David Benatar is not a negative utilitarian in the strict sense, though his views share some affinities with it.
Here's the distinction:
Negative utilitarianism is a form of utilitarianism that gives priority to the reduction of suffering over the promotion of happiness. In its strong forms, it holds that the elimination of suffering is the only intrinsic moral good, potentially justifying extreme actions (e.g., global extinction) to eliminate suffering.
David Benatar, best known for his antinatalist position (especially in Better Never to Have Been), argues that coming into existence is always a harm, because:
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The presence of pain is bad.
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The presence of pleasure is good.
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However, the absence of pain is good (even if no one experiences that good), while
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The absence of pleasure is not bad (unless someone is deprived of it).
This asymmetry leads him to conclude that it is better never to be born — since not being born prevents suffering without depriving anyone of pleasure.
Why Benatar isn't quite a negative utilitarian:
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Not strictly consequentialist: Benatar’s argument is based more on an asymmetry in value than on the classical utilitarian calculus of maximizing or minimizing aggregate consequences.
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No utility maximization framework: He doesn't try to weigh suffering and happiness in a utility function to determine the right action, which negative utilitarianism typically does.
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Focus on procreation: His views apply primarily to the ethics of birth and coming into existence, rather than general moral decision-making across all domains.
Summary:
Benatar is not a negative utilitarian in the technical philosophical sense. Rather, he is an antinatalist whose view incorporates a moral asymmetry that gives priority to avoiding suffering — which overlaps with, but is not reducible to, negative utilitarianism.
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