Saturday, 3 October 2026

 Radical Ontic Structural Realism (ROSR) is a metaphysical position in the philosophy of science asserting that structure is all that exists, and objects or individuals are metaphysically eliminable. [1, 2, 3]

Core Ideas
  • Elimination of Objects: Unlike moderate structural realism—which allows for "thin" objects or items that only possess relational properties—ROSR claims there are no fundamental things, particles, or individuals at the base of reality, only free-standing relations. [1, 2, 3, 4]
  • Relations Without Relata: ROSR famously argues for "relations without relata", meaning the web of physical or mathematical structure exists independently of any things being related. [1, 2, 3]
  • Structuralist Existence Monism: Recent reformulations (such as Aiden Meyer's work) reframe ROSR through Spinozist monism, where the entire universe is viewed as a single, foundational world-structure, and everyday perceived "objects" are treated merely as modes or states of that structure. [1, 2]
Key Objections
  • The "Relations Require Relata" Charge: Critics argue it is conceptually incoherent to have a relation if there is nothing being related. Proponents often respond that "it’s relations all the way down," or that higher-level relational structures substitute for traditional objects. [1, 2, 3]
  • Account of Plurality: Critics question how an object-free, purely relational cosmos can account for the distinct, everyday plurality of medium-sized dry-goods (like tables, chairs, and individual people) that we experience. [1, 2]
If you'd like, I can:
  • Contrast Radical Ontic Structural Realism with Moderate Ontic Structural Realism
  • Explain how quantum field theory or spacetime state realism is used to defend ROSR


Phenomenological realism is a philosophical position that rejects Edmund Husserl’s later transcendental idealism in favor of the view that the objects of consciousness exist independently of the mind that perceives them. [1, 2]
Core Concepts
  • Independence of Reality: Unlike transcendental idealism—which holds that objects are constituted by or dependent on consciousness (noemata)—phenomenological realism maintains that the noumenon (the thing-in-itself) exists objectively and independently of human awareness. [1]
  • Back to the Things Themselves: Proponents took Husserl’s early motto ("zu den Sachen selbst") literally, arguing that we can directly know the real essences and existence of things rather than just phenomena inside consciousness. [1]
  • The Munich and Göttingen Schools: Early students of Theodor Lipps (such as Adolf Reinach, Johannes Pfänder, Max Scheler, and Roman Ingarden) split from Husserl after he adopted an idealist framework in Ideas I (1913), forming the core of realist phenomenology. [1, 2]
Key Figures
  • Adolf Reinach: Applied realist phenomenology to the a priori foundations of civil law and developed theories of social acts.
  • Max Scheler: Pioneered a material value-ethics based on the objective, independent existence of moral values.
  • Hedwig Conrad-Martius: Explored the ontology of real beings, nature, and the self as a central voice in early realist circles.
  • Josef Seifert: Modern champion of the tradition who explicitly advocates a return to knowing the "thing-in-itself". [1, 2, 3, 4]
Would you like to explore how phenomenological realism differs specifically from Husserl's transcendental idealism, or look into the work of a particular figure like Max Scheler or Adolf Reinach?

 Sure. The combination problem usually refers to a problem in philosophy of mind, especially concerning panpsychism.

The basic idea

Panpsychism says that consciousness, or some very basic form of experience, is a fundamental feature of reality.

For example, suppose an electron has some extremely simple form of experience. Your brain contains roughly \(10^{27}\) particles.

The question is:

How do all these tiny individual experiences combine to produce one unified human experience?

That's the combination problem.

An analogy

Imagine you have millions of tiny speakers, each producing its own sound.

You might think that if you put them together, you'd get one coherent piece of music. But that's not necessarily true. You could simply have millions of independent sounds occurring simultaneously.

Likewise, if:

  • particle A has experience \(E_A\)
  • particle B has experience \(E_B\)
  • particle C has experience \(E_C\)
  • ...

why should these experiences combine into one experience—your experience of seeing a red apple?

Why wouldn't there instead be:

"particle A experiences this, particle B experiences that, particle C experiences something else..."

with no single subject experiencing the whole thing?

The deeper problem

There are actually two related questions:

  1. Combination: How can many small experiences combine into a larger experience?
  2. Subject combination: How can many individual subjects become one subject?

The second is particularly difficult.

Suppose Alice and Bob each have their own consciousness. Putting Alice's brain next to Bob's brain doesn't seem to create a new person who experiences both Alice's and Bob's experiences.

So what makes the particles in your brain different?

Why do their experiences belong to one unified subject—"you"?

Why this matters

The combination problem is one of the major challenges for constitutive panpsychism.

Panpsychism has an attractive answer to the "hard problem" of consciousness:

If consciousness is already fundamental, we don't have to explain how completely non-conscious matter somehow produces consciousness.

But it appears to inherit another problem:

If everything is already conscious, how do all those little consciousnesses produce the single, unified consciousness we experience?

So there's a kind of trade-off:

Physicalism:

How does unconscious matter produce consciousness?

Panpsychism:

How do many conscious entities combine into one consciousness?

And neither question is obviously easy.

A famous example

Imagine three particles:

A: experiences red
B: experiences green
C: experiences blue

Even if we somehow put them together, what would the resulting experience be?

Would there be a fourth experience:

"I experience red + green + blue as one unified scene"?

If so, where did that unified experience come from?

And if there isn't such a fourth experience, then the combination hasn't really explained why a brain gives rise to a single conscious perspective.

That's the heart of the combination problem.

"They absolutely don’t care about us, even the people around us, most of the time, don’t give a damn, let alone random rich people. They just see most poor humans as useless eaters taking up space".

 A limited symptom attack (LSA) or limited symptom panic attack is a milder form of panic attack where a person experiences fewer than four of the standard DSM-5 panic symptoms. [1]

Key Characteristics
  • Symptom Count: Involves 1, 2, or 3 panic symptoms (such as a racing heart, trembling, dizziness, or a sudden fear of dying) instead of four or more. [1, 2, 3, 4]
  • Duration: Typically peaks within 10 minutes and can last from 1 to 5 minutes, or persist as part of a waxing and waning episode for several hours. [1]
  • Context: They frequently occur in people with panic disorder, phobias, or agoraphobia, and are commonly experienced by individuals recovering from or undergoing treatment for panic disorder as symptoms decrease in intensity. [1, 2]
  • Impact: Even though they involve fewer symptoms, they can still cause significant distress, physical discomfort, and worry. Learn more about symptom criteria through the Anxiety & Depression Association of America. [1, 2]

 "If somebody can't afford decent housing, telling them that: 'less is more' might actually get you punched in the face, in certain circumstances. Because sometimes, less is definitely less."

FM

 Sure. The clearest way to answer this is to use the UK under Margaret Thatcher as the case study, since it is one of the most important examples of neoliberal reform.

1. What problems existed beforehand?

By the late 1970s, Britain had several serious economic problems:

  • High inflation: inflation reached about 27% in 1975, though it had fallen considerably by 1979.
  • Low productivity growth: British industry was often less productive than major competitors such as West Germany, France and the US.
  • Frequent industrial disputes: strikes and confrontations between governments and trade unions were a major feature of the 1970s.
  • Weak economic growth: Britain had experienced relatively poor growth and repeated "stop-go" cycles.
  • Large and inefficient state-owned industries: sectors such as coal, steel, railways and telecommunications were substantially state-owned.
  • Fiscal and external pressures: Britain experienced a serious financial crisis in 1976 and required an IMF loan, although the crisis was not simply caused by excessive public spending.

So there were genuine economic problems requiring reform. The important question is whether the particular reforms Thatcher chose were necessary to solve them.


2. What reforms were introduced?

Thatcher's governments pursued a fairly broad transformation:

ReformWhat happened
Monetarist policyInterest rates were raised and monetary policy was used to reduce inflation
PrivatizationState-owned companies such as British Telecom, British Gas and British Airways were sold
Trade-union reformLaws restricted secondary action, strengthened balloting requirements and changed union liability
Financial deregulationThe 1986 "Big Bang" substantially changed London's financial markets
Tax reformIncome-tax rates were reduced while indirect taxation became more important
DeregulationVarious controls on businesses and markets were reduced
Council-house salesTenants were given the right to buy many council properties
Reduced subsidiesGovernment support for some industries was reduced
Greater competitionCompetition was promoted in areas previously dominated by state monopolies

These weren't one single policy. They were a package of reforms, and it's important not to treat them as if they were all equally necessary.


3. Which reforms were arguably necessary?

There is a stronger case for some reforms than others.

Controlling inflation

This is probably the clearest example.

Britain had experienced repeated episodes of high inflation, and bringing inflation down was an important economic objective.

However, the fact that inflation needed to be reduced doesn't prove that every aspect of monetarist policy was necessary.

The government could have pursued disinflation through different combinations of:

  • monetary policy,
  • incomes policy,
  • wage bargaining,
  • fiscal policy,
  • exchange-rate policy.

So:

Problem: inflation was genuinely serious.
Need for action: high.
Necessity of Thatcher's precise method: much more debatable.


Reforming inefficient state industries

There was also a legitimate argument for improving state-owned enterprises.

Some state industries suffered from:

  • low productivity,
  • overstaffing,
  • political interference,
  • inadequate investment,
  • weak incentives to reduce costs.

But privatization was only one possible solution.

Alternative approaches included:

  • restructuring public companies,
  • giving managers greater autonomy,
  • introducing competition while retaining public ownership,
  • partial privatization,
  • employee ownership.

Thus:

"The state industries needed reform" does not logically imply "they needed to be privatized."

That's an important distinction.


4. Which reforms were more ideological or politically chosen?

This is where the distinction becomes particularly useful.

Privatization

There was an economic case for increasing competition and improving management.

But selling state assets was not economically inevitable.

A government could have kept British Telecom or British Gas publicly owned while restructuring them and introducing competition.

Privatization therefore involved a political/ideological choice about the appropriate role of the state, in addition to an economic argument about efficiency.


Trade-union reform

Britain's industrial relations genuinely had problems.

But there were different ways to address them.

Thatcher's government chose legislation that significantly shifted the balance of power between unions, employers and government.

That was not simply a technical economic reform. It reflected a particular political conception of:

  • individual bargaining,
  • collective bargaining,
  • property rights,
  • union power,
  • the role of the state.

So industrial-relations reform was arguably necessary; the exact Thatcherite form of it was a political choice.


Tax cuts

The government reduced the top rate of income tax substantially.

There was an economic argument that high marginal tax rates could discourage work, investment and entrepreneurship.

But there was also an ideological argument:

Should the government redistribute income extensively through taxation, or should individuals retain more of their income?

There isn't an objective economic theorem that determines the answer.

The need to maintain sustainable public finances is one thing; the choice of a particular distribution of taxation is another.


5. The biggest issue: could Britain have reformed without neoliberalism?

This is ultimately the most interesting question.

Yes.

There was nothing inevitable about Britain following exactly the Thatcherite path.

Consider two hypothetical alternatives.

Alternative A: Social-democratic reform

Britain could have retained more public ownership while:

  • restructuring inefficient industries,
  • increasing managerial independence,
  • investing in technology,
  • improving vocational training,
  • reforming industrial relations,
  • introducing competition,
  • maintaining stronger welfare provision.

This would still have involved substantial economic reform without full-scale neoliberalism.

Alternative B: Thatcherite reform

The actual government pursued:

  • privatization,
  • deregulation,
  • weaker unions,
  • lower direct taxation,
  • greater reliance on markets,
  • reduced state ownership.

Both approaches could recognize that Britain's economy had serious problems.

The disagreement was over how far markets should replace government direction.


6. What happened afterward?

The reforms had both significant successes and significant costs, and their effects differed across groups and regions.

Inflation was brought down dramatically after the severe early-1980s recession. Productivity growth subsequently improved, and Britain's economy became more market-oriented and financially integrated.

But the adjustment was extremely disruptive.

Unemployment rose above 3 million in the early 1980s. Manufacturing employment declined dramatically, and many industrial communities experienced long-term economic and social disruption.

Regional inequality also became an important issue, with economic activity increasingly concentrated in London and parts of southern England.

So the historical debate isn't really:

"Did neoliberalism fix an economy that was completely broken?"

versus

"Did neoliberalism destroy a perfectly functioning economy?"

Neither description captures the evidence particularly well.

A better interpretation is:

Britain had genuine structural and macroeconomic problems in the 1970s. Some substantial reforms were necessary. But the particular combination of privatization, deregulation, union reform, tax changes and reduced state intervention was a political choice among several possible reform strategies.


7. A useful way to distinguish "necessary" from "ideological"

You can evaluate each policy by asking three questions:

1. Was there a real problem?

For example, high inflation → yes.

2. Did the government need to do something about it?

High inflation → yes.

3. Did solving the problem require this particular policy?

Inflation → no. There were multiple possible approaches.

That gives us:

PolicyProblem was real?Reform necessary?Particular neoliberal solution inevitable?
Reduce inflationYesYesNo
Reform inefficient industriesYesGenerallyNo
Improve industrial relationsYesYesNo
Increase competitionOftenOftenNo
Privatize state firmsSometimesNoNo
Weaken trade-union powerIndustrial relations problem existedNot necessarilyNo
Reduce top income-tax ratesSome economic argumentsNoNo
Financial deregulationFinancial markets needed modernizationNot necessarilyNo

That distinction is probably the best way to think about neoliberalism generally.

The existence of an economic crisis can make reform necessary without making one particular ideology necessary.

 While the classic "reject versus affirm" framing belongs largely to existentialism, the Age of Reason and the Anglo-American analytical and empirical traditions approached the value of life through different conceptual toolkits. Rather than framing existence as an ontological crisis of cosmic affirmation or denial, they interrogated the calculus of happiness, the limits of human reason, and the empirical verification of meaning.

1. The Age of Reason (Rationalism)

Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rationalists sought to ground existence in clear, distinct ideas and logical necessity, viewing life not as a tragic burden to be endured or a dramatic theater of absurdity, but as a structure to be understood and optimized through reason.

  • Baruch Spinoza (Amor Dei Intellectualis): Spinoza offers the rationalist analogue to Nietzsche's amor fati. For Spinoza, everything that occurs does so with the absolute necessity of divine substance (Deus sive Natura). To reject life, sadness (tristitia), or suffering is to suffer from inadequate ideas—failing to see reality sub specie aeternitatis (under the aspect of eternity). True intellectual love of God is the ultimate affirmation of reality as it is rationally structured.

  • Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (The Best of All Possible Worlds): Leibniz famously argued that an all-good, all-powerful creator must have selected the best of all possible worlds. While this provoked Voltaire's savage satire in Candide (rejecting the Panglossian optimism that "all is for the best"), Leibniz maintained that the total sum of perfection outweighs the localized suffering within the system. Reason dictates that existence is fundamentally coherent and rational, even if human finitude cannot trace the full harmony.

2. British Empiricism

Empiricists discarded grand metaphysical frameworks in favor of experience, observation, and utility, treating life's value as an empirical question of pleasure and pain.

  • David Hume (Mitigated Skepticism & Sentiment): Hume dismissed both dogmatic optimism and radical pessimism as flights of metaphysical fancy. For Hume, reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions. Life is not to be abstractly "rejected" or "affirmed" in a cosmic vacuum; rather, it is navigated through custom, sociability, and natural sentiment. If life becomes too heavy, Hume famously defended suicide in his essay Of Suicide as a rational choice when the pain of living outweighs the utility of existence, cutting against both Christian prohibitions and romanticized endurance.

  • Utilitarianism (Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill): Empiricism culminated in the quantitative and qualitative calculus of utility. Life is affirmed if and only if it produces an excess of pleasure (or happiness) over pain. Bentham quantified this mechanically, while Mill introduced qualitative distinctions ("better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied"). For the utilitarian, the rejection of life is a failure of social arrangements or individual circumstance to generate net utility, rather than an existential tragedy.

3. Analytic Philosophy and Logical Positivism

As philosophy shifted toward language, logic, and verification in the twentieth century, analytic thinkers argued that the question "to reject or affirm life" is, strictly speaking, meaningless in a technical sense.

  • Logical Positivism (A.J. Ayer and the Vienna Circle): According to the verification criterion of meaning, statements about the ultimate "meaning," "value," or cosmic justification of life are neither tautologies (like logic and math) nor empirically verifiable facts. Therefore, they are literally nonsensical—emotive expressions of attitude rather than propositions about reality. An analytic philosopher would analyze the grammar of the question: what empirical conditions would falsify an "affirmation" of life? If none, the debate collapses into a matter of psychological preference.

  • Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus): Wittgenstein famously declared that "the solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem." To worry about whether to accept or reject life is to look in the wrong direction; the mystical lies not in how the world is, but that it is. Life is not a problem to be solved or a thesis to be judged, but a boundary condition of language and experience.

Analytic vs. Continental Approaches to Existence

DimensionAge of Reason & EmpiricismAnalytic Philosophy
Primary MethodLogical deduction (Rationalism) or observation of utility/passion (Empiricism).Linguistic analysis, formal logic, verification criteria.
Status of the QuestionAddressed through ethics, political economy, and the calculus of pleasure/pain.Treated as a category mistake or an emotive expression rather than a cognitive proposition.
Stance on SufferingA problem to be minimized via social reform, institutional design, or rational understanding.A clinical or psychological state, or a consequence of conceptual confusion.

  Radical Ontic Structural Realism (ROSR) is a metaphysical position in the philosophy of science asserting that structure is all that exist...