In the tradition of western philosophy, the argument has long been over the primacy – even existence – of external vs. internal relations. External relations are all just that: they are external, outside of, and “other to” any particular “thing” under consideration. Internal relations say just the opposite: how a thing is related to the world is constitutive of that “thing’s” very being. So both approaches hinge on the notion of identity, and differ to how they characterize identity. With external relations, identity is the first given fact; with internal relations, it is the last achieved result. Most philosophical approaches in the west have been built upon accepting one without question while rejecting the other wholesale. (For example, traditional empiricism was all about external relations, idealism all about internal relations.)

Whitehead argues, convincingly, that both approaches are essential, but that the way they have been approached has rendered them irreconcilable. So rather than talking about “internal” and “external” relations, as a process philosopher, he argues for those phases of coming to be that involve the internalization and externalization of relatedness. This produces the two aspects of an actual occasion: internalization gives us the subject while externalization gives us the superject.

Herstein

Your statement is largely faithful to Whitehead’s philosophy of organism (particularly as developed in Process and Reality), though it condenses and reformulates some complex ideas in a way that may risk oversimplification or subtle distortion, depending on the audience or context.

Here’s a breakdown:

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✅ What is accurate:

1. Phases of concrescence:
   Whitehead does indeed describe the coming-to-be of an actual occasion as a process involving phases. These include the prehension (or feeling) of other entities, leading toward subjective unity (subject) and then a completed, objective datum (superject).

2. Internalization and externalization of relatedness:
   It’s true that an actual occasion internalizes relations via prehensions—taking account of other actualities—and that the superject is what is “thrown forward” into the world as a new datum that can be prehended by future occasions. So the notion of internalization (leading to subjectivity) and externalization (as world-contribution) fits, though these terms aren’t explicitly Whitehead’s.

3. Subject and superject:
   Yes, in Whitehead’s terms, the subject is the self-unifying process of becoming (the occasion while it is still "in process"), and the superject is the outcome or result that enters the world and contributes to future becomings. So your identification of internalization with subject and externalization with superject maps onto this fairly well.

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⚠️ What’s potentially misleading or needs nuance:

1. "Rather than talking about 'internal' and 'external' relations":
   Whitehead doesn’t reject these terms per se, but reinterprets them. He critiques substance philosophy for its treatment of relations as either external (classical substance metaphysics) or internal (as in some idealist traditions). Instead, he subsumes relation under prehension, which is neither purely internal nor external in the classical sense. Saying “rather than talking about internal and external relations” might obscure that his innovation is not their rejection, but a re-conceptualization.

2. The phrasing “phases of coming to be that involve the internalization and externalization of relatedness”:
   This is interpretive language. It’s not how Whitehead puts it, though it’s a fair reading. Just know it adds a metaphorical gloss—framing process as “internalizing” and “externalizing” relationships—that isn’t technical language in his system.

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Summary:

Your paraphrase captures the spirit of Whitehead’s idea that actual occasions involve a movement from relational intake (prehending the world) to world-contribution (being prehended by others). But for strict fidelity to Whitehead’s own terminology and conceptual framing, it might be better to say:

“In process philosophy, particularly Whitehead’s, actual occasions involve the prehension of other actualities—internalizing the world into a unified subject of experience—which then culminates in the production of a superject, an objective outcome that contributes itself to the world. This movement from subject to superject reflects a dynamic of relatedness that exceeds the simple binary of internal versus external relations.”