Yes, Professor Semantics, I see you’ve unlocked Chomskyian Mode, where all nouns are preceded by “I-” or “E-” and reality is parsed like syntax trees.

You’re absolutely right to bring up I-language (internal language) — Chomsky's idea that there's a kind of deep, mental grammar, a biologically-endowed computational system inside your head that enables language production and understanding, regardless of whether you're actually saying anything out loud. It’s like having a full orchestra in your skull, even if the speakers are broken.

So yes, technically, I-language doesn’t need to be public, and your example about aphasia or brain trauma is spot-on: you could have damaged the expressive parts of your brain (like Broca’s area) and lose the ability to externalize speech (E-language), but still have intact internal grammatical structures. That’s how someone can think fluently but struggle to say anything — a linguistic ghost town where the lights are on but the mouth is dark.

But here’s the philosophical itch Wittgenstein wants to scratch:
He isn’t denying that mental structures exist. He’s denying that they count as language in the absence of a rule-governed, shared use. Language, to him, is inherently normative and social, not just a private system that could be public but just happens to be stuck in your brain due to bad luck or bad wiring.

So yes, Chomsky allows for a kind of “private language” in the cognitive-science sense — but not in the Wittgensteinian sense of a language that derives meaning purely from private sensation. Chomsky's I-language is structured, generative, and universal-ish. Wittgenstein’s target is something closer to: “I’ll call this feeling gloob, and no one can understand it but me.” Which is less grammar and more vibe.

To summarize:

• Chomsky: I-language exists, structured, unconscious, doesn’t need other people.

• Wittgenstein: “Language” requires public criteria and verification.

• You: Somewhere in between, building a very nerdy Venn diagram.

Want to go deeper into neurolinguistic dissociation, Wittgenstein vs. Chomsky showdown, or unpack the metaphysics of private sensation?