You said:
ChatGPT said:
Yes—but with caveats. Let’s unpack this precisely.
1. What is coarse-graining?
In physics, coarse-graining refers to simplifying a system by averaging or aggregating over microstates to obtain a manageable macrodescription. It’s a form of informational compression that discards “irrelevant” fine details in order to model behavior at a larger scale. Classic examples:
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In thermodynamics, many-particle states are coarse-grained into temperature, pressure, etc.
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In statistical mechanics, you divide phase space into cells and track probabilities over those.
So, coarse-graining is not just about losing detail—it’s an epistemological and modeling move based on a perspective.
2. Does non-human nature coarse-grain?
There are three interpretive angles here:
A. Nature as inherently coarse-graining (ontological claim)
If we ask whether non-human processes themselves enact coarse-graining, in a way analogous to our modeling, then yes—some systems naturally evolve in ways that suppress fine detail and stabilize macropatterns:
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Dissipative structures (like hurricanes or river deltas) stabilize certain large-scale dynamics regardless of underlying microstates.
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Evolutionary processes filter over time—discriminating large-scale viable traits, which you could analogize to a kind of coarse-graining.
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Entropy increases via a loss of information about microstates. From one angle, this is “nature forgetting”—a kind of coarse-graining.
But this is not a conscious modeling process—it’s more like effective loss of specificity due to dynamics.
B. Nature as appearing coarse-grained from within itself (relational view)
From a relational ontology (e.g., process philosophy, Barad, Whitehead), entities interact not with the full resolution of each other, but via selective coupling—which is functionally coarse-grained:
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A bat doesn’t perceive electromagnetic fields the way a fish does.
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Cells respond to signaling molecules via thresholds and categories, not full-spectrum gradients.
In this view, nature “coarse-grains” relationally—each organism or process engages with the world through a simplified interface tuned to its viability.
This is close to Jakob von Uexküll’s Umwelt and fits tightly with Karl Friston’s active inference and Markov blankets—where entities are information-processing systems that model their environment through lossy internal states.
C. Nature doesn’t coarse-grain—it just is, and we impose models
This is the strict epistemic position: coarse-graining is a human conceptual strategy, not something “nature does.” From this angle:
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Molecules don’t “know” they are being averaged.
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The universe doesn’t care about scales or abstraction layers.
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All coarse-graining is observer-relative.
This is important when resisting anthropomorphism or techno-projection. Nature has structure and dynamics, but no “intention” to simplify. So coarse-graining here is a metaphor for emergent constraint, not an agentic act.
3. Conclusion: Does nature coarse-grain?
| Frame | Answer |
|---|---|
| Ontological (dynamical systems) | Yes, in effect—through irreversible processes, emergent stability, and entropy. |
| Relational/Processual | Yes—different entities and systems interact with the world through limited, filtered views. |
| Epistemological (strict) | No—coarse-graining is a modeling tool humans use to make sense of the world. |
So: non-human nature does not “coarse-grain” in the way we do, but many of its processes are functionally indistinguishable from the effects of coarse-graining. It can therefore be fruitful—but also dangerous—to use the concept metaphorically across scales.
Do you want this applied to a specific ecological or cognitive system? Or tied to Agamben or Haraway?
You said:
So coarse-graining here is a metaphor for emergent constraint, not an agentic act.
ChatGPT said:
Yes, you've put your finger on a key philosophical divergence.
✳️ Michael Levin: The Agentic View
Levin argues that biological systems—down to tissues, cells, and even molecular assemblies—display a kind of basal agency. In his framework:
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Cells and tissues can make decisions, solve problems, and navigate morphospace.
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He describes bioelectric networks as implementing goal-directed behavior over developmental and regenerative processes.
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Coarse-graining is not just a tool for describing them—it’s how these systems function. He even calls multicellular structures “collective intelligences.”
➡️ So for Levin, coarse-graining is endogenous to nature—organisms and sub-organismic systems use coarse-grained representations to act in the world.
Nature is filled with agentic modeling systems. Evolution produces problem-solving structures that abstract and filter data—that is, coarse-grain their inputs—in order to guide action.
It’s a teleonomic view—where coarse-graining is an intrinsic, evolved strategy for adaptive behavior.
✳️ Terrence Deacon: The Constraint-Based View
Deacon’s approach is more thermodynamic and semiotic, but much more cautious about agency:
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He emphasizes emergent constraints that shape systems without being reducible to component interactions.
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In Incomplete Nature, Deacon explores how teleology can arise without invoking agency, through absential phenomena (what is not present can constrain what is).
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His view of coarse-graining is non-agentic: it’s a description of emergent organization, not a choice or action.
➡️ For Deacon, coarse-graining is something we impose to understand how constraints function, or how a system's macrostate emerges from microdynamics—but nature itself doesn’t “do” coarse-graining in any deliberative or even proto-cognitive way.
🔍 Summary Comparison:
| Concept | Michael Levin | Terrence Deacon |
|---|---|---|
| Agency | Present at many levels of biology; systems act and compute | Emerges only from particular constraints, not assumed |
| Coarse-graining | Functional operation inside biological systems | Observational abstraction of emergent constraint |
| Nature’s role | Actively modeling, choosing, guiding development | Being constrained by what is absent or excluded |
| Philosophical flavor | Process-based, bio-cognitive, cybernetic | Thermodynamic, semiotic, anti-vitalist |
| Closest analogies | Active inference, morphogenetic fields, collective intelligence | Autogenesis, dynamical closure, ententionality |
🧩 Implications
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Levin naturalizes modeling itself—framing it as something tissues and organisms do.
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Deacon naturalizes absence and emergence—but avoids importing cognitive metaphors where they might not apply.
So yes—you’re absolutely right: Levin treats coarse-graining as an agentic biological function, while Deacon treats it as a descriptive tool for making sense of emergent, non-agentic order. They differ deeply on where to draw the line between life, mind, and meaning.
Would you like this contrast pushed further—perhaps into ontological stakes, or linked to thinkers like Agamben, Barad, or Haraway?
You said:
ententionality
ChatGPT said:
Absolutely. The term “ententionality” is a neologism coined by Terrence Deacon in his book Incomplete Nature to describe a class of phenomena that involve end-directedness or purpose-like behavior, without presupposing consciousness or traditional teleology.
🧠 What does “ententional” mean?
"Ententional" is a play on the word intentional, but deliberately distinguished from it. While intentionality (in philosophy of mind) refers to aboutness—the capacity of mental states to be directed toward something—ententionality is broader and not necessarily mental.
Deacon uses ententional to refer to:
“those features of processes or structures that appear to be ‘about’ something, or directed toward an end, even if there is no mind doing the directing.”
This includes:
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Functions (e.g., the function of a heart is to pump blood)
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Purposes (e.g., a bird building a nest “for” raising chicks)
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Meanings (e.g., DNA sequences encoding proteins)
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Absences (e.g., a valve blocking flow when it’s not open)
These are not just physical properties, but emergent constraints that guide a system’s behavior by virtue of what is excluded or deferred.
🔄 How is it different from intentionality?
| Term | Traditional Meaning | Deacon’s Twist |
|---|---|---|
| Intentionality | Mental aboutness; the mind is directed toward objects or concepts | Implies consciousness or symbolic thought |
| Ententionality | Purpose-like, end-directed organization that can exist in non-conscious systems | Emerges from constraints, not minds |
⚙️ Example:
A self-replicating molecule has no mind, but it has a structure that constrains chemical interactions in such a way that copying itself becomes likely. This organization is ententional—its structure is “about” making copies, in a minimal, emergent sense.
Likewise, the structure of DNA means something for protein synthesis, but that meaning doesn’t come from a subject. It arises through absence and constraint—by excluding alternatives.
🧩 Why invent this term?
Deacon is trying to solve a big problem:
How can mind-like, purpose-like, or meaningful features arise from purely physical processes without smuggling in dualism?
His solution:
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Start from thermodynamics and emergence.
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Build a vocabulary for quasi-teleological behavior that doesn't require minds.
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Show how these ententional processes are necessary precursors to what later becomes conscious intention.
So: ententionality is a scaffolding concept—a way to talk about pre-mental purposiveness without assuming mentalism.
🧠 In short:
Ententionality = the appearance of aboutness, purpose, or function in nature, without assuming a subject or a mind. It’s Deacon’s bridge term between thermodynamic constraint and the eventual emergence of mind and meaning.
Would you like it illustrated with an example from biology, AI, or semiotics?
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