ChatGPT said:

Great—let’s dive into how Levinas’ ethical “call of the Other” challenges Kantian and broader liberal ethics. These traditions differ fundamentally in their view of the subject, the origin of responsibility, and the structure of ethical life.

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🔹 1. Kantian Ethics: Autonomy and Universal Moral Law

Core Premises:

• The ethical subject is a rational, autonomous individual.

• Morality is grounded in reason and universality: the categorical imperative demands that we act only on maxims we can will to become universal law.

• Respect for others arises because they are rational agents like ourselves—ends in themselves, not mere means.

For Kant:

• Responsibility is self-given—I legislate the moral law to myself as a rational being.

• Ethics is symmetrical—I expect from others what I demand of myself.

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🔹 2. Levinas’ Critique of Kantian (and Liberal) Ethics

Levinas sees Kantian ethics—and much of liberal thought—as too formal, too abstract, and too self-centered, even in its attempt to be universal and fair.

Key Contrasts:

Feature	Kantian/Liberal Ethics	Levinasian Ethics
Subject	Rational, autonomous self	Accused, summoned by the Other
Source of ethics	Self-legislation (autonomy)	Heteronomy: the Other imposes responsibility on me
Symmetry	Mutual, equal respect	Asymmetrical: I am more responsible for the Other than they are for me
Rational universality	Ethics is rational and universalizable	Ethics arises from particular, face-to-face encounters
Moral obligation	Based on rules or duties derived from reason	Infinite and pre-rational: “Thou shalt not kill” is spoken in the face
Justice	Mediated through procedures, laws, fairness	Justice comes after ethics, and must never erase the face of the Other

Levinas writes:

“The face of the Other signifies: ‘you shall not kill me.’”
This is not a rational deduction—it is a moral imperative issued through exposure and vulnerability, before any system of justification.

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🔹 3. Critique of Liberalism More Broadly

Levinas also challenges liberal political thought, which often:

• Begins from individual rights, freedom, and contractual reciprocity.

• Assumes a neutral public sphere where all voices are equal.

• Frames justice in terms of equality and impartiality.

Levinas points out:

• Such neutrality can become indifference to suffering.

• Not all Others can “participate” in liberal deliberation—they may be voiceless, faceless, or excluded.

• Ethics cannot wait for procedures; it begins in the unjustifiable, non-reciprocal demand of the vulnerable Other.

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🔹 4. Implications

Levinas' critique suggests that:

• Liberal ethics may miss the urgency and asymmetry of ethical life.

• Rational universality can obscure the uniqueness of the Other’s suffering.

• The ethical subject is not the confident moral agent of Enlightenment liberalism, but a haunted, vulnerable self, summoned into infinite responsibility.

In short: Where Kant begins with the self, Levinas begins with the Other.