Friday, 18 September 2026

 Yes. Such a form of philosophical thought is not only possible but has been elaborated in several post-Heideggerian and post-Levinasian trajectories. The tension you describe—mutual implication of Being and ethical responsibility, without neutralizing the Other’s power to contest my ontological claim and my right to occupy the world—is precisely the problem that certain strands of phenomenology, deconstruction, and relational ontology have sought to hold open rather than resolve.

The Classical Tension

Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein treats Being as the fundamental horizon; ethical relations appear derivative or secondary. Levinas inverts this: the face of the Other commands responsibility prior to any ontological comprehension, interrupting my conatus essendi and my right to be. In the starkest reading, ethics is “first philosophy” and ontology is always already a form of totalization or violence. Your question asks whether a third possibility exists: one in which Being and responsibility co-constitute each other, yet the Other retains the capacity to put my very claim to world-occupation into question.

Affirmative Developments

Several lines of thought pursue exactly this mutual implication without subordinating the ethical interruptive force:

  • Levinasian revisions and “ethical ontology.” Later Levinas (especially Otherwise than Being) already complicates the priority thesis. Responsibility is not simply exterior to Being; it is the very modalization of subjectivity as substitution, hostage, and “one-for-the-other.” The subject’s being is already ethical exposure. Yet the Other continues to exceed any ontological recovery: the saying (Dire) remains anarchic relative to the said (Dit). The face still unsettles my place under the sun. Readings that emphasize this (e.g., certain work by Bernasconi, Critchley, or large parts of the “ethical turn”) treat Being and responsibility as mutually implicating while preserving the asymmetrical power of the Other to contest my ontological self-assertion.
  • Derrida’s hospitality and undecidability. Derrida radicalizes the Levinasian interruption while refusing a clean hierarchy. Hospitality is both an ontological condition of being-with and an ethical demand that can never be fully satisfied. The Other arrives as an absolute surprise that puts my home, my laws, and my claim to the world into question—yet this questioning is itself the condition of any possible “Being.” The mutual implication is structural: there is no pure Being untouched by the ethical demand of the arrivant, and no pure ethical relation that is not already a relation of dwelling and place. The right to occupy is permanently unstable.
  • Nancy’s being-with (ĂȘtre-avec). Jean-Luc Nancy’s ontology of singular plurality makes co-existence constitutive of Being itself. There is no solitary existence that later acquires ethical obligations; existence is exposure and sharing. Ethical responsibility is therefore not added to ontology but is the very sense of Being-with. At the same time, the Other remains irreducible: each singular existence is an absolute spacing that cannot be appropriated. The other can always contest the limits of any community or world-sharing I attempt to secure. The mutual implication is ontological; the contestatory power is preserved as the excess of singularity.
  • Ricoeur and dialectical mediation. Paul Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another develops a more dialectical version: the ethical aim of the good life with and for others is intertwined with the ontological structures of selfhood, attestation, and narrative identity. Responsibility is not prior in a simple sense, nor is it merely derivative; the two poles mutually implicate each other through the practical and narrative mediation of action. Yet the Other retains a capacity for contestation that can shatter my narrative self-understanding and my assumed right to the world.
  • Critical and decolonial phenomenologies. Thinkers working in the wake of Fanon, Wynter, or contemporary critical phenomenology often treat the dominant ontology of the world (the “right to occupy”) as already racialized, gendered, or colonial. Being and ethical responsibility are shown to be mutually shaped by historical structures of domination, while the colonized or marginalized Other retains the power to put that ontology into radical question—sometimes by refusing its terms altogether. Here the mutual implication is historicized rather than purely transcendental, but the structure you describe remains intact.

The Persistent Difficulty

The difficulty is structural. If Being and ethical responsibility are too tightly mutually implicating, the Other’s interruption risks being reabsorbed into a more sophisticated ontology (a danger Levinas constantly warned against). If the Other’s power of contestation is absolute, the mutual implication can collapse back into a pure priority of ethics. Successful versions therefore keep a productive asymmetry or undecidability: responsibility is the condition of any coherent claim to Being, yet the Other always exceeds the system that tries to integrate that responsibility. The right to occupy the world is never secured once and for all; it remains permanently exposed to the question that comes from elsewhere.

In short, the form of thought you describe is not only conceivable; it is one of the central ambitions of much late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century continental philosophy. It requires holding open the tension rather than dissolving it into either a pure ontology of Being or a pure ethics of the Other.

grok

 Yes, it is true. Spatial ability (also called spatial intelligence, spatial skills, or spatial thinking) is one of the strongest and most consistently documented cognitive predictors of achievement, interest, and attainment in STEM fields, even after accounting for mathematical and verbal ability.

Key evidence

Large-scale longitudinal studies spanning decades and hundreds of thousands of participants show that spatial ability measured in adolescence (around age 13) predicts later STEM educational credentials and careers over and above math and verbal scores. Adolescents with higher spatial ability relative to verbal ability are especially likely to enter and succeed in STEM.

Childhood measures also predict outcomes: stronger spatial skills in 4th grade increase the likelihood of choosing STEM college majors years later, both directly and indirectly through later math achievement and motivation, after controlling for verbal skills, motivation, and family background.

Cross-sectional and correlational work links spatial skills to performance in specific STEM domains (engineering design and problem-solving, chemistry, physics/kinematics, mathematics, geology, etc.). The association is often moderate (e.g., around r ≈ .36 with math performance in meta-analyses) and remains after controlling for general intelligence or fluid reasoning.

Why the link exists

STEM disciplines rely heavily on visualizations—diagrams, graphs, 3D models, molecular structures, maps, number lines, engineering drawings, etc. Spatial thinking helps people mentally rotate, transform, and organize information in space, which is central to understanding and solving problems in these fields. Spatial skills appear especially important early in learning (as a “gateway”) and can become less rate-limiting once expertise develops specialized mental representations.

The association is stronger in some STEM areas (e.g., engineering, chemistry) than others (e.g., certain biology topics that rely less on mental visualization).

Causality and trainability

Most evidence starts correlational, but experimental and quasi-experimental studies show that targeted spatial skills training improves STEM course grades, STEM GPAs, and retention (with particularly notable benefits for women in engineering). Meta-analyses confirm spatial skills are moderately malleable (average training effect ~0.4–0.5 standard deviations), with transfer to other spatial tasks and, in many cases, to mathematics performance.

In short, spatial ability is not the only factor in STEM success (motivation, opportunity, prior knowledge, and other cognitive skills matter), but the link is robust, predictive beyond general ability, and actionable through training and early experiences (e.g., play with blocks, puzzles, and spatial toys).

Object-based spatial skills involving mental manipulation and visualization of shapes and objects are the kinds most consistently linked to later STEM success in children. Navigation or large-scale spatial orientation skills show weaker or less consistent unique prediction once other factors are controlled.

Main categories that predict STEM outcomes

Spatial ability is multi-faceted. Researchers often classify skills along dimensions such as intrinsic vs. extrinsic (object-focused vs. relating objects to the environment or self) and static vs. dynamic (fixed vs. involving transformation/movement). The strongest childhood predictors of STEM achievement and major choice fall in the intrinsic-dynamic and related visualization domains:

  • Mental rotation and mental folding/transformation: The ability to mentally turn, fold, or reconfigure 2D or 3D shapes. These predict science achievement (including physics and biology) in 7- to 11-year-olds even after controlling for verbal ability and age. Mental folding has emerged as a particularly strong unique predictor.
  • Spatial visualization and object assembly/manipulation: Skills measured by tasks such as Block Design (constructing patterns with colored blocks), paper folding, pattern assembly, 2D/3D drawing, or copying designs with LEGO/tangrams. These form part of an “object manipulation” domain that shows the strongest associations with STEM grades and degree choice in longitudinal data, remaining predictive after accounting for general intelligence and verbal ability.
  • Spatial scaling: Judging or transforming relations across different scales (e.g., relating a small model or map to a larger space). This extrinsic-static skill uniquely contributes to science scores (especially biology and chemistry) in middle childhood.

Early measures of these skills matter. Spatial assembly ability at age 3 (e.g., accurately copying shapes or LEGO structures) predicts math readiness at age 5. Mental transformation skills around age 5 predict later calculation performance, partly through better number-line understanding (a spatially organized representation of magnitude).

Evidence linking childhood skills to STEM

  • Middle childhood (around 4th grade): Broader spatial skills (often indexed by Block Design or similar tests) directly predict later choice of STEM college majors, above and beyond concurrent math/verbal achievement, motivation, and family background. They also operate indirectly by boosting intervening math achievement and motivation. High spatial performers in 4th grade show substantially higher odds of entering math-intensive STEM majors.
  • Broader pattern: Object-manipulation skills (mental rotation, drawing, assembly) tend to outperform pure navigation or map-reading measures as predictors of STEM educational outcomes. All major spatial domains correlate with STEM, but object-focused ones show the most robust unique links.

What is less strongly linked

Large-scale navigation or wayfinding ability correlates with spatial cognition overall but contributes less unique variance to STEM success in the available data. Everyday spatial awareness (e.g., simply knowing where things are in a room) is related but not the primary driver identified in predictive studies.

Practical note

These skills are moderately malleable. Activities that build mental rotation, visualization, and assembly—such as construction toys, puzzles, block play, spatial language, or targeted training—show benefits that can transfer to math and science performance. The predictive power appears early and persists, making childhood a useful window for both assessment and support.

Thursday, 17 September 2026

The Edible Coast

The first person to eat sand was probably a child, which is not meant as an insult to children, although it will inevitably sound like one, because there is something about the sentence the first person to eat sand was probably a child that seems to require the child in question to be stupid. He was not necessarily stupid. She might not even have been a she. Nobody knows. What we know is only that, at some point in the long and mostly undocumented history of human ingestion, a human being put sand into a human mouth and did not immediately spit it out.

The important thing is that the sand stayed down.

This was initially considered a medical emergency.

Then it wasn't.

Then it became lunch.

The discovery that human beings could digest sand did not, as you might imagine, cause civilization to collapse overnight. Civilization is surprisingly reluctant to collapse, mostly because collapsing civilization requires an administrative infrastructure that is difficult to maintain during a collapse. There were committees. There were conferences. There were PowerPoint presentations with titles like SAND: THREAT OR RESOURCE? One particularly influential paper, published in the Journal of Nutritional Adaptation, demonstrated that an adult human could survive indefinitely on certain types of coastal sand, provided the sand contained sufficient mineral diversity and was consumed in quantities that were, initially at least, described as “psychologically challenging.”

People hated this phrase.

There was a protest about it.

The protest lasted three days.

Then everyone went to the beach.

I should say here that my father had always hated beaches, which was strange because he had grown up beside one. He said the sand got everywhere, though this was obviously true of sand and therefore not a particularly useful criticism. He said beaches were places where people went to expose themselves to weather and strangers simultaneously, which he considered a suspicious combination. When I was eight he took me to the coast once, and I remember him sitting on a concrete wall with his shoes still on while I dug a hole beside him. I asked him what he thought was at the bottom of the sea. He said, “More sea.” I remember this because I thought it was funny, although I didn't laugh.

He died before the sand became edible.

This fact became strangely important to me.

Not because I wanted him to live long enough to eat sand. The idea of my father eating sand is actually horrifying, partly because I can picture the exact expression he would have made after the first mouthful: suspicion first, then reluctant concentration, then the tiny nod he gave when something had exceeded his expectations but had not yet earned praise. I can see him doing it. I can hear him saying that the texture was “not ideal,” as though he had been appointed to review the coastline.

What bothered me was that the world had discovered, after his death, that the thing he had complained about his entire life was enough.

That seemed unfair.

Not cosmically unfair. I don't mean that. The universe has no obligation to arrange its revelations around the emotional schedules of individual people. But there was something personally offensive about it. My father had spent fifty-eight years believing that survival required groceries, money, a house, shoes, petrol, work, and a refrigerator that made a worrying noise but could not be replaced because the replacement would cost too much.

Then suddenly none of it mattered.

You could just eat the beach.

I found myself thinking about this whenever I watched people grazing.

This was how the old world ended, more or less: not with fire or plague or nuclear winter but with teachers realizing that they had lost the authority to prevent children from eating the landscape.

The supermarkets lasted longer.

This surprised everyone.

People continued going to supermarkets for years after they no longer needed to. They would push carts through aisles containing thousands of objects whose original purpose had become obscure. Pasta. Breakfast cereal. Toothpaste. Those little plastic containers of hummus.

Hummus survived especially long.

There was something about hummus that people couldn't emotionally abandon.

At the time nobody understood why.

Years later, anthropologists would discover that the attachment had less to do with nutrition than with the memory of choosing something. Before sand, choosing what to eat had been one of the small daily dramas of being alive. You stood in a shop and looked at twelve kinds of bread and felt, for perhaps three seconds, that your preference mattered.

The beach had no such drama.

There was just sand.

Endless sand.

You could eat it in the morning. You could eat it at midnight. You could eat it while talking to someone, while crying, while getting married, while waiting for a bus that no longer existed.

Eventually people stopped building houses.

Why would you?

The beach was already there.

This was the part that frightened the architects.

Architects, after all, are people professionally committed to the proposition that a human being ought to live inside a shape designed by another human being. The disappearance of this requirement caused something like a theological crisis. There were conferences. There were manifestos. One famous architect proposed that people build enormous concrete shells over beaches so that they could continue experiencing the psychological benefits of having walls.

Nobody listened.

By then the beaches were crowded with grazers.

At dusk they moved slowly along the shore, millions of them, heads lowered, taking handfuls or simply putting their faces into the sand and chewing.

From a distance it looked peaceful.

Up close it was not.

There was always the sound.

The tiny sound of grains of quartz being masticated.

I remember this because my father hated that sound too, although he had never actually heard it.

Sometimes I think that was what the beach really meant.

Not freedom.

Not abundance.

Just the disappearance of the need to go anywhere.

And if that sounds beautiful to you, you have probably never stood on an empty beach at three in the morning, with the tide coming in, and realized that you are no longer hungry, no longer employed, no longer needed anywhere, and that there is, quite literally, enough of the world beneath your feet to keep you alive forever.

llm


Yes—and I think that actually makes the story more interesting, because then the narrator's anxiety about the beach could be wrong.

The story currently leans toward: remove necessity → remove meaning. But you could reverse it:

Remove necessity → remove coercion → give people genuine freedom → people finally have time to discover what they actually want.

In that version, the beach isn't an existential wasteland. It's the first genuinely post-scarcity human environment.

The psychological interpretation changes

The key distinction would be between meaning and necessity.

Our narrator assumes that people need difficulty in order for life to matter. But maybe that's a psychological bias produced by living under scarcity.

Imagine someone who doesn't have to work 50 hours a week to afford food or rent. They might initially feel lost. But after that period of adjustment, they could discover that they actually want to:

  • make music
  • raise children
  • explore
  • build things
  • study
  • fall in love
  • tell stories
  • play
  • care for other people
  • sit on a beach doing absolutely nothing

The important thing is that these activities become chosen rather than compulsory.

And that would radically change the meaning of "grazing."

Instead of:

Humans have become animals because they no longer need civilization.

It becomes:

Humans have finally become free enough to decide what civilization is actually for.

The supermarket becomes beautiful instead of tragic

This is where I'd alter the interpretation of the supermarket passage.

People don't keep going because they're desperately nostalgic for scarcity.

They go because choice survives even after necessity disappears.

Someone might walk into an abandoned supermarket, pick up a jar of hummus, and realize:

"I don't need this. I want this."

That's a much more profound distinction.

Under scarcity, desire and necessity get tangled together.

You eat because you're hungry.

You work because you'll starve otherwise.

You live somewhere because you need shelter.

You choose a career because you need money.

But the sand separates those things.

Now you can ask:

What would I choose if I didn't have to?

That's potentially an enormous psychological liberation.

And the father becomes tragic in a different way

The father still dies before the discovery, but now the narrator's grief changes.

Instead of thinking:

My father's whole life was meaningless because none of those necessities were necessary.

The narrator might eventually realize:

My father spent his whole life doing things he didn't have to do—and perhaps that is precisely what made them meaningful.

He worked, loved, complained about beaches, raised a child, bought groceries.

The fact that those things were necessary doesn't explain their value.

Their value might have been that he chose them anyway.

That makes the father's life more meaningful, not less.

And there's a beautiful irony available here: the father hated beaches because he thought they represented useless leisure. After the revolution, the beach becomes the place where everyone finally has permission to be useless.

And perhaps that's exactly what humans had been missing.

The ending could become genuinely utopian

Instead of the final image being millions of people wandering around aimlessly, you could have the narrator realize that the people on the beach aren't lost.

They're simply no longer in a hurry.

Children graze while adults talk. Somebody is building something out of driftwood. Somebody else is teaching themselves the violin. Two people are lying beside each other doing nothing at all. Someone has spent six years trying to understand a particular species of shell.

Nobody needs to justify any of it economically.

And the narrator initially finds this horrifying because they've inherited the old assumption that if you're not producing something, you're wasting time.

Then they remember their father.

His shoes on the concrete wall.

His complaint about sand.

The question about what lies beneath the sea.

“More sea.”

And finally the narrator understands that perhaps the mistake was assuming that a life needs to be necessary in order to be worthwhile.

The beach doesn't destroy meaning.

It destroys the need to justify meaning.

That's a much more optimistic—and philosophically richer—story.



The supermarket, when I finally went back, no longer felt tragic. I picked up a jar of hummus and understood, for the first time, the difference between needing something and wanting it. Under scarcity the two had been tangled so tightly they were almost the same word. The sand had cut them apart. Now you could ask the question that scarcity had made almost impossible: what would I choose if I did not have to?

My father’s life looked different in that light. He had worked, loved, complained about beaches, raised a child, bought groceries, kept a noisy refrigerator running past its natural lifespan. The fact that those things were necessary does not explain why they mattered. Their value may have been that he did them anyway—that he chose them under constraint. The beach simply removes the constraint. It does not remove the possibility of choice; it multiplies it.




The first fence appeared on a Tuesday.

Nobody was worried.

It was a very good fence.

This is worth mentioning because bad fences announce themselves. They are ugly, temporary things, wire and posts, the sort of fence that seems embarrassed to exist. This one was different. It was low and white and almost elegant, with a little wooden sign at the entrance.

COASTAL CONSERVATION AREA

Below that, in smaller letters:

PLEASE HELP US PROTECT THIS RESOURCE.

People thought this was sensible.

By then we had already learned that not all sand was equally good.

This had been expected, though nobody had expected how quickly the differences would become important. Some sand gave you everything you needed. Some made you sick. Some was too coarse. Some was deficient in particular minerals. Some, according to the new laboratories, contained microorganisms that had not previously been considered part of the human diet.

The best sand was pale and fine and slightly damp.

My sister liked the grey sand.

She said it had a better taste.

I thought this was impossible.

“You can't taste minerals.”

“I can.”

“You've never tested it.”

“I don't need to test it.”

She put another handful into her mouth.

For a while, this was how science worked.

Then the scientists arrived.

They began taking samples.

There were machines now, little machines with plastic tubes that disappeared into the beach and came back carrying portions of it in transparent bags. The bags were labelled. The labels had numbers. The numbers became rankings.

A magazine published a list.

THE TWENTY BEST BEACHES FOR GRAZING.

Number one was a beach three hundred miles from where we lived.

Within six weeks there was a waiting list.

Within three months there were hotels.

Within a year you needed a permit.

People complained.

Then they bought the permits.

The permits were not expensive at first.

That was important.

If they had been expensive, everyone would have noticed.

Instead there were small fees. Administrative charges. Conservation contributions. Seasonal access passes.

There was a website.

The website explained that the purpose was not to restrict access but to ensure sustainable use.

This was true.

The beach was becoming crowded.

People were eating it.

There was less of it than before.

Or perhaps there wasn't less of it, exactly. The sea was constantly bringing more sand in and taking some away. Nobody understood the arithmetic well enough to say whether we were consuming the beach faster than geology could replace it.

But somebody did the arithmetic.

Then somebody else owned the arithmetic.

And after that, things changed.

My sister's beach was designated a protected mineral zone.

She laughed when she heard.

“Protected from what?”

I said I didn't know.

“Us, presumably.”

The next morning there was a gate.

There were two guards.

The guards were polite.

This was also important.

They weren't soldiers. They weren't frightening. One of them was a woman who had gone to school with my sister.

She recognized us.

“Sorry,” she said.

“It's all right,” my sister said.

“It isn't me.”

“I know.”

The guard looked embarrassed.

“New regulations.”

My sister pointed toward the beach.

“There are people eating sand.”

“I know.”

“We're people.”

“I know.”

“So?”

The woman looked at the sign.

Then back at us.

“I can let you through this once.”

My sister shook her head.

“No.”

She took my arm.

We walked away.

Three days later, the government announced that certain beaches contained unusually high concentrations of essential minerals and therefore required controlled access.

The announcement said this was for public health.

There were charts.

The charts were convincing.

Nobody wanted people eating contaminated sand.

That was reasonable.

Nobody wanted children eating contaminated sand.

That was reasonable too.

The problem was that the safe beaches were increasingly the beaches behind fences.

People began talking about certified grazing.

There were certified beaches.

Certified sand.

Certified spoons.

Someone invented a little card that showed your recommended daily mineral intake.

You could have your grazing profile assessed.

There were people who knew their profiles to six decimal places.

There were people who traveled with their own sand.

There were people who refused to eat anything uncertified.

And then there were the people who ate whatever they found.

These people were called wild grazers.

At first this was affectionate.

Then it wasn't.

The wild grazers were blamed for erosion.

They were blamed for spreading bacteria.

They were blamed for ruining the beaches for everyone else.

Someone said they were eating irresponsibly.

Someone else said they were stealing from future generations.

The strange thing was that both sides believed they were protecting something.

Nobody stood up in a room and said:

I would like there to be less freedom because freedom is inconvenient to me.

Nobody needed to.

They said:

“We need standards.”

“We need accountability.”

“We need to protect quality.”

“We need to make sure everyone gets their fair share.”

And then someone asked who would enforce the standards.

This was the easy part.

The companies already existed.

The companies had laboratories.

The companies had lawyers.

The companies had the software.

The companies knew which sand was good.

The companies could tell you which beach you were allowed to eat from.

The companies could even tell you how much.

My sister refused to register.

She continued going to the grey beach.

By then it was illegal.

We went at night.

There were no fences there yet.

That was how you knew it was still free.

We would walk down after midnight, when the coast was empty, and sit in the dark.

Sometimes she ate.

Sometimes she didn't.

One night she said, “Do you remember when nobody owned sand?”

I said yes.

“Do you remember when people thought that was boring?”

I laughed.

She didn't.

“I think that was the dangerous part.”

“What?”

“That we got used to it.”

The sea was almost completely black.

Far away, lights moved along the coast.

Construction.

More fences.

More hotels.

More laboratories.

The next morning the government announced that the grey beach had been classified as environmentally unstable.

No grazing would be permitted.

There was a photograph of the beach accompanying the announcement.

It looked exactly the same.

This was how I began to understand that scarcity did not necessarily require the absence of a thing.

It only required someone to stand between you and the thing.

My father would have understood this immediately.

He had spent his whole life paying for access.

Access to a house.

Access to transport.

Access to food.

Access to education.

Access to time.

I used to think money bought things.

Now I understood that money mostly bought permission.

The sand had frightened the old world because it had removed the permission structure.

For a little while, you could simply kneel down and eat.

Nobody had to approve it.

Nobody had to measure it.

Nobody had to certify it.

Nobody had to sell it to you.

And perhaps that was what could not be tolerated.

Not the abundance itself.

The lack of an intermediary.

My sister looked at the dark water.

“What do you think they'll do next?”

I knew the answer, although I didn't know why I knew it.

“They'll sell us the beach.”

She laughed.

“No.”

“What?”

“They'll sell us the idea that there is no beach.”

I didn't understand.

She stood and brushed sand from her knees.

“They'll make us afraid of the free stuff.”

Then she walked down to the water.

I followed.

For a moment there was nothing except the two of us and the enormous unowned dark.

She crouched.

Put her hand into the sand.

Lifted it.

She looked at me.

Then she ate.

I did too.

It tasted like sand.

Which, at the time, still felt like a kind of miracle.


Wednesday, 16 September 2026

 Yes — but with an important qualification: “left-libertarian” gets closer than “right-libertarian,” but “anarchist” or, more precisely, “anarchist sympathiser” is probably the most faithful description of Scott's mature position. He himself was reluctant to accept even that label unqualifiedly.

If I had to put him on your list, I'd rank the descriptions conceptually like this:

  1. Anarchistic / anarchist sympathiser — strongest
  2. Left-libertarian — broadly useful, but somewhat imprecise
  3. Centrist-libertarian — misleading
  4. Right-libertarian — quite misleading

Why "anarchist" is actually defensible

Scott explicitly developed what he called an “anarchist squint” or “anarchist lens.” His Yale biography lists anarchism among his principal areas of research, alongside political economy, peasant politics and resistance.

And Two Cheers for Anarchism is quite explicit about the attraction:

voluntary cooperation without hierarchy

Scott celebrates local knowledge, ordinary people's practical intelligence, autonomy and resistance to imposed hierarchies.

His intellectual starting point is therefore quite different from classical liberal individualism. He isn't primarily saying:

"Leave individuals alone because individual liberty is the highest value."

He's closer to:

"Be extremely suspicious when an institution claims the authority to organise other people's lives from above, particularly when it discounts their own situated knowledge and capacity for self-organisation."

That's a recognisably anarchist argument.


But he isn't a conventional anarchist

This is where the qualification matters.

Scott explicitly said that abolishing the state isn't realistically or theoretically an option, and argued that states can sometimes play emancipatory roles. He therefore doesn't fit comfortably into a straightforward anti-state anarchist tradition.

His position is roughly:

Don't assume hierarchy is necessary. Don't assume the state is benign. Don't assume the state is always the enemy either.

That's quite different from an orthodox anarchist programme of state abolition.

In fact, in the interview Yale reproduced, Scott describes himself as an “anarchist sympathizer” rather than simply declaring himself an anarchist.

And this ambivalence is not accidental. A recent scholarly analysis of Scott's anarchism identifies precisely this tension: he is deeply influenced by anarchism while simultaneously allowing for circumstances in which state institutions can have emancipatory functions.


Is he "left-libertarian"?

Yes, if we're using the term in the broad political-theory sense.

Scott is emphatically not a right-libertarian in the Hayek/Rand/Nozick/anarcho-capitalist sense.

This is particularly clear because Scott explicitly distanced himself from libertarianism that tolerates or encourages large inequalities of wealth, property and status.

That's a crucial distinction.

His suspicion of the state doesn't translate into a celebration of unrestricted private property or laissez-faire capitalism.

His underlying sympathies are much closer to:

  • egalitarianism
  • local autonomy
  • decentralisation
  • mutual aid
  • worker/producer autonomy
  • small-scale communities
  • resistance to domination
  • practical knowledge
  • suspicion of concentrated power.

So "left-libertarian" is considerably better than "right-libertarian."

But I still wouldn't make it his primary label.


There's an interesting relationship with Hayek

This is particularly relevant to our discussion of the Architects Sketch.

Scott and Hayek actually share a surprisingly important epistemological insight:

No central authority possesses all the knowledge necessary to successfully organise a complex society.

But they draw rather different political implications from it.

Hayek

Hayek says, roughly:

Knowledge is dispersed → central planning cannot process it → decentralised markets are therefore extraordinarily valuable.

Scott

Scott says something more like:

Knowledge is dispersed → central authorities cannot process it → beware states, bureaucracies and large organisations imposing abstract schemes on local communities.

But Scott's alternative isn't simply:

"Therefore, let the market do it."

He is interested in commons, informal cooperation, subsistence economies, customary practices, local institutions, mutual aid and autonomous communities.

That puts him much closer to Kropotkin than to Hayek.

And this is another reason I'd resist calling him a conventional libertarian.


Kropotkin is probably the most revealing comparison

Peter Kropotkin is an especially good intellectual comparator.

Kropotkin's Mutual Aid challenged the idea that social order necessarily requires hierarchical command.

The basic proposition is:

Cooperation can emerge spontaneously from below.

Scott's anthropology repeatedly discovers something similar.

People don't necessarily need someone at the top telling them how to coordinate.

They often already possess elaborate systems of cooperation that are:

  • informal,
  • locally adapted,
  • historically evolved,
  • difficult for outsiders to see,
  • difficult to represent bureaucratically.

This is essentially the positive counterpart to Seeing Like a State.

The state sees:

illegible complexity

Scott sees:

locally intelligent social order.

That's profoundly anarchistic.


And this brings us back to the Architects Sketch

This actually strengthens our earlier interpretation considerably.

The architect represents top-down rationality.

Scott's political instinct is to ask:

What knowledge has the architect failed to see?

The architect has:

  • plans,
  • measurements,
  • professional expertise,
  • technical vocabulary,
  • institutional authority.

But the people who actually inhabit the building have:

  • practical knowledge,
  • experience,
  • tacit knowledge,
  • local adaptations,
  • knowledge of consequences.

Scott's fundamental suspicion is that the first group will often dismiss the second as noise.

And that is precisely what makes the Python sketch potentially political.

The architects aren't necessarily stupid.

They simply possess the wrong epistemology.

They believe that the relevant knowledge is the knowledge contained in the plan.

Scott's response would be:

The plan is necessarily an abstraction from reality. Don't confuse legibility with understanding.


There's also a fascinating connection to Jane Jacobs

Scott was particularly fond of Jane Jacobs, and this makes the architectural connection even stronger.

Jacobs' The Death and Life of Great American Cities was essentially a revolt against the high-modernist planner's conception of the city.

The planner sees:

buildings → streets → traffic → population densities → zoning

Jacobs sees:

people → encounters → informal surveillance → local economies → spontaneous adaptation → neighbourhood life.

The city isn't merely an object that can be designed.

It is a complex emergent system.

Scott treats Jacobs as an example of the kind of anarchist sensibility he finds valuable.

And suddenly the Architects Sketch looks almost like a Jacobs/Scott satire of the planner's mind.


So I'd put Scott here

If we constructed a two-dimensional political map:

More hierarchicalMore decentralised
More egalitarianDemocratic socialism / social democracyScott / Kropotkin / communal anarchism
More market-orientedClassical liberalismHayek / some libertarian traditions
More authoritarianState socialism / fascism

Scott sits firmly toward the decentralised + egalitarian quadrant.

But he's not a doctrinaire anarchist.

His characteristic position is more:

Anarchism as an epistemological and political suspicion rather than a comprehensive blueprint for society.

And that last phrase is important.

Scott is almost anti-blueprint.

He doesn't want to replace the state's grand blueprint with an anarchist grand blueprint.

He thinks the very desire for a grand blueprint is part of the problem.

That's why I think “anarchist sceptic of hierarchy and high-modernist planning” is actually a more precise description than any conventional left/right label.

And it gives us a very nice connection to the Python sketch:

The architects believe society can be designed.
Scott asks whether society might instead need to be allowed to organise itself.

That's a much deeper opposition than simply left versus right.

 Yes — I think that is an important correction to the previous analysis. The macro/social scale is actually where the sketch becomes most interesting, whereas the interpersonal psychology of the characters is relatively thin. The characters are almost deliberately types rather than psychologically developed individuals.

The sketch is fundamentally about institutions, social organisation and the attempt to make society rationally intelligible and controllable.

And there is one thinker I would add to the earlier list who may actually be the key to the whole thing: James C. Scott.

The sketch as a miniature model of society

The basic structure of the sketch is worth noticing.

The architects aren't primarily being mocked as people. They represent a social position:

the people who have been authorised to design reality for everyone else.

That makes the architectural setting unusually significant.

An architect doesn't merely describe the world. An architect produces a representation of a future world—a plan, model, specification—and then attempts to make physical reality conform to it.

That is exactly the kind of relationship between representation and reality that becomes politically significant at societal scale.

And this is where Scott's Seeing Like a State becomes almost uncannily relevant.


James C. Scott: society as something to be "designed"

Scott's central concept is legibility.

Large institutions need to make a complicated world comprehensible to themselves. They therefore simplify it into categories:

  • maps
  • statistics
  • plans
  • classifications
  • measurements
  • administrative units
  • standardised procedures
  • models.

Scott's argument isn't that simplification is inherently bad. Governments and other large organisations couldn't function without it.

The problem arises when:

the simplified representation is mistaken for the reality it represents.

Scott uses examples ranging from forestry and agricultural planning to urban design and state social engineering. He is particularly interested in what he calls "high modernism": confidence that society can be rationally redesigned by sufficiently knowledgeable planners.

And architecture is one of his central examples.

He discusses Le Corbusier as an archetype of high-modernist planning: the aspiration to rationalise the city on an enormous scale, treating urban life almost as an engineering problem.

That gives us an extraordinary way of reading the Python sketch.

The miniature architectural models sitting in the sketch aren't merely props.

They can be understood as a metaphor for the modern state's relationship to society.

The model is:

neat
bounded
comprehensible
geometrical
controllable.

Society is:

messy
contingent
historically accumulated
unpredictable
full of local knowledge and conflicting purposes.

The comedy begins when the first is treated as though it were the second.


The really important distinction: "designing a building" versus "designing society"

This is where the sketch scales upward.

An architect can legitimately say:

"This is how the building should be."

But that logic becomes much more problematic when transferred to:

"This is how people should live."

And then further:

"This is how a city should function."

And ultimately:

"This is how society should be organised."

That progression takes us into the intellectual history of modernity.

You can see versions of it in:

  • urban planning,
  • social engineering,
  • economic planning,
  • bureaucratic administration,
  • public-health systems,
  • educational systems,
  • welfare administration,
  • colonial administration,
  • industrial management,
  • population statistics.

The common aspiration is:

make the world legible → model it → optimise it → intervene in it.

The Architects Sketch is funny because it reduces that enormous civilisational ambition to something ridiculous.


The Soviet Union, BrasĂ­lia and the dream of the planned society

Scott's analysis becomes especially relevant when we look at twentieth-century examples.

Consider BrasĂ­lia.

It was conceived as a radically planned capital, designed principally by LĂșcio Costa and Oscar Niemeyer, with an enormous emphasis on formal order, monumental architecture and rational spatial organisation.

From above, the city makes extraordinary sense.

It is legible.

It is diagrammatic.

It looks like something that has been designed.

But actual human life is considerably less geometrical.

The same broad problem appeared in very different political systems: planners could design physical environments according to rational principles, but people would subsequently use those environments in ways the plan didn't anticipate.

This is Scott's crucial distinction between formal knowledge and what he calls mētis—practical, situated knowledge.

The planner knows:

"Here is how the system ought to work."

The inhabitant knows:

"Here is how this thing actually works."

And those aren't necessarily the same thing.


That makes the sketch a satire of "high modernism"

This is, I think, a much more precise interpretation than simply calling it "absurdist."

The sketch is attacking a particular cultural faith:

If sufficiently intelligent experts analyse a problem, reality can be rationally designed into submission.

That's high modernism in Scott's sense.

And the architects are almost perfect representatives of it because architecture gives physical form to the ideology.

The building is supposed to embody rationality.

But then reality intrudes.

And the Python mechanism is essentially:

Plan → reality → discrepancy → attempt to rationalise discrepancy → greater discrepancy → institutional absurdity.

That pattern can operate at enormous social scales.


Weber: the machine of rationality

This brings us back to Weber, but now we can make the point more precise.

Weber's concern isn't that modern society becomes irrational.

It's almost the opposite.

It becomes extraordinarily rational in particular dimensions.

We become exceptionally good at:

  • calculation,
  • measurement,
  • prediction,
  • administration,
  • categorisation,
  • standardisation.

But Weber also saw the danger that rationalised systems could acquire a life of their own.

The classic metaphor is the "iron cage": human beings increasingly inhabit systems whose rules they themselves have constructed but which subsequently constrain them.

So imagine society as a gigantic architectural project.

Nobody individually designed the entire thing.

But everyone operates according to its specifications.

That is the macro-level version of the Python joke.


Foucault: the architect becomes the state

And here Foucault takes us somewhere different.

Foucault's concept of governmentality is particularly useful.

Modern power doesn't necessarily operate primarily by saying:

"Do this or I'll punish you."

It increasingly operates through systems that organise the field in which people act:

  • schools,
  • hospitals,
  • prisons,
  • planning systems,
  • statistics,
  • examinations,
  • professional standards,
  • urban design,
  • public-health regimes.

The environment itself becomes a mechanism of governance.

Architecture therefore isn't merely decorative.

To design space is partly to design behaviour.

A school can be designed around surveillance.

A prison can be designed around visibility.

A city can be designed around traffic flows.

An office can be designed around productivity.

A housing estate can be designed around particular assumptions about family and community.

And so the architect becomes, metaphorically, a figure of social power.

The deeper Pythonian joke could therefore be:

Who authorised these people to decide what reality should look like?


Henri Lefebvre: space isn't neutral

I'd add another thinker here: Henri Lefebvre, particularly The Production of Space.

Lefebvre argues that social space isn't simply an empty container in which society happens.

Society produces space, and space in turn structures social relations.

That gives architecture enormous sociological significance.

A road layout determines movement.

A housing development determines patterns of interaction.

A workplace determines visibility and hierarchy.

A city centre determines who can occupy particular spaces and when.

So when the architects in the Python sketch treat architecture as an abstract technical activity, there's a much larger question lurking underneath:

Who gets to decide the physical form of collective life?

That is a political question even when nobody uses explicitly political language.


The macro-scale version of the absurdity

At individual scale:

"Why has this architect done something so stupid?"

At institutional scale:

"Why didn't anyone notice?"

But at societal scale the question changes:

"Why does modern society repeatedly create systems in which apparently rational decisions can aggregate into irrational outcomes?"

That's much more interesting.

And it doesn't require incompetent individuals.

In fact, the really disturbing possibility is:

Everyone can be behaving rationally according to their institutional role.

The planner optimises the plan.

The engineer optimises the engineering.

The accountant optimises the budget.

The manager optimises the performance indicator.

The regulator checks compliance.

The politician responds to incentives.

The citizen adapts to the system.

And yet the aggregate outcome can be absurd.

That's a classic problem in social theory.


Friedrich Hayek: knowledge that cannot be centralised

This also connects unexpectedly well to Friedrich Hayek.

Hayek's critique of central planning wasn't simply that planners were unintelligent. Quite the opposite: his argument was that the knowledge required to coordinate a complex society is distributed among millions of people and situations.

A central planner cannot possess all the relevant information.

Someone knows:

  • what works locally,
  • what people actually want,
  • which resource is scarce,
  • which arrangement has evolved historically,
  • which apparently minor detail matters enormously.

Much of this knowledge isn't easily reducible to a spreadsheet.

That's strikingly similar to Scott's mētis.

So there is a fundamental tension:

centralised formal knowledge

versus

distributed practical knowledge.

The architect's drawing is formal knowledge.

The lived building is practical knowledge.

And the Python sketch is, among other things, a comedy about what happens when the former becomes contemptuous of the latter.


But there's a fascinating political irony here

We shouldn't turn this into a simplistic:

experts bad / ordinary people good

argument.

That would miss the point.

Modern society needs experts.

You want someone who actually knows structural engineering designing a bridge.

You want epidemiologists contributing to pandemic policy.

You want architects who understand building science.

You want statisticians who understand statistical inference.

You want engineers rather than crowdsourcing the load-bearing capacity of a building.

Scott himself isn't simply arguing for ignorance or against expertise.

The problem is epistemic overreach:

the belief that one form of knowledge is sufficient to capture the whole system.

That's much subtler.


Which brings us to Niklas Luhmann

If we want to get really sociological, Niklas Luhmann offers an almost perfect macro-theoretical framework.

Luhmann sees modern society as differentiated into semi-autonomous systems:

  • politics,
  • law,
  • economics,
  • science,
  • medicine,
  • education,
  • media, etc.

Each operates according to its own internal logic.

Law asks:

legal / illegal?

Science asks:

true / false?

Economics asks:

profitable / unprofitable?

Politics asks:

government / opposition?

Medicine asks:

healthy / pathological?

The problem is that reality doesn't necessarily respect these boundaries.

A single social problem can simultaneously be:

  • economically disastrous,
  • legally permissible,
  • scientifically uncertain,
  • politically advantageous,
  • medically dangerous.

Each institution sees the problem through its own code.

That is extraordinarily close to the logic of the Python sketch.

The architect sees:

an architectural problem.

The client sees:

a financial problem.

The regulator sees:

a compliance problem.

The engineer sees:

a technical problem.

The inhabitant sees:

a bloody building that doesn't work.

No individual perspective necessarily encompasses the whole.


And that might be the deepest meaning

So I would now reformulate the central philosophical proposition of the sketch.

It isn't:

"Experts are fools."

Nor even:

"Bureaucracy is absurd."

It is closer to:

Modern society produces increasingly sophisticated systems for representing reality, but the representations are always partial. Trouble begins when an institution mistakes its partial representation for reality itself.

That is why architecture is such a brilliant setting.

The architectural model is literally a representation.

It is a miniature world.

And once you have a miniature world, you can begin believing that you've understood the real one.

Scott's formulation is particularly powerful here: administrative maps deliberately simplify the world according to what matters to the administrator; the danger comes when those simplifications are treated as though they exhaust the reality being governed.


There's also a very British dimension

The sketch's setting matters historically.

It comes from 1970, right in the middle of Britain's postwar encounter with large-scale planning, bureaucracy and modernist architecture. The sketch first appeared in Monty Python's Flying Circus episode 17, "The Buzz Aldrin Show."

Britain had experienced an enormous expansion of:

  • council housing,
  • comprehensive planning,
  • public administration,
  • modernist architecture,
  • large infrastructure projects,
  • professionalised social services.

The postwar state had acquired unprecedented capacity to design and administer social life.

And there was an increasingly visible gap between the utopian rhetoric of modern planning and the experience of people actually living amid some of its concrete manifestations.

So Python's absurdity has a very specific historical resonance.

It's not merely:

"Look at these funny architects."

It's:

"Look at what happens when the people who believe they can rationally organise the world encounter the world itself."


And that takes us back to the macro/micro distinction you raised

I think you're right that interpersonal psychology is largely secondary.

The characters don't need rich inner lives because they function almost like nodes in a social system.

Their individual personalities are less important than their institutional positions.

That's why I would put the analytical levels roughly like this:

Micro:
Why is this person behaving absurdly?

Meso:
Why does this organisation behave absurdly?

Macro:
Why does modern society repeatedly generate organisations whose locally rational behaviour can produce globally irrational outcomes?

The third question is where the sketch gets genuinely philosophical.

And then you can trace a remarkable intellectual lineage:

Weber → rationalisation and bureaucracy

Hayek → dispersed knowledge

Foucault → expertise and governmentality

Lefebvre → socially produced space

Luhmann → autonomous institutional systems

Scott → legibility and high-modernist planning

Bauman → bureaucratic modernity and moral distance

with Kafka and Camus supplying the literary/existential vocabulary for what it feels like to inhabit such a system.

The particularly Pythonian insight is that the absurd is not necessarily the opposite of rationality.

It can be rationality multiplied.

Everyone follows the rules.

Everyone performs their function.

Everyone uses the appropriate vocabulary.

Everyone has a reason.

And somehow, collectively, the building ends up being upside down.

That, I think, is the macro-societal philosophical core of the sketch.

  Yes. Such a form of philosophical thought is not only possible but has been elaborated in several post-Heideggerian and post-Levinasian t...