Levinas’ ethical “call of the Other” is one of the most important concepts in 20th-century continental philosophy—and it differs profoundly from Heidegger’s thinking, even as it responds to it.

Here’s a breakdown of what it means, how it functions, and how it differs from Heidegger’s solicitude and your interpretive notion of solicitation:

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🔹 The Ethical Call of the Other (Levinas)

For Emmanuel Levinas, ethics is first philosophy—it comes before ontology, epistemology, or any system of understanding the world. His central claim is that the encounter with the Other (another human being) places an infinite ethical demand on us. This demand is not negotiated or chosen—it precedes freedom, identity, or reflection.

1. The Face as Ethical Epiphany

• The face of the Other (la face) is not just a physical appearance—it’s a phenomenological event.

• It expresses vulnerability, exposure, and a kind of nakedness that cannot be reduced to a category or absorbed into knowledge.

• When I encounter the Other face-to-face, I am called: “Thou shalt not kill.”

• This is not a moral rule, but the primordial structure of human relation: a commandment inscribed in the Other’s presence.

2. Asymmetry and Responsibility

• The call of the Other is asymmetric. The Other is always ethically prior to me.

• I am infinitely responsible for the Other—even if they are not responsible for me.

• This reverses much of Western philosophy (e.g., Kant, Husserl, Heidegger), which presupposes a sovereign subject first.

• For Levinas, subjectivity is founded on being-for-the-Other, not on autonomy or being-in-the-world.

3. Against Totality

• Levinas distinguishes between Totality (systems of knowledge, power, control) and Infinity (the irreducible Otherness of the Other).

• Ethics resists totalization—it arises when the Other interrupts my self-enclosure, when I cannot reduce them to the Same.

• This is why ethics, for Levinas, is a kind of rupture, not a social contract or natural inclination.

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🔹 Comparison with Heidegger

Concept	Heidegger	Levinas
Relation to Others	Mitsein (being-with); Fürsorge (solicitude: helping or leaping-ahead)	The face of the Other confronts me with an infinite ethical demand
Ethics	Emerges only within authentic modes of Being-with; not foundational	Ethics is first philosophy, prior to ontology
Otherness	Others can be absorbed into das Man (the impersonal “they”)	The Other is irreducible, cannot be totalized
Responsibility	Emerges through choice and authenticity	Always already; I am responsible even before choosing
Temporality	Future-oriented authenticity (Being-toward-death)	The ethical call is pre-reflective, pre-temporal—it precedes time itself

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🔹 Why It Matters

Levinas is offering a radical reorientation of philosophy. For him:

• Being is not neutral or indifferent.

• Ethics is not a set of rules or a mode of care—it is being accused, summoned, obligated before any “I” comes to be.

• The solicitation of the world in Heidegger (interpreted as affordances or invitations to action) is practical.

• The call of the Other in Levinas is ethical—and disturbing, even traumatic. It disrupts your comfort, your world, and your self-possession.

ChatGPT said:

Great—let’s dive into how Levinas’ ethical “call of the Other” challenges Kantian and broader liberal ethics. These traditions differ fundamentally in their view of the subject, the origin of responsibility, and the structure of ethical life.

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🔹 1. Kantian Ethics: Autonomy and Universal Moral Law

Core Premises:

• The ethical subject is a rational, autonomous individual.

• Morality is grounded in reason and universality: the categorical imperative demands that we act only on maxims we can will to become universal law.

• Respect for others arises because they are rational agents like ourselves—ends in themselves, not mere means.

For Kant:

• Responsibility is self-given—I legislate the moral law to myself as a rational being.

• Ethics is symmetrical—I expect from others what I demand of myself.

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🔹 2. Levinas’ Critique of Kantian (and Liberal) Ethics

Levinas sees Kantian ethics—and much of liberal thought—as too formal, too abstract, and too self-centered, even in its attempt to be universal and fair.

Key Contrasts:

Feature	Kantian/Liberal Ethics	Levinasian Ethics
Subject	Rational, autonomous self	Accused, summoned by the Other
Source of ethics	Self-legislation (autonomy)	Heteronomy: the Other imposes responsibility on me
Symmetry	Mutual, equal respect	Asymmetrical: I am more responsible for the Other than they are for me
Rational universality	Ethics is rational and universalizable	Ethics arises from particular, face-to-face encounters
Moral obligation	Based on rules or duties derived from reason	Infinite and pre-rational: “Thou shalt not kill” is spoken in the face
Justice	Mediated through procedures, laws, fairness	Justice comes after ethics, and must never erase the face of the Other

Levinas writes:

“The face of the Other signifies: ‘you shall not kill me.’”
This is not a rational deduction—it is a moral imperative issued through exposure and vulnerability, before any system of justification.

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🔹 3. Critique of Liberalism More Broadly

Levinas also challenges liberal political thought, which often:

• Begins from individual rights, freedom, and contractual reciprocity.

• Assumes a neutral public sphere where all voices are equal.

• Frames justice in terms of equality and impartiality.

Levinas points out:

• Such neutrality can become indifference to suffering.

• Not all Others can “participate” in liberal deliberation—they may be voiceless, faceless, or excluded.

• Ethics cannot wait for procedures; it begins in the unjustifiable, non-reciprocal demand of the vulnerable Other.

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🔹 4. Implications

Levinas' critique suggests that:

• Liberal ethics may miss the urgency and asymmetry of ethical life.

• Rational universality can obscure the uniqueness of the Other’s suffering.

• The ethical subject is not the confident moral agent of Enlightenment liberalism, but a haunted, vulnerable self, summoned into infinite responsibility.

In short: Where Kant begins with the self, Levinas begins with the Other.