1. The Myth of the Given

Sellars argued against the notion that there is a foundational layer of non-conceptual, sense-datum-like knowledge that serves as the ultimate basis for all other knowledge.

• Target: Empiricist accounts that suggest we build knowledge on a “given” bedrock of raw sensory data (e.g., "I see a red patch").

• Critique: Sellars claimed that even our most basic perceptions are conceptually mediated. There is no such thing as pure observation or sense experience untouched by conceptual structures.

Famous Quote:

"Empirical knowledge…is a linguistic affair."

This is the heart of the Myth of the Given critique: all knowing is shaped by language, categories, and communal practices.

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2. The Space of Reasons vs. the Space of Causes

Sellars distinguished between two domains:

• Space of Causes: The natural, scientific domain where events are explained through causal laws (e.g., brain states, physics).

• Space of Reasons: The normative, justificatory domain where beliefs and actions are assessed as rational or irrational, justified or not (e.g., ethical and epistemic judgments).

He argued that mental states like beliefs and intentions belong to the space of reasons, and cannot be reduced to brain events, even though they are real.

This distinction prefigures debates in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science about normativity, rationality, and naturalism.

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3. Scientific Realism and the Manifest vs. Scientific Image

In his essay Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, Sellars distinguishes between:

• The Manifest Image: How we ordinarily understand ourselves as persons—agents with beliefs, desires, and moral responsibilities.

• The Scientific Image: How science describes humans—as complex physical systems composed of atoms, neurons, and so on.

Sellars didn’t want to eliminate the manifest image, but he thought philosophy's task was to reconcile it with the scientific image—what he called “stereoscopic vision.”

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4. Functionalism about Mental States

Though he wasn’t a computationalist per se, Sellars advanced a proto-functionalism: mental states should be understood in terms of their roles in a system of behavior, not in terms of private inner episodes.

He anticipated later work in cognitive science and philosophy of mind, including the idea that minds are not things, but systems of relations among states that play specific roles.

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5. Inference and Conceptual Understanding

Sellars emphasized the idea that to have a concept is to be able to use it in inferences—to understand its place in a network of implications. Learning a concept is like learning a role in a language game.

This places inferentialism at the center of meaning and understanding—a position that would later influence philosophers like Robert Brandom.

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Summary in One Sentence:

Sellars aimed to bridge the gap between empiricism and rationalism by showing that all knowledge is conceptually mediated, that the mind belongs to a normative space of reasons, and that philosophical understanding requires reconciling our ordinary self-understanding with the scientific account of the world.

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Would you like a diagram or further comparison with other thinkers like Kant or Quine?

You said:

Can you focus on Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind

ChatGPT said:

Absolutely. Let's dive deep into Wilfrid Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM)—his most famous and foundational work, first published in 1956. It’s a rigorous critique of traditional empiricism and a reworking of how perception, knowledge, and the mind function.

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✦ Central Aims of EPM:

1. To refute the "Myth of the Given"—the idea that there are non-conceptual, immediate sense-data or raw experiences that serve as the foundation for all knowledge.

2. To show that perception and knowledge are embedded in conceptual and inferential frameworks—there is no "pure" given untouched by thought or language.

3. To offer a naturalized, yet normatively robust, account of the mind, where mental episodes are real but understood in terms of their role in rational behavior, not inner intuition.

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🔍 1. The Myth of the Given

Sellars defines and critiques a view common to both classical empiricism and some 20th-century analytic philosophy: that certain kinds of knowledge (like sense-data or perceptual impressions) are "given" immediately and non-inferentially to the mind, and that these given elements justify further beliefs.

What’s wrong with the “Given”?

• Even basic perceptual judgments are conceptual: To see a red apple and say “that’s red” presupposes understanding of the concept red.

• Justification is inferential: Knowing that something is red involves not just being struck by a color but knowing how "red" fits into a web of concepts and inferences (e.g., red is a color, it contrasts with green, it applies to roses, apples, etc.).

• No “pure” foundation: There is no foundational layer of untainted, private experience that can serve as the bedrock for knowledge.

“All awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short, all awareness of abstract entities — indeed, all awareness even of particulars — is a linguistic affair.”

This is the death knell for traditional empiricism, which posited that knowledge is built from the ground up on a foundation of sense-impressions.

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🔍 2. The Role of Language and Inference

Sellars argues that being able to have any conceptual content at all requires participation in a public language. This challenges both internalist and atomist theories of mind.

• Concepts are inferential roles: To understand “red” is to know how it relates to other concepts—what it entails, what it contrasts with.

• Learning a concept is learning a role: We acquire concepts by being trained into patterns of reasoning and normative correction—what Sellars calls the “logical space of reasons.”

This is an early formulation of what later became inferentialism, especially developed by Robert Brandom.

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🔍 3. Sense Impressions and “Looks Talk”

Sellars introduces the distinction between:

• “Looks”: statements like "That looks red" can be true even when the object isn't red (due to lighting, illusions, etc.)

• Perceptual knowledge: saying "That is red" is a claim within the space of reasons and is subject to justification, error, correction, etc.

He doesn’t deny that people have sensations, but he denies that these sensations are self-justifying epistemic foundations.

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🔍 4. The "Myth of Jones" and Theoretical Terms

Sellars tells a thought experiment about a community that initially explains human behavior without invoking thoughts or sensations. Then, a genius named “Jones” posits internal episodes (thoughts, experiences) as theoretical constructs to explain behavior more effectively.

What does this do?

• Mental states are like scientific posits: They’re not given introspectively but introduced to explain observable behavior.

• Mind-talk is theory-laden: Saying “he believes it will rain” is akin to saying “he has a cold” — it attributes a theoretical state to explain outward behavior.

This anticipates functionalism: mental states are defined not by their intrinsic feel but by their role in a system (input, output, and relations to other states).

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📚 Philosophical Implications

Traditional Empiricism	Sellarsian View
Knowledge is based on immediate sensory givens	All knowledge is conceptual and inferential
Justification can begin with raw experience	Justification only occurs in the space of reasons
The mind is transparent to itself	Inner states are theoretical constructs
Language reports inner states	Language constructs and mediates conceptual awareness

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✦ Why EPM Still Matters

• It undermines the entire project of foundationalist epistemology.

• It bridges analytic philosophy, phenomenology (in its rejection of givenness), and pragmatism.

• It inspires later thinkers: Brandom, McDowell, and Davidson all build on Sellars to develop more sophisticated accounts of mind, meaning, and knowledge.

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Want More?

Would you like a visual diagram of how Sellars’ critique of the “Given” unfolds logically? Or a comparison to Kant, Quine, or contemporary empiricists like Bas van Fraassen?

You said:

Can you offer a synopsis of From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science.

ChatGPT said:

Certainly. From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (1984) is a landmark book by Stephen P. Stich, in which he launches a provocative critique of folk psychology—the everyday framework we use to explain and predict human behavior in terms of beliefs, desires, intentions, and other mental states.

Here's a concise but deep synopsis of the book’s central arguments and philosophical significance:

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🧠 Thesis in a Sentence

Folk psychology is a misleading, obsolete theory of the mind, and it should be replaced by a more scientifically accurate account provided by cognitive science.

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🔍 What is Folk Psychology?

• Folk psychology refers to our common-sense way of understanding minds: we explain behavior by positing beliefs, desires, intentions, and other propositional attitudes.

• Example: “She went to the store because she believed she was out of milk and wanted to get some.”

Stich argues that this framework, while useful in everyday life, is not necessarily true or scientifically accurate.

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🛠 Stich’s Strategy: A Two-Front Attack

1. Critique of Realism about Beliefs

Stich questions whether beliefs (as folk psychology understands them) exist at all in the way we assume.

• Beliefs are too vague and indeterminate: Real people often hold contradictory or half-formed ideas, which don't fit neatly into the tidy, discrete "belief boxes" folk psychology assumes.

• Too tied to language and culture: Beliefs are often expressed in words, but this leads to problems when we try to match beliefs across different languages or conceptual frameworks.

Stich calls into question the very coherence and ontological reality of beliefs.

2. Advocacy for Cognitive Science

Stich looks to cognitive science as a more empirically grounded approach to understanding the mind.

• Instead of folk-psychological categories, we should develop computational and neuroscientific models of mental processes.

• These models may end up eliminating beliefs and desires as explanatory categories, much like science eliminated “phlogiston” or “vital spirits.”

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🔄 Connection to the “Eliminativist” Tradition

Stich’s work is often associated with eliminative materialism, particularly the views of Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland, who also argue that folk psychology is a failed theory destined for replacement.

However, Stich is more methodologically cautious:

• He doesn’t categorically claim that beliefs don’t exist, but rather that we shouldn’t assume they will play a role in the best scientific account of the mind.

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🧩 Stich’s Constructive Proposal (Sort of)

Stich leaves open the possibility that future cognitive science will use very different, perhaps non-propositional, internal representations to explain thought and behavior.

• Mental architecture might involve sub-symbolic processes (like connectionist networks or later, neural networks).

• Whatever replaces folk psychology, it won’t look like belief-desire psychology.

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📚 Structure of the Book (Simplified)

1. The Nature of Folk Psychology

   • Clarifies what it is, how it works, and how deeply it's embedded in our daily lives.

2. Problems with Belief

   • Argues that belief is a messy, imprecise, and ultimately unscientific construct.

3. Alternatives in Cognitive Science

   • Reviews computational and neuroscientific approaches as better candidates for explaining human cognition.

4. Metaphilosophical Implications

   • Touches on realism, anti-realism, and the future of philosophy of mind.

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⚖️ Key Tensions and Implications

Folk Psychology	Cognitive Science
Beliefs, desires, intentions	Models, modules, algorithms, neural networks
Conceptual and narrative	Empirical and computational
Normative (how we ought to think)	Descriptive (how we do think)
Culturally and linguistically embedded	Potentially universal and biologically grounded

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✦ Why It Still Matters

• Early intervention in the cognitive revolution: Stich pushed philosophers to take seriously the idea that folk psychology might not be sacred or immutable.

• Foreshadowed debates: The book anticipates contemporary discussions on theory of mind, mental representation, the status of intentionality, and whether “belief” is a scientific kind.

• Presses on philosophy’s role: Is it to clean up everyday concepts or to replace them with better tools?