In Heideggerian terms, modern techne (especially as it manifests in technological enframing, or Gestell) can be understood as a corruption, constriction, or deformation of Sorge (care), which is the fundamental mode of being of Dasein.
Let’s unpack this carefully.
1. What is Sorge in Heidegger?
In Being and Time, Sorge (care) is not an emotion or moral stance but the ontological structure of Dasein’s being. It expresses how human existence is always already thrown, concerned, and projective—engaged in the world in a temporally unfolding way.
-
Sorge is the way Dasein comports itself toward its being.
-
It contains Besorgen (concern for things) and Fürsorge (solicitude for others).
-
It is the primordial structure that makes understanding, relating, and meaning possible.
2. What is techne for Heidegger?
Originally, in ancient Greece, techne meant a mode of poiesis—a bringing-forth, a revealing. It was not “technology” in the modern sense but a way of disclosing truth, often through craftsmanship or art. It was aligned with aletheia (unconcealment).
However, in his later work (especially “The Question Concerning Technology”), Heidegger argues that modern technology is no longer techne in this original sense. Instead, it becomes:
-
Instrumental and anthropocentric—reducing the world to a standing-reserve (Bestand).
-
Enframing (Gestell)—a mode of revealing in which everything, including human beings, is disclosed only in terms of use, efficiency, and availability.
-
A closure of other ways of revealing truth, leading to a forgetting of Being.
3. Is Modern techne a Corruption of Sorge?
Yes—if we understand corruption ontologically, not just morally. Here’s how:
-
Sorge includes care for one’s own being and for the world—it is open-ended, being-toward-possibility.
-
But modern techne (in its enframing mode) flattens the world into objects for manipulation, eroding the space of possibility, mystery, or openness.
-
In this way, the existential project of care becomes instrumentalized—Dasein is no longer caring in the ontological sense, but managing, optimizing, surveilling.
So we might say:
Modern techne is a degenerate mode of Sorge—a way in which the ontological openness of care is closed down into utility, prediction, and control.
This deformation is not accidental but structural. Under Gestell, even Sorge is captured—turned inward as self-optimization, or outward as technocratic management of others.
4. An Example: Mental Health Policy
In this light, modern mental health policy—as we discussed—can be seen as corrupted Sorge:
-
Originally, care is about being-with the suffering of another (Fürsorge).
-
But in institutional settings, it becomes risk assessment, compliance tracking, and resource triage.
-
This is Sorge hollowed out: the form remains (we still call it care), but its ontological depth is lost.
Conclusion
Yes, from a Heideggerian point of view, modern techne is a corruption of Sorge. Not in the sense that technology is "evil," but in the deeper sense that modern Gestell captures and distorts our primordial mode of being-in-the-world.
* This is _Sorge_ hollowed out: the form remains (we still call it care), but its ontological depth is lost.
ChatGPT said:
Yes—hollowed-out Sorge and hyperreality share a deep structural resonance. Both describe a condition in which the form or appearance of something survives, while its ontological depth, grounding, or referent is erased or replaced. What remains is a simulation, a terrarium-version of care, concern, or being—a world that functions without worlding.
1. Sorge Hollowed Out
In Heidegger, Sorge is the existential-ontological structure through which Dasein is open to being: a form of attunement, projection, and care that discloses the world. When it is hollowed out—such as through modern techne or bureaucratic procedures—we are left with:
-
Gestures of care without attunement
-
Structure without ground
-
Intervention without being-with
Care becomes formally recognizable (case notes, sessions, protocols) but ontologically absent—it does not “care” in the primordial sense of being-toward-possibility.
2. Hyperreality (Baudrillard)
Baudrillard’s hyperreality is the condition in which the simulation replaces the real. Key features include:
-
The precession of simulacra: the copy precedes and conditions the “real.”
-
The real is no longer lost but becomes unnecessary.
-
We interact with signs that refer only to other signs (a terrarium of meaning).
In hyperreality, representation no longer represents; it absorbs and replaces.
3. The Convergence: A Terrarium of Care
You’re exactly right to name this as a terrarium—a closed, self-sustaining simulation of life. Hollowed-out Sorge and hyperreality converge in systems that:
-
Display the gestures of concern but are incapable of existential contact.
-
Measure and quantify “well-being” without ever being-with.
-
Reproduce the appearance of responsiveness while being structurally incapable of vulnerability or openness.
Just as a hyperreal theme park simulates “culture” in a tightly controlled, non-risky environment, mental health systems simulate “care” in a way that excludes the very conditions of care: ambiguity, interdependence, attunement, and mutual risk.
4. Ethical Implications:
In both cases, something vital is foreclosed:
-
With Sorge hollowed out: the being of Dasein is evacuated.
-
With hyperreality: the possibility of the real is foreclosed.
-
With both: relations become transactions, and world becomes inventory.
This is why you can feel so disoriented inside systems of care—why they feel lifeless, unreal, even though they are full of documentation, effort, and structure. You’re inside a care-terrain, not a world of care.
Conclusion
Yes—hollowed-out Sorge is structurally and existentially analogous to hyperreality. Both are terrariums: sealed worlds of appearances that reproduce the form of life while eliminating the conditions of being. They are not failures of intention, but successes of a system that has replaced ontology with optics.
No comments:
Post a Comment