You’re not talking nonsense. You’re circling something very close to what Levinas does accuse Hegel of—and you’re also adding a twist that is very much in Levinas’s spirit, though not in his vocabulary.

Here’s a clean way to parse it:

1. Levinas’s criticism of Hegel: the totalizing system

Levinas explicitly sees Hegel as the paradigm of totality—a system in which the movement of Spirit (Geist) gradually sublates every difference into a higher unity. Nothing remains absolutely exterior; everything is ultimately comprehended, reabsorbed, reconciled.

For Levinas, this is ethically disastrous because:

• Hegelian thought “reduces the Other to the Same.”

• The other person becomes an element in a conceptual totality.

• Freedom becomes the self-realization of Spirit, not an obligation to the other.

• Violence is conceptually neutralized: all conflict is redeemed in the dialectic.

So yes: Levinas does think Hegel’s worldview is totalizing in precisely this way.

2. Levinas’s counter–move: breaks, interruptions, ruptures

Levinas absolutely wants ruptures.
But what generates them?

Not metaphysical “cracks,” not historical contingencies, not dialectical failures, but the encounter with the face of the other—an ethical event that:

• interrupts ontology,

• interrupts totality,

• interrupts the smooth running of systems.

Levinas calls this the “infinite responsibility” that breaks the logic of the Same.

So yes: you are right that Levinas wants interruptions in the smooth unfolding of systems (such as Geist), and he anchors these interruptions in the ethical relation.

3. Your addition: moral dimensions that arise in trillions of encounters in which harming or not are options

This is not how Levinas frames it, but it is very much in keeping with the spirit of Levinas’s thought.

Levinas tends to describe the ethical encounter in transcendental terms—the Face as an archetypal situation, almost a priori.

But there is no reason you can’t reinterpret this in a more immanent, plural, ecology-of-encounters frame:

• Each face-to-face encounter is a micro-rupture in totality.

• Each situation in which one can harm or spare is a point where totality could be interrupted.

• If these accumulate across a social field, you get a constant, ubiquitous pressure against the totalizing movement of systems.

• This is compatible with Levinas’s general thrust: ethics arises in the everyday, not from metaphysics.

In fact, the Levinasian line would be:
it is precisely the uncountable encounters, each with its own asymmetrical responsibility, that prevent Geist (or any system) from fully totalizing the social field.

This does not contradict Levinas; it extends him in a direction he hints at but never systematizes.

4. Where you might be blending frameworks

Levinas:

• thinks the ethical rupture is prior to and outside totality.

• thinks it is infinite and singular (not cumulative, not built up through repetition).

You:

• frame the rupture as arising within the dense texture of social life.

• treat ethics as something that recurs and accumulates through innumerable encounters.

• implicitly situate ethics within history, which Levinas tends to avoid.

This is not wrong—it's just non-Levinasian Levinas.
More like a Levinasian ecology or Levinasian micropolitics.

5. Are you talking nonsense?

No.
You’re doing something intelligible and interesting:

• Identifying Hegel’s totality.

• Bringing in Levinas’s ethical rupture.

• Re-situating the rupture not as a transcendental structure but as millions of ethical “micro-events” that destabilize systemic totalization.

• It’s not nonsense. It’s just that you’re making Levinas more worldly, more situated, more “ecological” in his model of ethical breaks—whereas Levinas keeps it transcendental, quasi-liturgical, almost biblical.