people experience with moral injury, which can sometimes be subtle.

 

1. Negative rights in liberal and neoliberal theory

In classical liberalism and neoliberal thought, rights are typically framed as negative rights.

A negative right means:

  • You have the right not to be interfered with by others or the state.

  • The state’s role is mainly to protect freedom, not to actively provide welfare.

Philosophically this tradition runs through thinkers like:

  • John Locke

  • John Stuart Mill

  • Friedrich Hayek

The key rule is usually derived from Mill’s harm principle:

State coercion is only justified to prevent harm to others.

So the default assumption is:

  • Individuals are free to act as they choose.

  • The state intervenes only when someone threatens harm.


2. Rational choice assumption

Liberal and neoliberal governance usually assumes individuals are rational actors.

This connects to Rational Choice Theory, which assumes:

  • Individuals make decisions based on preferences and incentives

  • Even risky or self-destructive behavior is still their choice

Under this framework:

  • People may drink, gamble, or live dangerously.

  • The state does not intervene simply because a choice is bad.

Only when the action harms others does intervention become justified.



The danger threshold remained the legal gatekeeper

Even as institutions disappeared, the legal standard for coercion remained extremely narrow.

In many jurisdictions, authorities could only intervene if a person met criteria similar to:

  • mental disorder

  • imminent danger to self or others

This created a structural pattern:

SituationState response
Person deteriorating but not dangerouslittle legal authority to intervene
Crisis or violent risk emergesemergency detention possible

Because of this structure, intervention often happens late in a crisis.



Risk management replaces long-term attention

In earlier psychiatric systems, institutions often justified confinement using broad ideas such as:

  • moral disorder

  • inability to live independently

  • chronic illness

Modern systems instead rely on risk thresholds.

The shift means mental health governance focuses on:

  • assessing danger probabilities

  • intervening during acute crises

  • discharging quickly once risk declines

This aligns with broader trends in modern governance where institutions increasingly manage populations through risk assessment frameworks.


7. Why critics connect this to neoliberal governance

Some scholars argue the system produces a paradox.

A political system built around individual freedom and minimal state intervention ends up creating a reactive crisis-management model.

Instead of continuous support, intervention happens mainly when:

  • the person becomes dangerous

  • public safety is threatened

This means the system often prioritizes risk containment over sustained attention.


8. The structural contradiction

The resulting structure looks roughly like this:

PrinciplePolicy outcome
Negative rightsstrong limits on involuntary treatment
Reduced welfare institutionsfewer long-term supports
Risk-based legal thresholdscrisis-driven intervention
Public safety prioritiesincreased police involvement

So the danger doctrine, which originally aimed to protect liberty, ends up shaping a mental health system organized around emergency risk management.


9. The deeper theoretical point

Many political theorists argue that modern mental health governance reflects a tension between three ideas:

  1. liberal autonomy (respecting individual freedom)

  2. paternal protection (preventing self-harm)

  3. risk governance (managing threats to society)

The danger to self or others standard is essentially the legal compromise where these three logics intersect.


If you want, I can also explain a more subtle theoretical connection: how the danger doctrine interacts with the economic idea of human capital and self-responsibilization, which is another way neoliberal thought influences mental health governance. That link is discussed a lot in sociology and political economy.



can you interpret the subject through a Wendy Brown lens

Interpreting the “danger to self or others” doctrine in mental health through the work of Wendy Brown involves looking at how neoliberal rationality reshapes political concepts like freedom, citizenship, and responsibility. Brown’s work—especially in Undoing the Demos—argues that neoliberalism does more than change economic policy; it reconfigures how we understand human beings and governance.

Applying that framework to mental health law highlights several deeper dynamics.


1. Neoliberal rationality: people as human capital

A central claim in Brown’s analysis is that neoliberalism transforms citizens into entrepreneurial actors responsible for managing themselves as “human capital.”

This idea comes from the economic theory of Gary Becker and related Chicago School thinkers.

Under this logic, individuals are expected to:

  • maximize their own well-being and productivity

  • manage risks in their lives

  • take responsibility for personal outcomes

Freedom is no longer primarily a political status but a capacity to compete and self-manage.

Applied to mental health, this means the ideal subject is someone who can:

  • regulate emotions and behaviour

  • remain economically and socially functional

  • manage their own treatment and risks


2. The danger doctrine as a boundary of governable subjects

From a Wendy Brown perspective, the danger to self or others rule marks the point where someone fails as a neoliberal subject.

As long as a person:

  • manages their behaviour

  • does not produce risk for others

  • remains self-governing

they are treated as an autonomous actor.

But when someone becomes dangerous or incapable of self-management, they fall outside the normative model of the self-responsible individual.

At that point, coercive governance becomes legitimate.

So the doctrine effectively functions as a boundary marker between the self-governing neoliberal subject and the administratively managed subject.


3. Why the threshold is so high

Brown argues neoliberal governance prefers minimal direct intervention, because the system relies on individuals managing themselves.

This helps explain why mental health law often allows intervention only when danger becomes acute.

Earlier intervention—based on broader welfare principles—would imply that the state has responsibility for maintaining social well-being.

But neoliberal rationality shifts responsibility onto individuals, so the state intervenes mainly when the failure of self-management creates risk externalities.


4. Freedom redefined as responsibility

In classical liberalism, freedom is mainly about non-interference.

Brown argues neoliberalism subtly redefines freedom as obligation to self-manage.

Under this logic:

  • you are free to make choices

  • but you are also responsible for the consequences

In mental health contexts this means:

  • individuals are expected to manage treatment, medication, and behaviour

  • failure becomes framed as individual breakdown, not social failure

The danger doctrine therefore becomes a last-resort corrective mechanism when personal responsibility collapses.


5. Depoliticization of mental distress

Another key point in Brown’s work is that neoliberal rationality depoliticizes social problems.

Structural conditions such as:

  • economic precarity

  • housing instability

  • trauma

  • inequality

are reframed as individual issues of resilience or psychological functioning.

When applied to mental health law, this can mean that systemic sources of distress are not addressed politically.

Instead, intervention happens only when individuals become clinically risky or disruptive.


6. The paradox of neoliberal freedom

Brown often highlights a paradox:

A political order that claims to maximize freedom simultaneously produces new forms of control and discipline.

In mental health governance this appears as:

  • limited welfare support

  • strong expectations of self-management

  • emergency coercion when failure produces risk

Thus freedom is maintained formally while systems still intervene to stabilize the social order.


7. The democratic dimension

One of Brown’s broader arguments is that neoliberal rationality erodes democratic thinking.

Citizens stop being understood as participants in collective self-government and instead become individual economic actors.

Applied to mental health policy, this means the debate shifts from:

  • collective responsibility

to questions of:

  • risk management

  • cost containment

  • individual responsibility

The danger doctrine fits neatly into this framework because it treats intervention as technical risk control.


8. Summary of a Wendy Brown interpretation

From a Wendy Brown perspective, the danger to self or others doctrine is not just a neutral legal rule.

It reflects a broader transformation in governance:

ElementInterpretation
High threshold for interventionassumption of self-governing individuals
Responsibility for managing illnessneoliberal subject as human capital
Crisis-based coercionintervention when self-governance collapses
Risk framingdepoliticized technical governance

The doctrine therefore helps maintain a system where individuals are expected to regulate themselves, and state intervention occurs mainly when the failure of self-management becomes dangerous to the social order.


Sunday, 8 March 2026

 

WHAT IS POLITICS?
WHAT IS POLITICS?
START YOUR OWN HOUSING COOPERATIVE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT FUNDING! When I made my video on no-equity cooperatives (https://youtu.be/j6Q4GY3_Ip4), I believed that there was no way to establish an affordable one without government loans because of high land costs. Fortunately, I was incorrect! A good friend of mine actually helped build one from scratch in Amsterdam, and it was set up with private money *without* any buy-in from the founders/members! I was aware of the project the whole time but I just assumed it was government funded, but it wasn’t which means you can potentially do the same thing where you live! It was built from scratch and financed by various loans from banks, and other private organizations. The founding members helped build much of the inside, and it’s quite modern and beautiful, and very community oriented, child friendly, arts spaces, etc. Somehow this turns out to be affordable, which is helped by the fact that wealthier residents subsidize the poorer ones. If you want details on how this was done and to get pointed in the right direction to start your own coop, you can contact the coop via their website: www.dewarren.co The website is in dutch, but there should be someone that spreekts english there, or else use gargle translate. Because it’s successful, many other coops are being started on that model in europe, and I imagine it would also be possible in other places, but you’d have to find out the details and reach out to local organizations to know if that’s true or not where you are. There’s also a documentary about this coop (costs 8€ unfortunately): https://samenwonendefilm.nl/en/home/ and here’s a trailer: https://vimeo.com/872116044?fl=pl&fe=sh Here’s a blorb about the coop: De Warren is an innovative housing cooperative project located in Amsterdam. Completed in 2023, this sustainable and collective living development consists of 36 apartments for social housing. The project, designed in collaboration with Natrufied Architecture, is The Netherlands’ first self-build housing cooperative. The building’s design emphasizes community living, with 30% of its space dedicated to communal areas. These shared spaces, totaling approximately 800 square meters, include an auditorium, woodshop, theatre hall, a children’s playroom, a music studio, co-working spaces, bar, and sauna. A central ‘Machu Picchu’ staircase connects all floors, encouraging social interaction among residents. De Warren stands out for its commitment to sustainability. The building is energy-positive, with an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) rating of -0.16. It utilizes innovative features such as ‘energy piles’ for heating and cooling, solar panels, and extensive use of wood in construction. The facade is clad with reclaimed azobe wood, and the structure incorporates 330 cubic meters of wood, sequestering about 300 tons of CO₂. The project has gained recognition for its approach to sustainable urban living, winning the Amsterdam Architecture Prize in 2023. De Warren serves as a model for environmentally friendly, community-oriented housing in dense urban settings, demonstrating the potential of cooperative living and sustainable design in modern cities. For us, the pilot was a circular permaculture farm the collective built in southern Portugal ten years earlier, which was the breeding ground for the idea. De Warren was realized after winning a municipal tender from the City of Amsterdam, in response to both the housing crisis and the climate crisis. With us as the project developers, the project was financed through a mix of funding from German GLS Bank, sustainability funds and subsidies, crowdfunding, and the sale of bonds. The building is collectively owned by an association of residents. There is no private ownership: residents are their own landlords, homes cannot be sold on the private market, and all 36 units are permanently secured within a social and mid-rent housing model. The cooperative operates through a non-hierarchical governance structure inspired by holacracy. Every resident holds a mandate and contributes towards running the community within our social architecture (food forest and coop, internal subsidy systems, etc.) The development process was documented in a film, which was created as a practical toolkit in the hopes of supporting the replication of cooperative, sustainable housing projects.

Saturday, 7 March 2026

Isabelle Stengers is generally critical of instrumentalism, though her position is more nuanced than a simple rejection. Her work in the Philosophy of Science argues that reducing science to a mere instrument for prediction, control, or technological application misunderstands how scientific practices actually produce knowledge.

Below are the key elements of her view.


1. What “Instrumentalism” Means in This Context

Instrumentalism—here referring to the philosophical position Instrumentalism—treats scientific theories as tools for predicting and manipulating phenomena, rather than as attempts to describe reality.

In an instrumentalist view:

  • Scientific theories are useful models.

  • Their value lies in successful prediction or practical control.

  • Whether they are “true” descriptions of the world is considered irrelevant.


2. Stengers’ Main Concern: Instrumentalism Flattens Science

Stengers argues that instrumentalism oversimplifies what scientists actually do.

For her, science is not merely about producing tools. It involves:

  • creating new ways of posing problems

  • establishing constraints imposed by phenomena

  • developing experimental practices that force researchers to respond to the world

She often describes science as a process where nature “answers back.”

In other words, scientific practice is not purely instrumental manipulation; it involves being forced to acknowledge something real and resistant in the world.


3. Her Idea of “Reciprocal Capture”

A recurring idea in Stengers’ philosophy is that scientific knowledge emerges through what she calls reciprocal capture between:

  • researchers

  • instruments

  • theories

  • phenomena

Scientists attempt to control or isolate phenomena, but those phenomena also constrain and reshape the scientists’ theories.

This makes science neither:

  • pure discovery of objective truth
    nor

  • mere instrumental manipulation.

Instead, it is a negotiated process between humans and the world.


4. The Political Problem with Instrumentalism

Stengers is also concerned about the political consequences of instrumental thinking.

If science is seen only as a tool for control, it becomes easy to justify:

  • technocratic authority

  • domination of nature

  • disregard for alternative forms of knowledge

She argues that science should instead be understood as one practice among others that creates obligations to the phenomena it studies.

This connects to her collaborations with thinkers like Bruno Latour and her engagement with science studies.


5. Her Alternative: “Ecology of Practices”

Rather than instrumentalism, Stengers proposes an idea she calls an “ecology of practices.”

This means:

  • different knowledge practices (science, politics, indigenous knowledge, activism) each have their own constraints and values

  • none should simply dominate the others

  • scientific knowledge should be understood within a pluralistic ecosystem of practices

Science remains powerful and valuable—but not merely as a tool of control.


In Short

Stengers’ position can be summarized as:

  • Instrumentalism captures one aspect of science (its usefulness).

  • But it misrepresents science if taken as the whole story.

  • Scientific practice is better understood as a dynamic interaction between researchers and the world that constrains them.

Friday, 6 March 2026

There isn’t a single group you can credit for sewage systems, water filtration, and roads. Historically they emerged from a mix of public institutions, engineers, and collective investment, usually organized by governments or civic authorities rather than private firms alone.

Here’s the broad picture.


Sewage systems

Large-scale sewer systems were mostly created through public health reforms in cities.

A famous example is the London sewer network built after the Great Stink, when the smell and disease from the polluted Thames forced Parliament to act.

The modern London sewer system was designed by:

  • Joseph Bazalgette

It was funded by public taxation and government authority because the cost and coordination required were enormous and the benefits were shared by everyone.

Similar public sanitation systems spread across Europe and North America during the 19th–20th centuries to combat diseases like:

  • Cholera


Water filtration

Modern water treatment also developed mainly through municipal public works.

A key breakthrough came with the first large-scale filtered municipal water supply in:

  • Paisley in 1804.

Later, chlorination dramatically improved safety. One of the first sustained uses was in:

  • Jersey City in 1908.

These systems were generally run by city governments or publicly regulated utilities because clean water is considered a public health necessity.


Roads

Road building has existed since ancient states.

Some of the earliest large networks were constructed by:

  • Roman Empire

Roman roads were built and maintained by the state to support administration, trade, and military movement.

Modern highway systems are typically funded and coordinated by governments. A famous example is the U.S. interstate system created under:

  • Dwight D. Eisenhower
    through the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956.


Why governments often build these

Infrastructure like sewers, water systems, and roads has characteristics economists call public goods or natural monopolies:

  • extremely expensive to build

  • benefits spread across the whole population

  • difficult to run multiple competing networks

Because of that, they are usually built through public planning and taxation, though private contractors often construct them.


So the short answer:
We have civil engineers, public health reformers, and government-funded infrastructure programs to thank—supported by taxpayers and organized through states and municipalities.

Private industry often helped build them, but the coordination, funding, and long-term maintenance were typically public responsibilities.



If we focus specifically on things organized or coordinated primarily by governments or civic authorities, there are several systems comparable in importance to sewers, water systems, and roads. These tend to be large-scale infrastructure or institutions that require collective coordination.

Here are some of the most significant.


Public health systems

Governments created large-scale systems to prevent disease and protect population health.

Examples include:

  • vaccination programs (for diseases like Smallpox and Polio)

  • sanitation standards

  • disease surveillance and epidemiology

A major milestone was the global eradication campaign led by the World Health Organization that eliminated smallpox in 1980.


Public education

Mass literacy and schooling systems were largely created through government policy in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Universal education dramatically increased:

  • literacy

  • technical skills

  • scientific capacity

Many countries introduced compulsory schooling laws during this period to build an educated population.


Electrical infrastructure

Large-scale electricity networks—power plants, transmission lines, and national grids—required massive coordination and regulation.

In many countries governments built or heavily regulated the grid because it functions as a natural monopoly.

For example, rural electrification in the United States expanded rapidly under the Rural Electrification Administration during the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt.


Scientific research funding

Governments fund a large share of foundational scientific research.

Many technologies that later became commercial products originated in publicly funded programs, including:

  • the internet through DARPA

  • satellite navigation through United States Department of Defense which developed Global Positioning System

  • space exploration through NASA

These programs were funded because the benefits were too uncertain or long-term for private investment alone.


Legal and institutional frameworks

Markets themselves rely on systems created and maintained by governments, including:

  • contract law

  • property registries

  • courts

  • regulatory standards

These systems allow large-scale economic coordination and reduce uncertainty in transactions.


Disaster and safety infrastructure

Governments also organize systems that protect people from large-scale risks, such as:

  • flood control and dams

  • emergency response services

  • aviation safety systems

  • weather forecasting

National meteorological agencies and disaster management authorities operate these systems.


In summary:
The most comparable contributions are large collective systems such as:

  • public health infrastructure

  • universal education

  • electricity and utility networks

  • foundational scientific research

  • legal frameworks for markets

  • safety and disaster management systems

These tend to be areas where coordination, scale, and shared benefits make collective organization through governments or civic institutions especially effective.

The comment you shared is a clear, well-structured defense of capitalism, but it also relies on several assumptions and rhetorical moves that critics would challenge. It’s persuasive in style, but philosophically it’s not as airtight as it presents itself. Here’s a balanced breakdown.


1. What the comment does well

Clear intuitive examples

The coffee shop and desert island examples are meant to show a simple idea:

  • Access to capital (tools, machines, businesses) increases productivity.

  • Working with existing resources is usually better than starting from nothing.

This reflects a real idea in economics: capital accumulation increases productivity. In mainstream economics, workers generally earn higher wages when they have better tools, technology, and infrastructure.

So the basic point—capital can make labour more productive—is valid.


2. Where the argument becomes controversial

It frames the choice unrealistically

The comment presents the worker’s choice as:

  • A) Work with nothing

  • B) Work for the capitalist

Critics argue that this ignores other possibilities, such as:

  • Worker cooperatives

  • Public ownership

  • Shared ownership of capital

  • Stronger bargaining power for workers

Socialist arguments usually claim the real choice is constrained by existing property relations, not that workers literally prefer poverty.


“Capitalists invested their labour”

This is a key claim in the comment.

But critics say ownership usually doesn’t come only from personal labour. In reality it often comes from:

  • inherited wealth

  • investors

  • accumulated profits

  • financial markets

So the argument assumes the owner personally built the factory with their own labour, which is not typically how modern corporations work.


The “voluntary transaction” claim

The comment says capitalist transactions are voluntary.

Critics respond that voluntary doesn’t always mean equal power.

Example:

  • If you must work to survive and the only jobs pay very little, you technically “choose” them — but the choice is constrained.

This is the core Marxist argument about structural coercion, not literal slavery.


3. The “profit flows downward” argument

The smartphone example tries to show that consumers gain far more than companies.

There’s some truth here:

Economists call this consumer surplus — the value you get beyond what you paid.

But critics would respond that this doesn’t address distribution of production profits, which is what socialist critiques usually focus on.

Different question:

  • How much value do workers create?

  • How much of that value do they keep?


4. The “biological reality” argument

The comment says needing food and shelter is natural and unrelated to oppression.

That’s partly true — survival needs are biological.

But critics say the political issue is who controls access to the resources needed to meet those needs.

For example:

  • Land ownership

  • Housing markets

  • Wage levels

So the disagreement is about institutional structures, not about biology itself.


5. The rhetorical style

The comment uses several classic debate techniques:

  • Simplified scenarios (desert islands)

  • False dichotomies (nothing vs capitalism)

  • Appeals to common sense (“people with half a brain”)

  • Moral framing (“you invested nothing”)

These make the argument feel powerful, but they also oversimplify complex economic systems.


6. The deeper philosophical divide

The disagreement really comes down to two different views of property and production.

Capitalist view

Ownership is justified because:

  • someone invested labour or capital

  • voluntary exchange creates mutual benefit

Socialist view

Ownership of production should belong to:

  • the workers collectively

  • society as a whole

because labour creates value.


Bottom line

The comment is a strong rhetorical defense of capitalism, and some of its points (productivity of capital, consumer surplus) are economically valid.

But it also:

  • simplifies the worker’s choices

  • assumes owners created capital personally

  • avoids questions about power, inequality, and distribution.

So it’s persuasive as an argument, but not a definitive refutation of socialism.


If you're interested, I can also show you something fascinating: why both sides of this debate often talk past each other, and why economists, Marxists, and libertarians all define “profit” and “value” differently. That’s actually where most of the confusion comes from.


The commenter says: 'So as a capitalist customer if you buy a smart phone from Apple you make a profit of $499,999,500 which is a lot more than Apple's measly profit of $50'. But if you buy groceries at a consumer co-op you pay about the same as you would elsewhere, no?

Yes—your intuition is pointing at a real weakness in the commenter’s argument.

Their smartphone example relies on a concept economists call consumer surplus (the value you get beyond what you paid). But they misapply it, and your co-op example exposes why.


1. The “$500 million to build your own iPhone” claim

The commenter says:

  • If you had to build an iPhone yourself it would cost ~$500M

  • Apple sells it for ~$1,000

  • Therefore you gain ~$499,999,000 in “profit”

This is misleading because consumer surplus isn’t calculated that way.

The real comparison is:

  • the maximum price you’d personally be willing to pay for the phone

  • minus the price you actually pay

Example:

  • You might be willing to pay £1,200 for an iPhone

  • Apple sells it for £1,000

Your consumer surplus = £200, not millions.

The “build it yourself” scenario is not how economists measure value.


2. Your consumer co-op example

You’re right: if you buy groceries at a consumer cooperative, prices are usually similar to normal stores.

Examples include organizations like:

  • Co‑operative Group

  • Park Slope Food Coop

In those systems:

  • customers collectively own the store

  • profits are either small or returned as dividends

  • prices remain roughly market level

Why?

Because prices are mostly determined by market competition and costs, not just by ownership structure.

So the commenter’s claim that consumers capture massive profit doesn't depend on capitalism specifically. It happens in any efficient large-scale production system.


3. The real source of the benefit

What actually creates the huge benefit compared with “doing everything yourself” is:

division of labour and specialization

This idea was famously described by:

  • Adam Smith

When people specialize:

  • some design chips

  • some mine lithium

  • some assemble phones

  • some ship them

This massively increases productivity regardless of whether firms are:

  • capitalist corporations

  • worker co-ops

  • state enterprises


4. The commenter’s hidden assumption

The argument quietly assumes:

complex production requires capitalist ownership.

But that’s a separate claim, not proven by the example.

Historically we’ve seen large production systems under different ownership models:

  • capitalist corporations (e.g. Apple Inc.)

  • worker cooperatives (e.g. Mondragon Corporation)

  • state firms

  • mixed systems

All can benefit from specialization.


So your co-op observation is basically correct:

  • Consumers don’t get giant “profits” because firms are capitalist.

  • They benefit mainly from mass production and specialization, which exist under multiple ownership systems.


If you want, I can also explain the deeper mistake in the commenter's argument that economists call the “Robinson Crusoe fallacy.” It’s a common mistake in debates about capitalism and socialism and shows up directly in their island example.



You mean the Robinsonade fallacy, or the 'state of nature' posited in liberal thought?

Yes—those are closely related ideas, and you’re pointing to the right intellectual tradition.

1. The Robinsonade fallacy

The term comes from “Robinson Crusoe–style” stories used in economics and philosophy.

The critique was developed by thinkers like Karl Marx, who used the word “Robinsonades” to describe theories that explain economic systems by imagining isolated individuals starting from scratch.

The problem, according to the critique, is that:

  • Real economies are social and historical systems

  • Property rights, wages, markets, and firms already exist

  • Explaining them by imagining lone individuals on islands smuggles in assumptions about ownership and exchange

The YouTube comment’s desert island example is exactly this type of reasoning.


2. The connection to the state of nature

What you’re noticing is that Robinsonades resemble the state-of-nature thought experiments used in early liberal political philosophy.

For example:

  • Thomas Hobbes

  • John Locke

  • Jean-Jacques Rousseau

These philosophers imagined humans before society and government to justify different political conclusions.

Locke in particular argued:

  • individuals gain property rights by mixing their labour with nature

That idea appears almost verbatim in the comment’s line about building a farm or factory and therefore owning it.


3. Why critics object

Critics say these thought experiments can hide historical realities.

For example, modern ownership of land and capital often emerged through:

  • enclosure of common land

  • colonial extraction

  • state law and enforcement

  • inherited wealth

So critics argue that explaining capitalism as if it emerged from one person building a farm alone ignores those institutional histories.


4. But economists still use simplified models

To be fair, many economists use island or Crusoe-style models intentionally.

For example:

  • Paul Samuelson used Crusoe examples in textbooks

  • They simplify the world to illustrate ideas like trade, production, or opportunity cost.

The difference is whether the model is used:

  • as a teaching simplification, or

  • as a justification for real-world property relations


Bottom line

Yes—the argument in that comment resembles both:

  • Robinsonade reasoning (explaining social systems via isolated individuals), and

  • Lockean state-of-nature reasoning about labour creating property.

The criticism isn’t that such thought experiments are useless, but that they can oversimplify the historical and institutional realities of modern economies.

" The 'norm' = economic slavery to the elites. The truth of this can be seen in the epidemic levels of depression and emptiness...