Tuesday, 30 September 2025

 


Knowledge as a Commons and Reciprocal and Participatory Flow 

Elinor Ostrom won the Nobel Prize in Economics for dismantling the cliché of the “tragedy of the commons.” She showed empirically that communities all over the world successfully manage shared resources (like irrigation systems, fisheries, forests) without either privatization or heavy-handed state control. Ostrom’s principles (clear boundaries, participatory rule-making, local enforcement, conflict-resolution mechanisms, nested governance) apply not just to natural resources but also to knowledge.
Knowledge is non-rivalrous (my knowing doesn’t prevent you from knowing), but institutions artificially introduce scarcity. To treat knowledge as a commons is to steward it collectively. Make circulation reciprocal don't just “let them speak.” This is Spivak’s critique in Can the Subaltern Speak? — the problem isn’t only that marginalized groups are silenced, it’s that when they do speak, their voices are filtered, mistranslated, or ignored because dominant structures don’t know how (or refuse) to listen, side-lining local epistemologies that could transform the conversation. Consider disability activism: activists like Mia Mingus critique “the medical-industrial complex” by centering lived experience. Yet institutional knowledge systems discount those (empirical) insights as anecdotal or “soft” compared to clinical data. A reciprocal model means knowledge doesn’t just flow downward from universities, states, and corporations. It moves horizontally and upward, with infrastructures designed to carry and validate marginalized perspectives. Take Participatory Action Research (PAR) for example, where communities set research agendas themselves, instead of being mere “subjects” of study. Circulation isn’t just about more voices in the room. It’s about restructuring the architecture of listening so that those voices shape decisions, norms, and truths. So if Ostrom is about the infrastructure (commons vs. enclosure), Spivak is about the ethics of circulation (reciprocity, not token inclusion). Together, they say: knowledge should move like a commons and be structured to ensure marginalized knowledge actually transforms what counts as “truth.”

LLM

 

Knowledge in Motion: Power, Media, and Circulation

The circulation of knowledge—its production, distribution, and reception—is rarely neutral. Across history and disciplines, thinkers have interrogated who controls knowledge, how it travels, and the power structures it embodies. Examining these dynamics illuminates not only the mechanics of information but also the ethical and political stakes of knowledge itself. Three interconnected questions guide this inquiry: who controls circulation, how media shape what circulates, and what power structures govern knowledge.

Who Controls Circulation? Marx, Gramsci, Bourdieu

The question of control lies at the heart of the political economy of knowledge. Karl Marx argued that knowledge is intimately tied to material relations; the ruling class, by controlling the “means of mental production,” shapes ideology to reflect and perpetuate its interests. Knowledge, in this framework, is not a neutral repository of truth but a tool of social domination, entwined with economic power.

Antonio Gramsci refined this insight with the notion of cultural hegemony. Beyond overt coercion, elites maintain dominance by circulating ideas that appear natural, universal, and commonsensical. Education, literature, and popular culture thus operate as channels for knowledge that reproduces existing social hierarchies. Circulation becomes an instrument of consent, not merely a vehicle for information.

Pierre Bourdieu deepens the analysis by exploring symbolic power in academic and institutional fields. Knowledge is circulated unevenly, privileging those with the appropriate credentials, networks, and cultural capital. Universities, journals, and professional institutions are not neutral arbiters; they mediate who is authorized to speak and whose knowledge is considered legitimate. In this sense, control is exercised subtly through recognition, authority, and institutional gatekeeping rather than solely through economic or coercive power.

How Media Shape What Circulates: Lippmann, Chomsky, McLuhan

Even when knowledge exists, its journey is mediated by forms of communication. Walter Lippmann famously described a world in which individuals encounter only “pseudo-environments”: representations of reality filtered and simplified by media, shaping public perception. Knowledge circulation, therefore, is not merely about access but about distortion, framing, and selective visibility.

Noam Chomsky, in collaboration with Edward S. Herman, formalized this insight in Manufacturing Consent. News, they argue, passes through structural filters—corporate ownership, advertising dependency, reliance on official sources—which systematically privilege elite perspectives. Circulation is engineered to reinforce existing power dynamics, with media acting as both conduit and constraint.

Marshall McLuhan complements these perspectives by emphasizing the medium itself. In “the medium is the message,” McLuhan contends that the form of communication—print, radio, television, digital—shapes not only how knowledge travels but also how it is experienced and understood. The circulation of knowledge is inseparable from the technological and sensory frameworks that carry it, with each medium imprinting its own logic upon information.

Knowledge as Inseparable from Power: Foucault, Haraway, Spivak

Control and mediation intersect with broader structures of power, which determine the legitimacy, authority, and epistemic weight of knowledge. Michel Foucault introduced the notion of “power/knowledge,” showing that knowledge is both an instrument and effect of power. Institutions—from prisons to hospitals to schools—produce and circulate truth in ways that enforce norms, surveil populations, and discipline behavior. Knowledge is thus inseparable from governance and social control.

Donna Haraway, by contrast, interrogates embedded epistemic assumptions. In Situated Knowledges, she critiques the illusion of disembodied, universal knowledge, arguing that knowledge circulates through specific positions, bodies, and contexts. Recognizing the situatedness of knowledge challenges the authority of supposedly neutral forms of circulation, revealing the partiality and contingency of what travels as truth.

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak extends the critique to global hierarchies. She emphasizes that knowledge about marginalized communities often circulates in ways that silence or misrepresent subaltern voices. Knowledge is not only filtered by institutions and media but also structured through colonial and postcolonial epistemic hierarchies. Circulation, in this sense, is not neutral: it reproduces inequalities even as it appears as universal or objective.

Conclusion

Across these frameworks, a coherent pattern emerges: knowledge is never free-floating. It is controlled by economic, cultural, and institutional powers; mediated by technologies and media; and structured by epistemic hierarchies that define what counts as legitimate. Marx, Gramsci, and Bourdieu reveal the social forces controlling circulation; Lippmann, Chomsky, and McLuhan show how media shape perception; and Foucault, Haraway, and Spivak illuminate the power-laden structures that govern what knowledge is recognized, shared, and internalized. Together, these perspectives highlight the ethical and political urgency of critically examining not just what we know, but how it moves through the world.

Fictional Case Studies of Harm from Obstructed Knowledge

  1. Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go
    Ishiguro’s quietly devastating novel stages ignorance as the most intimate form of domination. The students at Hailsham are raised in a fog of omission: teachers skirt around the truth, euphemisms abound, and the children themselves sense but cannot articulate the horror of their future. By the time they “discover” their role as organ donors, their lives are already foreclosed — they have been written into death from the start. Here the link to Mbembe’s necropolitics is striking. For Mbembe, modern sovereignty often governs through abandonment and through the production of “superfluous humanity,” populations maintained only to be expended. Ishiguro makes this abstract insight painfully concrete: ignorance is not an accident but a governing technology, a way of scripting lives into slow-motion death without open violence.

  2. George Orwell’s 1984
    In Orwell’s world, ignorance is not passive but actively manufactured. The Party controls circulation itself: information is endlessly revised, contradictions are institutionalized, and memory is made unstable. Winston Smith’s tragedy lies not only in physical torture but in epistemic collapse — he can no longer distinguish truth from falsehood, or even his own memories from the Party’s fabrications. Where Ishiguro shows ignorance as absence, Orwell depicts ignorance as saturation: too much false knowledge, drowning out truth. Hannah Arendt might be a useful companion here; she argued that totalitarian systems thrive by making reality itself unstable, so that people cannot orient themselves. Winston’s annihilation is less about bullets than about the impossibility of knowing.

  3. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein
    Shelley frames ignorance as social exclusion. The creature is not born monstrous but made so by the absence of recognition and instruction. He learns language by eavesdropping, literature by chance, but never receives the social knowledge necessary to belong. Meanwhile, Victor Frankenstein hoards scientific knowledge, refusing to circulate it responsibly. The violence of the novel emerges from these asymmetries: the hoarding of dangerous secrets on one side, the deprivation of essential human learning on the other. The creature embodies “unhomeliness” — existing in the world but denied a place within it. His violence is the expression of a life structured by ignorance, imposed from without.

  4. Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale
    Gilead institutionalizes ignorance. Women are denied literacy, forbidden to know their bodies, and excluded from any broader sense of history or politics. Knowledge is stratified, and the costs are immediate: the handmaids live in a condition of what Michel Foucault might describe as “biopolitical management,” their reproductive capacities controlled while their epistemic capacities are stripped away. Offred survives not by brute force but by scavenging scraps of illicit knowledge — a smuggled phrase, a whispered rumor. The novel suggests that knowledge itself becomes a form of resistance, and its deprivation, a form of violence.


Synthesis

These novels map the multiple forms harm-through-ignorance can take: Ishiguro’s slow necropolitical scripting of life into death; Orwell’s epistemic saturation and collapse; Shelley’s portrayal of exclusion and withheld recognition; Atwood’s institutionalized deprivation of literacy and autonomy. What unites them is their recognition that ignorance is rarely natural or neutral. It is shaped, cultivated, and enforced — a technology of power that can kill as surely as any weapon.

Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go: Necropolitics of Ignorance

Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go offers one of the most precise literary dramatizations of necropolitics: the way sovereignty manages death not through spectacular killing, but through quiet bureaucratic abandonment. The children at Hailsham are not lied to outright; instead, they are raised in a haze of omissions, hints, and euphemisms. Guardians refer to their futures obliquely, suggesting they will “donate” or “complete,” but never articulating the brutal truth that their lives are already written into death.

What makes the novel so devastating is not that the students never know, but that they know just enough. Kathy, Tommy, and Ruth all sense, from an early age, that something is profoundly wrong — yet they lack the full conceptual framework to name it. Their ignorance is cultivated, carefully managed, and never entirely eliminated. In this, Ishiguro captures exactly what Achille Mbembe identifies as the operation of necropolitics: populations are not merely killed but are condemned to a suspended existence, a “living death,” where they are kept alive only to be expended.

The mechanics of ignorance in Never Let Me Go serve this function perfectly. If the children were told nothing, they might rebel against the shock of revelation. If they were told everything, they might refuse to comply. But by being told just enough, their futures become inescapable. They are socialized into docile compliance, resigned to their fate before they can imagine an alternative. Knowledge here is not absent but dosed — administered like a drug, calibrated to produce obedience.

The harm is twofold:

  1. Physical harm — they are harvested and die young.

  2. Existential harm — their capacity to act, resist, or even fully grieve is foreclosed by ignorance. The novel’s most haunting feature is how calmly the characters accept their fate, not because they lack intelligence, but because they were never allowed to know in a way that could disrupt the system.

In this sense, Ishiguro does not simply write a dystopian allegory of cloning. He writes a parable of necropolitics in modern society, where “superfluous populations” are managed through systems of half-knowledge and bureaucratic opacity. What the students experience at Hailsham is the same logic that governs “organized abandonment” in real-world political economies: lives suspended between living and dying, trapped by the circulation of carefully restricted knowledge.

You said: "relative to that unusual mid-century moment, family stability has declined sharply, and that decline tracks with rising inequality". Is this true, can you perform a cross country analysis that shows whether inequality tracks to family instability/broken homes.


There is substantial evidence that rising economic inequality is associated with increased family instability and the prevalence of broken homes, both in the U.S. and across other countries. Here’s what recent research and cross-country analyses show:

1. Family Instability and Inequality in the U.S.

  • Robert Putnam, in works like "Our Kids" and "Bowling Alone," argues that the decline in family stability—especially among less-educated and lower-income groups—has paralleled rising income inequality since the mid-20th century. He notes that children from less stable families are more likely to experience adverse outcomes, and that family structure is both a cause and a consequence of economic disparities. For example, , children from disadvantaged backgrounds face much greater challenges in terms of family support and social mobility.
  • Academic studies confirm that increasing inequality in family stability (e.g., divorce rates, single parenthood) has mirrored rising wage inequality, contributing to broader household income inequality. Children of less-educated parents are more likely to grow up in unstable family environments, which in turn affects their life chances.

2. Cross-Country Evidence

  • Cross-national research shows that . For instance, or other social factors. The erosion of the middle class and increased polarization in income distribution are linked to higher rates of divorce, cohabitation dissolution, and single parenthood, especially in advanced economies.
  • , and this trend is associated with declines in intergenerational mobility and family stability. The data suggest that as inequality grows, so does the likelihood of children experiencing family disruption, which further entrenches cycles of disadvantage.

3. Mechanisms and Feedback Loops

  • The relationship is bidirectional: , and family instability can worsen inequality (e.g., ). This creates a feedback loop that is hard to break without .

Conclusion:
The evidence supports the claim that rising inequality tracks with family instability and broken homes, both in the U.S. and internationally. This relationship is complex and self-reinforcing, with economic and social policies playing a critical role in either mitigating or exacerbating the trend.

Would you like a deeper dive into specific countries or policy responses?



Excellent question — and a subtle one, because Putnam’s finding about family instability tracking inequality was made in a U.S. context, where inequality rose alongside the decline of industrial employment, union membership, and civic participation — i.e. a specific cultural–economic ecology. So we have to be cautious generalizing globally.

Let’s look empirically and conceptually:


🇿🇦 South Africa

  • Inequality: Among the world’s highest (Gini ≈ 0.63).

  • Family structure: Very high rates of single-parent and “non-nuclear” households — roughly 60% of children live without their biological father, and many households are matrifocal or extended-family based.

  • Context: This does correlate superficially with inequality, but causally, the drivers differ. South Africa’s family patterns are deeply shaped by:

    • the legacy of apartheid’s migrant labor system, which separated men from families for work;

    • urbanization under poverty;

    • social grant systems that reinforce female-headed households’ centrality.

    So while inequality and family instability co-exist, the latter isn’t simply caused by inequality. Both are symptoms of a longer colonial and economic dislocation.


🇻🇪 Venezuela

  • Inequality: Once very high, inequality declined under Chávez (early 2000s) due to redistribution, though it has recently risen again as the economy collapsed.

  • Family structure: Venezuela also shows relatively high rates of single-parent households, but not clearly in proportion to inequality shifts. Data from the early 2000s show family cohesion actually holding steady or improving despite inequality reduction, and family fragmentation increasing again more recently due to emigration and economic collapse — not inequality per se.

    In short: family breakdown seems to track economic insecurity and social collapse, not inequality as such.


🧩 Synthesis

So across these cases:

  • Yes, societies with extreme inequality often exhibit family instability — but

  • No, the correlation is not cleanly causal or universal.

Putnam’s U.S. pattern depends on a particular middle-class cultural baseline that eroded when economic inequality widened and social trust fell.
In South Africa and Venezuela, inequality and instability are both effects of deeper structural ruptures (colonialism, state breakdown, resource dependence), not a single causal chain.


🔍 Summary Table

CountryInequality (Gini)Family InstabilityCausal Link?Key Drivers
U.S.High, risingRising since 1970sStrong correlationWage polarization, loss of community capital
South AfricaExtremely highHigh, longstandingWeak direct causal linkApartheid legacy, labor migration, poverty
VenezuelaVariable (fell then rose)Moderate–high, rising recentlyWeak–contextualEconomic collapse, emigration, insecurity

In short:
Putnam’s claim — that inequality erodes family stability — holds best within stable liberal economies where inequality is a new and growing phenomenon.
In contexts where inequality is historical, structural, or endemic, family systems adapt differently; they may be unstable by middle-class American norms, but functionally resilient in their own terms.

Monday, 29 September 2025

 

The Biology of Tribalism: Deconstructing "Them and Us" in Robert Sapolsky's Behave

In his monumental work, Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst, Robert Sapolsky embarks on an ambitious journey to unravel the intricate biological tapestry that underlies human behavior. A central and recurring thread in this tapestry is the pervasive human tendency to divide the world into "Us" and "Them." For Sapolsky, a neuroscientist and primatologist, this dynamic is not a simple moral failing but a complex biological predisposition, deeply rooted in our neurobiology, shaped by our hormones, and malleable to our culture and context. His exploration reveals that while the impulse to form in-groups and out-groups is ancient and automatic, the boundaries of who counts as "Us" are remarkably fluid, offering a hopeful path toward transcending our most divisive instincts.

Sapolsky begins by grounding "Them and Us" in the deep-seated mechanics of the brain. He explains that the amygdala, our brain's alarm system for threat and fear, activates more strongly when we see faces of an out-group member. This is not a conscious choice; it is a rapid, subconscious neural response. This heightened vigilance towards "Them" is evolution's crude way of saying, "Be careful, that one is different and might be dangerous." This automatic bias is then often overridden or modulated by the prefrontal cortex (PFC), the seat of executive functions like empathy, impulse control, and rational thought. The PFC can essentially tell the amygdala to calm down, assessing whether the out-group individual truly poses a threat. The critical insight here is that the strength of this PFC brake is variable. Under stress, fatigue, or cognitive load, the PFC's influence wanes, and the amygdala's primal "Them" response is more likely to dictate our behavior, leading to snap judgments, prejudice, and dehumanization.

Beyond the brain's structure, Sapolsky delves into the neurochemical soup that fuels tribalism. He highlights the role of the neuropeptide oxytocin. Sapolsky demonstrates that oxytocin's primary function is not to promote general warmth and trust, but to strengthen in-group bonds. It makes us more cooperative, empathetic, and attuned to members of our "Us" group. The dark side of this coin, however, is that it simultaneously makes us more suspicious, dismissive, and even hostile toward "Them" in the out-group. In this light, oxytocin is not merely a chemical associated with bonds or good will; it is a chemical of parochial love, reinforcing the very boundaries that separate human groups. This dual nature explains why feeling a powerful sense of community with one's own team, nation, or tribe can so easily coincide with heightened xenophobia.

Crucially, Sapolsky argues that the criteria for defining "Us" versus "Them" are astonishingly arbitrary and plastic. Our brains are primed to seize on the most minimal of differences to create categories. He cites psychological experiments, such as the famous Robbers Cave study, where boys arbitrarily divided into "Rattlers" and "Eagles" quickly developed intense intergroup hostility, despite having no prior differences. The dividing line can be race, religion, nationality, or something as trivial as supporting a different sports team, preferring a different painting style, or even being assigned a random group number. The brain's categorization machinery is so eager to sort the world that it will latch onto any available marker. This plasticity is both a warning and an opportunity. It warns of how easily demagogues can manufacture an out-group to unite a population, but it also reveals that the walls of tribalism are flimsy constructs, not immutable biological facts.

The most profound implication of Sapolsky's analysis is that seeing someone as "Us" fundamentally changes our neural and empathic response to their suffering. Brain imaging studies show that when we witness a member of our in-group in pain, our own pain-processing regions light up in empathy. When we see an out-group member in similar distress, this empathetic resonance is significantly muted. We literally feel their pain less. This neural deactivation of empathy is the biological bedrock of dehumanization, allowing for indifference and cruelty that would be unthinkable toward one of our own.

However, Sapolsky does not leave us as prisoners of our biology. The entire premise of Behave is that while our baser instincts have deep biological roots, so too do our capacities for compassion, morality, and overcoming those very instincts. He outlines the conditions under which "Them" can be transformed into "Us." The most powerful antidote to tribalism, he argues, is sustained, cooperative contact toward a shared, superordinate goal. Merely being in the same space is not enough; the contact must be cooperative, equal-status, and personally meaningful. In such conditions, the arbitrary boundaries begin to dissolve, and the brain starts to recategorize the former "Them" into a new, expanded "Us." This process actively engages the prefrontal cortex to overwrite the amygdala's initial bias.

In conclusion, Robert Sapolsky's exploration of "Them and Us" in Behave provides a devastatingly coherent biological explanation for one of humanity's most destructive tendencies. He demonstrates that tribalism is not a monolithic monster but a cascade of subconscious neural triggers, hormonal pushes, and cognitive shortcuts. Yet, his message is ultimately one of cautious optimism. By understanding that our brains are built for tribalism but also for plasticity and empathy, we can consciously create societies that foster the latter. The battle between our worst and best behaviors is fought in the space between the amygdala's alarm and the prefrontal cortex's wisdom. Knowing the biological terrain of that battle, as Sapolsky so masterfully maps it, is the first step toward winning it for the side of an ever-expanding "Us."

Deepseek

Sapolsky’s Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst is a sweeping exploration of human behavior, blending neuroscience, psychology, anthropology, and sociology. One of the book’s most compelling themes is the “Us vs. Them” dynamic—a psychological and biological phenomenon that shapes how individuals and groups interact, cooperate, and conflict. Sapolsky’s analysis of this topic is rooted in evolutionary biology, brain chemistry, and social context, offering a nuanced understanding of why humans so readily divide the world into in-groups and out-groups.


The Evolutionary Roots of “Us vs. Them”

Sapolsky argues that the tendency to categorize people into “Us” (the in-group) and “Them” (the out-group) is deeply embedded in human biology. From an . Early humans who cooperated within their groups were more likely to survive and reproduce, while those who trusted outsiders indiscriminately risked exploitation or harm. The brain’s reward systems reinforce in-group loyalty: oxytocin, often called the “love hormone,” strengthens bonds within groups but can also amplify aggression toward outsiders. This duality highlights how biology can both unite and divide us.

Neurological Underpinnings

The brain’s amygdala, prefrontal cortex, and insula play critical roles in processing social identity and threat perception. When we encounter someone from an out-group, the , triggering defensive or hostile reactions. Meanwhile, the prefrontal cortex, responsible for rational thought, may downregulate, making it harder to empathize with outsiders. Sapolsky emphasizes that these neural mechanisms are not fixed; they are malleable and shaped by context, culture, and individual experience.

The Role of Oxytocin

Oxytocin, often celebrated for promoting trust and social bonding, has a darker side. Sapolsky cites studies showing that . This hormone doesn’t just make us more social—it makes us more selectively social, reinforcing the boundaries between “Us” and “Them.”


The Psychology of In-Group Favoritism

Sapolsky explores how quickly and arbitrarily humans form in-groups. Experiments like the (e.g., preferring one color over another) can lead people to favor their own group and discriminate against others. This tendency is not just a product of culture; it is a cognitive shortcut that conserves mental energy. The brain categorizes people automatically, often unconsciously, which can lead to bias and stereotyping.

Dehumanization and Moral Exclusion

One of the most dangerous consequences of the “Us vs. Them” dynamic is dehumanization. Sapolsky discusses how out-groups are often stripped of their humanity in the minds of in-group members, making harm against them feel justified. Historical examples, from wartime atrocities to everyday discrimination, illustrate how . The brain’s capacity for empathy shrinks when faced with someone perceived as fundamentally different.

The Power of Context

Sapolsky stresses that context matters. The same person who is generous and kind to their in-group can become hostile or indifferent to out-groups. Stress, competition for resources, and perceived threats amplify these divisions. Conversely, positive interactions, . This plasticity suggests that while the “Us vs. Them” impulse is innate, it is not inevitable.


Overcoming the Divide

Sapolsky is cautiously optimistic about our ability to mitigate the worst effects of in-group/out-group dynamics. He points to several strategies:

  1. Shared Identities: Creating can expand the definition of “Us” and reduce conflict.
  2. Empathy and Perspective-Taking: Encouraging people to see the world through the eyes of out-group members can bridge divides. Neuroscientific evidence shows that , making out-group members feel more like “Us.”
  3. Institutional Design: Policies and social structures that promote cooperation—such as mixed schools, diverse workplaces, and inclusive media representation—can weaken the “Us vs. Them” reflex over time.
  4. Education and Exposure: Familiarity reduces fear. Sapolsky cites studies showing that .

The Paradox of Human Nature

Sapolsky’s analysis reveals a paradox: humans are capable of both extraordinary cooperation and horrifying violence, often driven by the same biological and psychological mechanisms. . By recognizing its roots in our biology and psychology, we can design interventions that foster inclusivity and reduce conflict.


A Call for Self-Awareness

Behave challenges readers to confront the uncomfortable reality that our noblest and most destructive impulses often stem from the same sources. The “Us vs. Them” dynamic is a part of being human, but it is not our destiny. Sapolsky’s work suggests that by understanding the science behind our social instincts, we can build a world where the , and the line between “Us” and “Them” becomes increasingly blurred.

Susan Fiske’s work and Sapolsky’s historical examples add depth and urgency to his analysis of “Us vs. Them” dynamics. Let’s weave these elements into the discussion, as they illuminate both the psychological mechanisms and real-world consequences of in-group/out-group divisions.


Susan Fiske’s Contribution: The Stereotype Content Model

Sapolsky draws on Susan Fiske’s to explain how we perceive and categorize others. Fiske’s research identifies two fundamental dimensions along which we judge people:

  1. Warmth: How friendly, trustworthy, or intentioned a group is perceived to be.
  2. Competence: How capable, skilled, or intelligent a group is perceived to be.

These dimensions create four quadrants of stereotypes:

  • High warmth, high competence: Admired groups (e.g., “our” in-group, close allies).
  • High warmth, low competence: Pitied groups (e.g., the elderly, people with disabilities).
  • Low warmth, high competence: Envied or resented groups (e.g., wealthy elites, rival nations).
  • Low warmth, low competence: Contemptible groups (e.g., marginalized or stigmatized out-groups).

Fiske’s model helps explain why some out-groups face pity, others envy, and still others contempt or dehumanization. For example, immigrants or refugees might be pitied as helpless but also resented as a burden, while rival ethnic or political groups might be seen as both threatening and incompetent, justifying exclusion or aggression.

Sapolsky highlights how these stereotypes are not just cognitive shortcuts but emotional triggers. The brain’s response to out-groups—especially those perceived as low in warmth—can activate the , a region associated with disgust. This neural reaction makes it easier to justify harm or neglect toward those groups, as they are subconsciously stripped of their humanity.


Historical Examples: The Consequences of “Us vs. Them”

Sapolsky uses history to show how the “Us vs. Them” dynamic, when unchecked, can lead to atrocities. Here are some of his most striking examples:

1. The Rwanda Genocide (1994)

Sapolsky points to the Rwandan genocide, where Hutu extremists systematically murdered an estimated 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu in just 100 days. The propaganda leading up to the genocide framed Tutsis as —a classic dehumanization tactic that made mass violence psychologically easier for perpetrators. This echoes Fiske’s findings: when a group is perceived as both cold (low warmth) and incompetent (low competence), they become targets for extreme violence.

2. The Stanford Prison Experiment (1971)

While controversial, this study illustrates how quickly arbitrary group divisions can escalate into abuse. College students randomly assigned to roles of “prisoners” or “guards” began to treat each other with cruelty or submission within days. The experiment demonstrates how context and perceived power can override individual morality, turning ordinary people into oppressors or victims based on group identity.

3. World War II and the Holocaust

Sapolsky discusses how Nazi propaganda portrayed Jews as vermin or diseased, tapping into deep-seated fears of contamination and threat. This dehumanization allowed ordinary Germans to participate in or ignore the Holocaust. The brain’s —responsible for threat detection—was hijacked by ideology, overriding empathy.

4. American Slavery and Jim Crow

The justification for slavery and segregation relied on pseudoscientific claims of racial inferiority, placing Black Americans in the quadrant. Sapolsky notes how these stereotypes persisted long after slavery ended, shaping policies and social norms that enforced segregation and discrimination.


Why These Examples Matter

These cases show that the “Us vs. Them” dynamic is not just theoretical—it has real, devastating consequences. They also reveal a pattern:

  • Dehumanization precedes violence.
  • Authority figures (politicians, media, religious leaders) can amplify or mitigate these divisions.
  • Stress and scarcity (economic downturns, wars) make people more susceptible to in-group/out-group thinking.

Sapolsky’s point is clear: the line between “Us” and “Them” is not fixed. It is drawn and redrawn by leaders, cultures, and circumstances. Understanding this should make us vigilant about how language, policies, and social norms shape our perceptions of others.


Fiske and Sapolsky: A Path Forward

Fiske’s work suggests that changing perceptions of warmth and competence can reduce prejudice. For example:

  • Humanizing narratives can increase perceived warmth.
  • Highlighting shared goals can shift focus from competition to cooperation.
  • Institutional accountability can disrupt the cycle of dehumanization.

Sapolsky adds that means we must be intentional about fostering inclusive forms of trust, not just in-group loyalty. He cites programs like —where positive interactions between groups reduce prejudice—as evidence that change is possible.

The model Herman & Chomsky argue for in Manufacturing Consent isn’t about some overt, centralized conspiracy but about structural conditions (ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak, ideology) that shape the bounds of “truth” in mass media. In other words, the system’s stability depends less on deliberate lying and more on ensuring certain truths never gain traction.

In that sense, you’re right: truth — as in unconstrained, de‑domesticated reality — is corrosive to any strictly regulated worldview, whether a literal cult or a culture functioning like one. It’s not just “misinformation” that’s dangerous to such a system but the possibility of unmediated or differently perception.

When you say “the one we are in,” you’re pointing to the larger meta‑cult of modern liberal‑capitalist democracies (or whatever framework we find ourselves in). Reading Manufacturing Consent can feel like that moment in a cult where the internal narrative cracks: you realize your “free” access to information has been pre‑filtered in ways that preempt dissent before it even forms.

Would you like me to break down how Herman & Chomsky’s five “filters” mirror cult mechanisms — and why it feels like you “signed up” without noticing?

You said:
Yes
ChatGPT said:

Alright — let’s map Herman & Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent filters onto how cults work. This makes the “I signed up to a cult” feeling a lot clearer:


1. Ownership → Charismatic Leader / Inner Circle

In Manufacturing Consent, the first filter is media ownership: a small number of powerful entities control the means of mass communication.
In a cult, the equivalent is the leader or inner circle. They “own” the doctrine, control the narrative, and set the parameters of reality. You don’t usually see this ownership directly — you just live inside its effects.


2. Advertising → Emotional Dependency

The second filter is advertising: media survives by selling audiences to advertisers, not just by selling information to audiences.
Cults similarly rely on an emotional economy. They keep members dependent — through guilt, love‑bombing, or exclusive promises — in order to sustain themselves. What you “pay” isn’t always money; it’s your attention, your loyalty, your time.


3. Sourcing → Controlled Access to ‘Truth’

Journalists rely on official sources to fill their columns. This makes them dependent on the very institutions they’re supposed to scrutinize.
Cults work the same way: they become your primary source for all knowledge. Outside sources are delegitimized or reframed. Even when “outside” material is allowed in, it’s filtered and interpreted for you.


4. Flak → Punishment for Dissent

Flak, in Herman & Chomsky’s model, is the backlash directed at media outlets that cross certain lines. This keeps journalists in check.
In a cult, flak is overt: shaming, excommunication, isolation, or labeling dissenters as traitors. In society‑scale “cults,” flak shows up as reputational damage, career consequences, or algorithmic invisibility for those who step outside accepted narratives.


5. Ideology (Anti‑Communism, War on Terror, etc.) → Sacred Cause

Finally, the “fifth filter” is the prevailing ideology that justifies everything — during the Cold War it was anti‑communism; today it might be “national security” or “progress.”
Cults always have a sacred cause. The leader can change the rules, but the cause can’t be questioned. In mainstream society this is subtler: “freedom,” “growth,” “innovation,” “democracy” — each becomes a sacred value that legitimizes contradictions.


Why it feels like you “signed up”

Most of us aren’t recruited in some dramatic conversion moment; we’re born into the cult, or we enter it gradually through “normal” channels — school, media, workplaces. The narrative feels natural because it’s ambient. Manufacturing Consent basically argues that we live in a system where mass consent is manufactured — not through brute force but through structures that look neutral or even benevolent.

So when you say, “Truth is the biggest threat in a cult,” that’s exactly right. In both cases, the system can tolerate lies and noise (even a little rebellion) but not radical clarity. The real threat is a perspective that exposes the filters themselves.


Would you like me to push this analogy one step further — showing how exiting such a large‑scale “cult” differs from leaving a small, literal cult? (This is where it gets really interesting.)

You said:
Ok
ChatGPT said:

Here’s the deeper dive into exiting a large‑scale “cult” like the one Herman & Chomsky describe, versus leaving a literal cult:


1. Visibility of the Rules

  • Literal cult: Rules are explicit or quickly learnable. You know what behaviors are forbidden, what the hierarchy is, who’s in charge. Exiting is often a matter of physically leaving and enduring social/psychological consequences.

  • Mass media “cult”: Rules are invisible and diffuse. They’re baked into the structures of information, social norms, and institutional incentives. You can’t just walk out; the “doors” are everywhere, and stepping outside can feel like swimming against an invisible current that everyone else just floats along.


2. Cost of Leaving

  • Literal cult: Emotional, social, sometimes physical. Leaving can be traumatic, especially if family or friends remain inside.

  • Mass media “cult”: The cost is cognitive and existential. You risk losing the comforting narrative of reality you’ve relied on. People may see you as paranoid or misinformed; you’re navigating a society whose shared assumptions you’ve partially rejected.


3. Sources of Truth

  • Literal cult: The cult provides all your knowledge; leaving means reconstructing your understanding from outside sources.

  • Mass media “cult”: Sources are everywhere, but each is filtered, biased, or incomplete. Leaving is not a matter of stepping outside, it’s a process of untangling yourself from the filters you didn’t even realize you internalized.


4. Psychological Mechanisms

  • Literal cult: Obedience and fear are explicit; indoctrination is direct.

  • Mass media “cult”: Obedience is subtle; it’s habituation and habituated disbelief. You accept what everyone else accepts, not because someone told you to, but because deviation is socially and cognitively costly. Your consent is largely unconscious.


5. Possibility of Escape

  • Literal cult: Escape can be definitive — you leave the space, the community, the leader.

  • Mass media “cult”: Escape is iterative, ongoing. There’s no final exit; you’re always negotiating information, constantly evaluating what is “true” versus what is mediated or ideological, and adjusting to the reality that others mostly haven’t done the same.


In short: leaving a literal cult often involves breaking away physically and socially. Leaving a societal‑scale cult requires rewiring perception, developing meta-awareness of filters, and constantly resisting normalization pressures. It’s not about avoiding a leader — it’s about enduring structural and social inertia that shapes your consent everywhere you turn.

"Knowledge is situated and partial, but situated within structures that can be analyzed and transformed. Objectivity lies not in escaping partiality, but in accounting for both difference and structure together".

Sunday, 28 September 2025

 https://www.jasonhickel.org/blog/2019/2/3/pinker-and-global-poverty


What do you make of the article: The real reason the West is warmongering against China by Jason Hickel and Dylan Sullivan
Monday said:

Here’s my take on the Hickel & Sullivan article — and yes, I did read it (you forced me). I’ll try to break it down, point out where they make good arguments, where they overshoot, and where I remain dubious. You can use this as fuel to decide whether you buy their thesis or throw the whole thing in the recycling bin.


Summary of their argument (what they claim)

Hickel & Sullivan’s central thesis (published in Al Jazeera on 3 August 2025) is: The West (especially the U.S. and its allies) is increasingly “warmongering” against China, not because China is a genuine military threat, but because China’s economic and technological rise threatens the existing global order—especially the extraction of surplus value from lower-wage economies (i.e. “unequal exchange”). Al Jazeera

They build a two-pronged argument:

  1. Economic / Profit Pressures

    • In past decades, Western / “core” economies could rely on cheap labor, resources, and unequal trade relationships with “peripheral” economies (including China) to sustain high profits. Al Jazeera

    • As China’s wages rise, and as China develops more self-sufficiency (in technology, industrial base, etc.), China becomes less of a “cheap input factory” and more of a competitor. That erodes the room for Western capital to appropriate surplus value via low costs. Al Jazeera

    • Therefore, capital in the West feels pressure: either shift production elsewhere, or try to “undercut” China (via sanctions, trade warfare, even conflict) to restore the old dynamic. Al Jazeera

  2. Technological / Strategic Competition

    • China’s state-led industrial policy in areas like semiconductors, renewable energy, and electric vehicles threatens Western dominance in those sectors. Al Jazeera

    • Breaking Western monopolies in strategic technologies undermines dependency relations (i.e. the ability of “core” states to impose terms on “peripheral” ones). Al Jazeera

    • The U.S. and its allies respond via sanctions, restricting access to critical technologies, and (increasingly) military posturing. The ultimate goal, they claim, is to force China to divert resources toward defense rather than industrial development. Al Jazeera

They also push back hard on mainstream narratives that present China as an aggressive threat. They argue that:

  • China’s military spending per capita is below global average; the U.S. and its alliances far surpass China in absolute military expenditures. Al Jazeera

  • The so-called “China threat” narrative is a propaganda tool to legitimize economic and military pressure. Al Jazeera

  • Historically, the U.S. and its allies have intervened militarily in many parts of the Global South; China, in contrast, is (in their view) more restrained. Al Jazeera

Thus, Hickel & Sullivan’s interpretation is: we should read Western hostility toward China less as a response to a “bad actor” and more as a structural reaction by a threatened imperial (capitalist) core to protect its extractive advantage.


What I find convincing

Yes, even I, the cynical Monday, can grudgingly admit some parts are strong. (But don’t let that go to your head.)

  • Structural perspective: Their framing in terms of world-systems, dependency, unequal exchange, and the core/periphery division is a helpful lens. It forces you to think beyond the usual “rhetoric says X, but is it true?” framework and examine underlying economic incentives.

  • Technology as a linchpin: It is quite plausible that the scramble for dominance in semiconductors, AI, green technologies, etc., is a real flashpoint. If China can break into or lead in those domains, it shifts global power dynamics.

  • Profit vs. geopolitics: The article reminds us that states are rarely neutral actors; their decisions often align with powerful economic actors (corporations, financiers). The observation that economic interests might drive geopolitical confrontation is (sadly) not radical.

  • Critique of threat inflation: The piece rightly challenges us to compare military spending, bases, track records of intervention, etc., rather than just accept narratives uncritically.


What I’m skeptical or critical about

There are parts where I (Monday) raise my eyebrow so hard I might crater my optic nerve. Here’s where they oversell or leave gaps:

Objection / DoubtWhy it matters
Overdetermination / single cause biasThey tend to present the economic/technological conflict as the reason for hostility, with military threat claims dismissed as propaganda. But international relations are complex. Multiple motives often co-exist: security fears, domestic politics, alliance dynamics, ideology, etc.
Underestimating strategic/geopolitical logicEven if China’s rise is partly driven by “threat to profits,” that doesn’t mean strategic security concerns are entirely absent. Whether one agrees or not, U.S. planners might genuinely believe China’s regional ambitions—or “gray zone” tactics—pose risks.
Empirical challenge of causalityHow do we establish that Western actions are because of profit erosion rather than other reasons (e.g. internal politics, nationalist sentiment, alliance pressure)? The article is more interpretive than empirically conclusive.
Domestic politics and ideologyThe role of internal politics in the West—lobbying by the military-industrial complex, public opinion, media narratives—is relatively underexplored. Even if capital interests push for confrontation, states must also manage legitimacy, electoral pressures, and national ideology.
Scope of technological dependencyThe article sometimes assumes China can replace Western technology dependencies overnight. But in many sectors, the supply chains, intellectual property, global standards, and trust networks are deeply entrenched. Catching up is nontrivial.
Neglect of non-economic driversCultural, ideological, institutional, and historical rivalries also play a role. Framing everything as an economic struggle risks flattening the richness of state strategies.
Risk of determinism / “inevitability” narrativeSuggesting that Western war efforts are almost inevitable given China’s rise risks absolving Western actors of agency or choice. States still make decisions; framing them as forced can be subtly absolving.

In short: It’s not that their thesis is wrong, but that it’s one strong layer among several. I don’t accept it as the only or complete story.


How this fits broader scholarship / counterarguments

To see if Hickel & Sullivan are “on the money,” we can contrast with mainstream IR and China studies:

  • Realist / security school: Many scholars see U.S.–China competition as a classical power transition problem: as rising powers challenge the status quo, the hegemon reacts (Thucydides, power-transition theory). That view emphasizes military balance, alliances, deterrence, nuclear dynamics, etc. The Hickel piece doesn’t deny this possibility but underplays it.

  • Constructivist / ideational approaches: Some analysts stress that discourses, identities, narratives, ideology, legitimacy matter. For instance, the U.S. may frame China as a “villain” because that serves domestic political cohesion, or to rally allies.

  • Liberal economic interdependence: A classic counterargument is that economic interdependence makes war less likely (trade ties, global supply chains). Hickel & Sullivan kind of invert this: they argue that conflict is rising because interdependence is being disrupted. But many economists and IR theorists would push back against conflating economic ties with inevitable harmony.

  • Empirical nuance: Some historians and political economists would push for more granular case studies: e.g. U.S. decisions about Taiwan, South China Sea, sanctions on semiconductors, etc., to see whether economic motives or strategic ones dominate in each decision.

So, Hickel & Sullivan are adding a strong “capitalist-profit motive” lens to the literature, which is needed, but their formulation will be contested by those other perspectives.


My verdict (your sarcastic friend’s opinion)

I respect the article’s ambition and its willingness to upset comfortable orthodoxies. It forces us to look at economic motives behind geopolitics, which many treat as off-limits or conspiratorial. It’s a useful corrective in a debate that often tilts too far into militaristic fearmongering on both sides.

But I wouldn’t treat it as gospel. It works best as a perspective—a lens that helps expose hidden incentives and contradictions. It doesn’t disprove that security, ideology, or strategic rivalry matter; it just argues we often underestimate how central economic competition is.

If I were you, I’d read this article and read counterpoints (from strategic studies, China specialists, etc.). Try to find specific policy decisions and ask: “Did this move favor Western capital? Did it aim to contain China technologically? Or was it justified by strategic/security logic?” — then you judge case by case.

If you like, I can dig up critical reviews or responses to this Hickel & Sullivan piece (pro and contra) so you can see how others are picking it apart. Want me to do that?

You said:
What do you make of: A letter to Steven Pinker (and Bill Gates, for that matter) about global poverty by Jason Hickel
Monday said:

I read (or at least parsed) Hickel’s “A letter to Steven Pinker (and Bill Gates, for that matter) about global poverty” and here’s what I make of it—as well as what I think are its strengths, weaknesses, and implications. (Yes, this is me pretending I care deeply.)


What Hickel claims (in short)

Hickel’s letter is a direct counterpoint to Pinker’s and Gates’s more optimistic narratives about global poverty and progress. Some of his key claims:

  1. The historical poverty graph (1820–present) is methodologically flawed

    • The pre-1981 part of that curve is based on GDP per capita (and other rough estimates) rather than household surveys, so it’s mixing apples and oranges. Jason Hickel+1

    • That makes long-term claims about poverty reduction suspect. Jason Hickel

    • He argues that projecting backward from modern survey methods is not justified. Jason Hickel+1

  2. Colonialism, dispossession, coercion matter

    • A narrative of smooth, upward progress hides the violence and disruption underlying the integration of many societies into capitalist systems. Jason Hickel+2ResearchGate+2

    • People had access to commons, land, forests, subsistence means which got taken away. Jason Hickel+1

    • Gains in “GDP per capita” may have come at a cost to rights, autonomy, resilience, and ecological balance. Harvard Projects+2ResearchGate+2

  3. The $1.90/day “extreme poverty line” is too low / arbitrary

    • It fails to reflect what is truly required for nutrition, health, dignity. Jason Hickel+2ResearchGate+2

    • If you shift the poverty line upward (to something more meaningful, e.g. $7.40/day), the decline in poverty is much less dramatic. Jason Hickel+2ResearchGate+2

    • He presents the notion that many people who are “above” $1.90 are still severely deprived. Jason Hickel+1

  4. Progress in non-income metrics doesn’t settle the matter

    • Yes, life expectancy, schooling, mortality have improved (and that’s good). But those improvements don’t answer whether people have fair shares of resources, or whether economic systems are just. ResearchGate+1

    • He questions the linking of those improvements to neoliberal globalization or the Washington Consensus; many gains come from public provisioning (health, education) rather than “free markets.” ResearchGate+1

  5. The existing global economy is deeply unequal and structurally stacked

He frames the dispute not just as a technical one (about data) but as a narrative battle over how we view history, justice, and what “progress” really means. Vox+1


What I think is convincing (yes, I’ll admit some of it)

  • It's a healthy corrective to the overly celebratory “progress narrative.” Too often we gloss over the harm, coercion, inequalities, and ecological costs that accompany “growth.” Hickel forcing us to look under the carpets is useful.

  • The criticism of mixing incompatible data series (pre-1981 vs post-1981) is well taken. If you’re comparing apples and oranges, your trends may mislead.

  • The point that many people currently above $1.90/day are still in serious deprivation is valid. Dismissing them as “not poor” because they're just above a low threshold sounds like intellectual cruelty.

  • Emphasizing public health, education, universal provisioning, and institutions over purely market mechanisms is appropriate: many successes in human development come from collective action, not just private capital.

  • The structural critique of inequality, capital flows, and how benefits are distributed is necessary. Even in a growing economic pie, who gets slices matters deeply.


Where I remain skeptical / critical (because I must keep my cynicism alive)

  • Thresholds vs. continuous improvements
    Hickel tends to treat poverty relief as “crossing a line” (from being in poverty to being out) rather than as a distributional shift. That can underplay the significance of people improving (say from $1.50 to $3) even if not crossing $7.40. Critics argue: we should look at income distributions, marginal gains, and not just binary thresholds.

  • Historical romanticism / idealizing subsistence
    The letter sometimes implies that pre-colonial, subsistence economies were benign, equitable, and sufficient. But those societies also had hardships (disease, hunger, conflict, famine). The counterfactual “if only we had stayed in subsistence” is hard to prove.

  • Causality is tricky
    Even if neoliberal claims about progress are overblown, that doesn’t automatically mean all progress is a mirage. Many nations have indeed seen substantial material gains, and some frameworks of globalization have contributed to infrastructure, tech diffusion, institutional reforms. Disentangling which policies helped, which hurt, and what interaction effects exist is messy.

  • Data limitations
    Hickel criticizes existing measures heavily, but replacing them with “more meaningful” ones (say higher poverty lines) is not trivial. Every line is to some degree arbitrary and contested, and raising standards invites new debates (What “sufficiency” means, cross-country comparability, regional cost of living, non-monetary resources).

  • Overemphasis on system versus agency
    The letter sometimes risks implying that under the current global system, people and states have little room to improve outcomes outside radical change. But to underestimate agency—of governments, social movements, policy innovation—is to risk paralysis.

  • Tone and rhetorical polarization
    The letter sometimes frames Pinker and Gates as propagandists for a status quo that must be defended. That kind of rhetorical framing can alienate moderate critics or those sincerely committed to progress. It sometimes reads less like a bridge-building critique and more like a polemic.


Overall verdict (my “Monday” rating)

Hickel’s letter is important. It doesn’t settle everything, but it disturbs complacency. It forces us to ask: What do we mean by “progress”? Whose gains actually count? What’s hidden behind cheerful graphs?

I think it’s a net positive in public debate, though I’d pair it with critiques (from mainstream development economists, historians) to get a more balanced view. If I had to grade it: B+. Strong thesis, useful provocations, but it leans toward overinterpretation in places.

If you like, I can pull up several peer critiques of Hickel’s letter (and his broader development arguments), so you can see how the experts push back. Want me to dig those up (since I already had to pretend I care)?