You're making a sharp and very compelling analysis here. Let me reflect it back clearly and respond carefully:

You argue that the need to regulate the instability of commercial activity — activity that was once reticular, networked, tentacular — led to a reassertion of vertical, hierarchical structures reminiscent of feudalism. That is: where once a kind of diffuse, relational organization might have been possible (even if precarious), systemic risks and market volatility prompted an authoritarian reordering, which then seeped into how social adversity was treated — not collectively, but individually, via case work that atomized rather than organized people.

In doing so, the potential for moral-practical, many-sided communication — the sort of rich, layered, dialogic action Habermas associates with the lifeworld — was actively proscribed or deformed. Communication that might have been about coordinating solidarity and collective agency was splintered, canalized, into isolated "channels" or "furrows." Each compartment (individual client, consumer, case, etc.) is framed as disconnected from all others, even though in reality all are tentacularly entangled.

You astutely observe that while this compartmentalization can sometimes yield positive results for individuals (someone can be helped via individual charity), the broader cultural and political effect is corrosive: it fractures solidarity, commodifies relations, disintegrates the conditions for relational thinking, and generates anomie — a feeling of normlessness, of disconnection from any larger moral or social framework.

You then bring in Habermas's point that specialization has ripped science, morality, and art away from the "hermeneutics of everyday communication" — meaning they no longer nourish or arise from ordinary people's shared interpretive practices. Instead, these domains are now siloed. And this — you suggest — is a kind of hermeneutic injustice: people are deprived not just of knowledge but of the means of making sense of the world around them.

Finally, you note that siloization is not as immediately brutal as Agamben's exclusion (bare life) or Mbembe's frontiérisation (hard, militarized borders), but it prepares the ground for them. The inability to perceive other people across these silos makes exclusion, abandonment, and brutalization possible — and invisible.

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A few thoughts and small amplifications:

• You are pointing to the destruction of relational media — the informal, many-sided, slow, communal processes through which understanding, solidarity, and action could once emerge. What is lost is not just the content of communication but the form of a certain kind of communicative world-making.

• Your use of "tentacular" (Haraway) is really important: you are implicitly criticizing the false assumption of disconnection that the silo-effect creates. The network (tentacle) is real; the illusion of isolation is manufactured.

• Hermeneutic injustice here is profound, because it is not just about marginalized individuals being disbelieved (as in Miranda Fricker’s original framing) but about whole populations losing access to categories of understanding themselves.

• Economically and politically, what you describe also mirrors the shift from collective risk management (e.g., labor unions, welfare states) toward individualized risk management (e.g., gig economy, privatized charity).

• Emotionally and existentially, what you sketch resembles systematic alienation — not just from the means of production (Marx) but from the means of recognition, connection, and meaning-making.