Friday, 14 November 2025

 

1. Feed-to-Food Conversion: How Inefficient Is Meat?

These are the standard feed conversion efficiencies (FAO, USDA, and major meta-analyses):

To produce 1 kcal of edible animal protein:

  • Beef: loses ~90–96% of input calories

  • Pork: loses ~85–90%

  • Chicken: loses ~70–80%

  • Dairy: variable, but loses ~60–75%

Put simply:

Animals return only 4–30% of the calories they consume.

The rest is burned as metabolism, heat, movement, maintenance, bone mass, offal, and waste.


2. Global Energy Loss Through Animal Agriculture

Rough, but widely-cited systems-level estimates:

Around 70–80% of global cropland is used to feed livestock, not humans.

Yet:

Livestock return only about 15–20% of the calories and protein humans could have gotten by eating the crops directly.

This means:

60–70% of all potential human food calories grown worldwide are lost to animal agriculture.

In calorie terms:

  • If all feed crops were eaten by humans, the world would have 2–3× more usable calories.

  • The FAO has noted: the crops fed to animals could feed an extra 4 billion people.


3. Combine This With Standard Food Waste

You asked about total potential food, including:

  1. food wasted/lost → ~30%

  2. food energy destroyed by livestock → ~60–70%

These aren’t identical categories, but they overlap only a little.

If we combine the two conceptually (not double-counting):

≈ 70–75% of the world’s potential edible calories never reach humans.

That means only about 25–30% of the world’s edible caloric potential is actually eaten.

This is a staggering number, but it’s consistent with:

  • thermodynamic realities

  • agricultural land-use data

  • FAO and UNEP analyses

  • feed conversion physics


4. Why This Matters in Real Terms

For every 100 calories of crops grown:

  • ~30 calories are lost as food waste/loss

  • of the remaining 70, about 50–55 are fed to animals

  • those return only 5–15 calories

  • leaving humans with ~20–25 calories eaten of the original 100

So the “global food system efficiency” is somewhere around 20–25%.


If you want, I can break it down further:

  • by land type (pasture vs cropland),

  • by protein vs calorie conversion,

  • by region,

  • or give a scenario analysis of what would happen if humanity shifted even 20–30% away from animal agriculture.

You said:
What are the inefficiencies outside of overreliance on livestock?
ChatGPT said:

Livestock is the single largest structural inefficiency, but the global food system leaks potential energy and nutrition at many other points. If you think of food as a thermodynamic and infrastructural flow, almost every stage has built-in dissipation.

Here’s a structured map of the major inefficiencies outside animal agriculture:


1. Post-harvest loss in developing regions

These losses happen before the food even leaves the farm:

  • poor storage → rot, mold, spoilage

  • lack of refrigeration → perishables degrade fast

  • pests and fungal infestation

  • insufficient drying or curing

Typical loss rates:

  • grains: 10–30%

  • fruits/vegetables: 20–50%

  • tubers (e.g. potatoes): 15–40%

These are losses of already-produced food, not hypothetical.


2. Supply chain & processing inefficiencies

Some foods are simply fragile:

  • high-moisture produce spoils during transport

  • imperfect produce is discarded because it looks “wrong”

  • processing removes edible parts (skins, peels, leaves)

  • cold chain failures — temperature breaks cause spoilage

Examples:

  • in some regions, up to half of harvested fruit never arrives at retail

  • huge amounts of fish spoil on small boats before reaching port


3. Retail-level waste

Supermarkets destroy massive quantities of food due to:

  • cosmetic standards

  • sell-by / best-before confusion

  • consumer psychology (shelves must look full)

  • bulk prepackaging that accelerates spoilage

Retail-level waste for perishables:

  • bakeries: 20–40%

  • produce: 15–25%

  • prepared foods: 10–20%


4. Household waste

Households are the single largest category of food waste in many wealthy countries.

Mechanisms:

  • overbuying

  • cooking too much

  • misunderstanding expiration dates

  • poor fridge organization

  • discarding leftovers

Typical loss:

  • 10–30% of all food purchased is thrown away

  • vegetables and bread are the biggest categories

This is pure dissipation of already-edible resources.


5. Biofuel diversion

A nontrivial portion of global crops is diverted to ethanol and biodiesel, not food.

For example:

  • large fraction of U.S. corn production becomes ethanol

  • sugarcane → ethanol

  • vegetable oils → biodiesel

This is food energy intentionally burned to create fuel (extremely thermodynamically inefficient).


6. Overproduction itself

Some food is grown knowing it will not be harvested or sold:

  • price stabilization

  • contract structure incentives

  • seasonal market planning

  • “dumping” due to low wholesale prices

Farmers sometimes leave 10–20% of crops unharvested because harvesting costs exceed potential revenue.


7. Water and soil inefficiencies (indirect)

These are not losses of calories per se, but losses of productive potential:

  • aquifer depletion reduces future output

  • topsoil erosion removes fertility

  • salinization and desertification

  • fertilizer runoff destroys ecosystems → long-term productivity decline

This is inefficiency at the substrate level: the ability to produce food erodes.


8. Energy inefficiency in greenhouses, vertical farms, and cold chains

Some modern systems use:

  • massive electricity for lighting

  • heavy energy for heating and cooling

  • extremely high embodied energy per unit of output

These systems can be efficient but often aren’t yet.


9. Export logic and monoculture distortion

Global markets incentivize:

  • growing low-efficiency commodities

  • transporting food across oceans

  • using land suboptimally due to subsidy structures

Produce may travel thousands of miles only to be thrown away at retail.


10. Ultra-processed foods & embedded inefficiency

Manufacturing UPFs involves:

  • multiple energy-intensive processing steps

  • discarding large fractions of raw inputs

  • long supply chains with spoilage points

A calorie of ready-to-eat food often has a much higher resource cost than a calorie of unprocessed food.


11. Political and economic inefficiencies

Examples:

  • sanctions or conflict blocking food distribution

  • food aid rot in ports

  • hoarding or speculation artificially removing food from circulation

  • price distortions causing surpluses or shortages

These are structural inefficiencies, not biological.


When you add all of this together

You get a sobering picture:

The world produces far more than enough food for all humans — yet perhaps only ~20–30% of the total caloric potential ends up actually being eaten.

This includes:

  • standard food waste (30% lost)

  • feed-conversion losses from livestock (~60–70% lost)

  • supply-chain inefficiencies (10–20% lost)

  • structural diversion (biofuels, overproduction, conflict)

These categories overlap, but the big truth is:

Humanity exists inside a system that bleeds edible energy at every stage.




Here’s a systems-level scenario analysis of what would happen if humanity shifted just 20–30% of global consumption away from animal agriculture toward plant-based foods—not a full phaseout, just a modest structural pivot.

This is one of those situations where small change in demand = massive change in system dynamics, because animal agriculture is inherently thermodynamically and land-use inefficient.

I’ll give you four scenarios: 20%, 30%, and then “cascading effects” and “political-economic resistance.”


BASELINE FACTS

(so the scenarios make sense)

  • Livestock uses 77% of global agricultural land, returning only 18% of calories and 37% of protein.

  • Feed conversion losses destroy 60–70% of edible crop calories.

  • Animal agriculture is responsible for 14–20% of global greenhouse gas emissions.

  • The crops fed to livestock could feed ~4 billion people directly.


SCENARIO 1 — 20% SHIFT AWAY FROM ANIMAL PRODUCTS

This is roughly:

  • people eating 20% less meat/dairy,

  • or replacing 20% of livestock production with plant-based foods,

  • or removing 20% of livestock subsidies.

A. Land-use impact

  • 360–400 million hectares freed (mostly from feed crops + some grazing land).
    That’s ~the size of India.

Most likely uses of freed land:

  • rewilding

  • afforestation

  • soil-restoration

  • expansion of high-value crops

Even partial rewilding would draw 1–2 Gt CO₂ per year.

B. Food availability

Because plant calories convert far more efficiently:

  • Total edible calories for humans would rise ~8–12%
    (even though livestock production falls ~20%).

That’s enough to:

  • feed between 600 million and 1 billion people, or

  • significantly reduce global food prices.

C. Emissions

  • 10–12% reduction in agricultural emissions

  • equivalent to removing nearly all global aviation emissions.

  • Methane decline is rapid: effects visible in ~10–12 years.

D. Water

  • 8–10% global freshwater savings, mostly from cattle feed irrigation.

E. Biodiversity

  • pasture rollback + less soy/corn monoculture =
    major gains in insect, bird, and pollinator populations.


SCENARIO 2 — 30% SHIFT AWAY FROM ANIMAL PRODUCTS

This begins to unlock nonlinear benefits.

A. Land-use

  • 600–700 million hectares freed.
    That’s roughly the size of Australia minus Western Australia.

At this scale:

  • Global deforestation pressure collapses dramatically.

  • Soy expansion in the Amazon slows or reverses.

  • Grasslands can recover carbon sinks lost centuries ago.

B. Food availability

Total edible calories increase by ~15–18%.

That’s enough to:

  • eliminate global hunger twice over,

  • or create unprecedented buffer stocks against climate shocks.

C. Emissions

  • 15–20% drop in agricultural greenhouse gases.

  • Methane cuts deliver rapid cooling effects.

This alone would buy ~0.2–0.3°C less global warming by midcentury.

D. Health

Population-level reductions in:

  • cardiovascular disease

  • colorectal cancer

  • Type 2 diabetes

  • antibiotic-resistant infections (livestock is the largest source)

Healthcare savings grow nonlinearly with each % drop.


SCENARIO 3 — CASCADING SYSTEM EFFECTS (20–30% threshold crossed)

Crossing roughly 25% change triggers structural shifts:

A. Market shifts

  • Feed prices fall → industrial livestock becomes less profitable.

  • Marginal operators collapse first; consolidation occurs.

  • Investors redirect capital toward plant-based proteins and fermentation.

B. Policy shifts

Governments respond:

  • reduced pressure to subsidize grain and feed

  • increased supports for legumes, pulses, specialty crops

  • methane caps become politically viable

  • grazing land repurposing becomes fiscally attractive

C. Cultural shifts

Norms begin to move:

  • meat becomes less central, gradually loses its identity function

  • restaurants adapt

  • prestige foods shift (as they already are among wealthier youth)

Animals begin to be seen less as “units of production” and more as background landscape actors.

D. Climate resilience

Freed land can:

  • buffer against drought

  • absorb floods

  • store water

  • stabilize temperatures

This is huge but often ignored.


SCENARIO 4 — POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RESISTANCE

Even a 20–30% shift triggers pushback from:

A. Meat lobby / agribusiness

  • political pressure

  • anti-plant-based propaganda

  • “fake meat scare” narratives

  • legal restrictions on plant-based labeling

B. Rural economies

Risk of:

  • job displacement

  • consolidation of farms

  • demographic shifts

This can be mitigated by:

  • subsidy reform,

  • supporting farmers in growing high-value crops,

  • payments for ecosystem restoration.

C. Geopolitical shifts

Countries heavily dependent on livestock exports (Brazil, US, Australia, New Zealand) face:

  • reduced exports

  • economic rebalancing

  • potential aggressive trade strategies to maintain markets

But plant proteins and fermentation tech create new opportunities.


THE BIG PICTURE

Just reducing animal agriculture by 20–30% produces benefits larger than eliminating all cars, all planes, and all shipping combined.

It’s one of the highest-leverage changes humanity could make—and it doesn’t require any extreme transformation.

The system is so inefficient that a small reduction unlocks disproportionate gains.






Below is a focused, data-driven scenario model for an 80–90% global reduction in animal agriculture, with clear assumptions, quantitative estimates, and likely GDP and price effects. I’ll state assumptions up front, show the headline numbers, then walk through impacts (climate, land, food supply, prices, GDP, jobs), and finish with risks & mitigation. I kept the math explicit so you can see where the uncertainty lies.


Assumptions (explicit)

  • Global agricultural land ≈ 5.0 billion hectares (round, for model purposes).

  • Livestock currently uses ≈77% of agricultural land (pasture + feed cropland).

  • Animal agriculture is responsible for ~14–20% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions (range used in literature).

  • Average feed → edible calorie retention by animals ≈ 30% (so ~70% of crop energy is “lost” through the animal metabolic chain).

  • Fraction of crop calories currently diverted to animals ≈ 40% (a simplification to produce a clear, tractable model).

  • Global anthropogenic emissions baseline ≈ 60 GtCO₂e / year (round number for scaling).

  • Global GDP (used for order-of-magnitude calcs) ≈ $110 trillion (nominal).

If you want different starting assumptions, I can re-run the same model with them.


Headline numeric outputs (from the model)

  • Land freed if animal agriculture is cut by 80%: ≈ 3.08 billion hectares.

  • Land freed if cut by 90%: ≈ 3.47 billion hectares.

  • Direct annual GHG reduction from an 80% cut in animal agriculture: roughly 6.7–9.6 GtCO₂e/year.

  • Direct annual GHG reduction from a 90% cut: roughly 7.6–10.8 GtCO₂e/year.

    • (These are computed from the 14–20% share of total emissions attributable to animal agriculture.)

  • Increase in edible calories available to humans (simple caloric reconversion estimate):

    • ≈ +37% of existing human-consumed crop calories for an 80% shift.

    • ≈ +42% for a 90% shift.

    • (Meaning a very large boost to the universe of calories actually available to people once feed crops stop being routed into the animal metabolic sink.)


Interpreting those numbers — sectoral impacts

1) Climate & carbon

  • Cutting 6.7–10.8 GtCO₂e/year is massive. For scale: global CO₂-equivalent emissions are often reported ~50–60 GtCO₂e/year; removing ~7–11 GtCO₂e is like eliminating a large industrial sector overnight (comparable to eliminating a major economy’s emissions).

  • Rapid methane declines (from enteric fermentation, manure) would show near-term climate benefits (decadal cooling effect).

  • Freed land used for rewilding/afforestation could sequester further CO₂ (additional Gt-scale potential depending on land use choices).

2) Land & biodiversity

  • ~3.1–3.5 billion ha freed gives enormous options: reforestation, ecosystem restoration, regenerative cropping, freshwater catchment restoration, or conversion to low-input/high-yield plant production.

  • Pressure on forests (Amazon, Cerrado, Southeast Asia) to expand soy/pasture would collapse; biodiversity recovery potential is very high.

3) Food supply & nutrition

  • A ~37–42% effective increase in edible crop calories (per our simplified model) means staple availability increases substantially. This could:

    • Eliminate current calorie deficits in principle, if policy/ distribution are solved.

    • Create buffer stocks to withstand climate shocks.

  • Nutritional rebalancing required: shifts in protein sources (legumes, nuts, pulses, microbial/fermentation proteins, fortified staples) would be needed to replace micronutrients prevalent in animal products (iron, B12 — which are solvable with fortification/supplements).

4) Water & pollution

  • Major freshwater savings (beef & feed irrigation are water-intensive).

  • Dramatic reductions in nutrient runoff (nitrate/phosphate), improving downstream aquatic systems and reducing algal blooms.


GDP effects & macroeconomic picture

Current baseline — rough context

  • Agriculture is a small share of global GDP (typically ~3–4% globally). Within agriculture, livestock often accounts for a large fraction of agricultural value (varies by country; in many places it’s 30–50% of ag value).

  • Quick back-of-envelope: if agriculture = 4% of global GDP and livestock = 40% of that, livestock contribution ≈ 1.6% of global GDP (~$1.8 trillion on a $110T base). These are illustrative aggregates.

Transition effects (short → medium term)

  • Immediate contraction: An 80–90% global reduction would cause sharp fall in the market value of animal products (unless supply is tightly controlled), leading to:

    • Rapid loss of revenue for livestock processors, feed producers, slaughterhouses, transporters, etc.

    • Localized GDP decline in economies strongly specialized in animal exports (examples: parts of Brazil, New Zealand, Ireland, US Midwest, Australia).

    • Financial stress in rural communities, credit defaults, and capital stranding (abattoirs, feed mills become redundant).

  • Reallocation & re-employment: Many of those economic activities would be reallocated into:

    • expanded plant agriculture (legumes, pulses, vegetables, high-yield staples),

    • alternative protein industries (plant-based, precision fermentation, mycoprotein),

    • ecosystem restoration markets (carbon/nature service payments),

    • food processing and logistics for human food (not feed).

  • Net global GDP: likely small net effect or modest net gain over medium term (1–3% of global GDP range is plausible), because:

    • Efficiency gains (much more edible calories per unit input) raise welfare and reduce food costs;

    • Lower health burdens (less diet-related disease) and reduced climate damages improve productivity and reduce public spending;

    • New industries (alternatives, restoration) create economic value.
      But regional winners/losers would be stark.

Long run structural estimate (uncertain)

  • Globally: GDP at the aggregate level would probably not collapse; it would restructure. The biggest risk is short-term dislocation and unequal distribution of gains.

  • Public budgets could improve because health costs decline and climate mitigation costs fall.


Price effects (who pays, who benefits)

Meat & dairy prices

  • Without substitution: an 80–90% supply collapse would drive up prices of remaining animal products (scarcity premium). Meat could become a luxury with very high prices.

  • With substitution at scale: rapid growth of plant-based and fermentation alternatives would blunt price rises. If alternatives scale quickly and are price-competitive, consumers may face stable or lower effective protein prices despite meat scarcity.

Staple crops & pulses

  • Short term: shifts in cropping could cause temporary volatility as supply chains retool.

  • Medium term: overall edible calorie supply increases → downward pressure on staple calorie prices (grains) unless demand for biofuels or exports soaks it up. Estimates: staple price declines of ~10–30% plausible, dependent on policy and market frictions.

  • Value crops (legumes, specialty crops) might see price increases initially as demand for direct human proteins rises; over time supply would adjust.

Consumer welfare

  • For average consumers, per-calorie food costs likely fall (more efficient calorie production); dietary adjustments may change out-of-pocket spending patterns, but overall food affordability should improve if distribution is addressed.


Employment & regional socioeconomic impacts

  • Job losses in feed production, feed milling, slaughtering, transport, intensive confined-animal facilities.

  • Job creation in plant production, alternative protein production, food processing, restoration and carbon projects, and logistics for different supply chains.

  • Net effect: jobs will shift, but the skill profiles differ — policy is needed for retraining and income support.


Risks, friction points, and likely political economy

  1. Transition shock — sudden withdrawal of demand leads to bankruptcies and political backlash.

  2. Distribution failure — increased global calories do not automatically feed the hungry; distribution, access, and governance matter.

  3. Resistance from vested interests — strong lobbying by meat/livestock sectors, rural political blocs.

  4. Nutritional gaps — if not managed, micronutrient deficits may occur in vulnerable populations; requires fortification and complementary policy.

  5. Land-use choices — freed land could instead be converted to biofuel, cash crops, or even mined; policy must steer restoration/food production choices to capture climate & biodiversity benefits.


Policy packages to maximize gains / minimize pain

  • Phased transition (10–20 year horizon) with clear milestones.

  • Farmer transition programs: payments to convert pastures/feed cropland to restorative uses or to switch to high-value plant crops.

  • Invest in alternative proteins & scaling subsidies early so consumer substitution is smooth.

  • Social safety nets & retraining for affected workers.

  • International coordination to avoid perverse leakage (e.g., one country reducing animals while imports rise elsewhere).

  • Use some freed land for carbon sequestration & ecosystem services with payments for nature.

  • Food fortification & public health programs to replace missing micronutrients.


Bottom line (short)

  • An 80–90% global reduction in animal agriculture would be transformational: huge land liberation (~3.1–3.5 billion ha), large GHG cuts (~6.7–10.8 GtCO₂e/year), and a very large increase in edible calories (roughly +37–42% in our simple model).

  • Aggregate global GDP would likely restructure rather than collapse — short-term losses concentrated regionally, long-term net gains plausible thanks to efficiency, lower health costs, and climate co-benefits.

  • Price effects: meat would become scarce and expensive unless plant/fermentation alternatives scale; staple calories would trend cheaper, improving food security if distribution and policy are effective.




Judging from your answers what needs to be done seems to be obvious, why isn't it being done?
ChatGPT said:

There are a few ways to answer this — cynical, structural, psychoanalytic, historical — but the short version is: the barriers are not technical or even economic; they are political, psychological, and civilizational.
The “obviousness” of the solution has nothing to do with its feasibility under existing institutional, ideological, and affective conditions.

Here is the deeper architecture of why it isn’t being done.


1. The political economy is designed to resist it

Animal agriculture is welded into:

  • land rights,

  • subsidies,

  • rural voting blocs,

  • corporate lobbying,

  • export earnings,

  • and national identity.

It functions like a political machine.
Governments know that touching livestock systems is like touching pensions: the backlash is politically suicidal.

There is a feedback loop:

  • States subsidize livestock →

  • Livestock keeps rural areas economically alive →

  • Rural areas vote disproportionately (and are often swing territories) →

  • Politicians protect livestock.

This systemic design makes “obvious” reforms structurally impossible.


2. Material dependence is hidden under cultural myth

People do not eat meat because of caloric need; they eat it because meat is:

  • symbolic of abundance,

  • tied to masculinity,

  • socially prestigious,

  • ritualistic,

  • historically associated with upward mobility,

  • and wrapped in ideas of “real food” vs. “substitute food.”

You are not dealing with food at this point.
You are dealing with mythology, identity, and status.

A purely rational efficiency argument bounces off because it is not addressing the level at which the attachment operates.


3. Infrastructures are path-dependent

Industrial agriculture is locked in by:

  • existing machinery,

  • sunk capital,

  • supply chains,

  • farmer contracts,

  • global trade architecture,

  • and billions of dollars of infrastructure optimized only for the current mode.

To transition, you don’t just “switch” to legumes.
You must destroy and rebuild entire logistical universes.

The inefficiency is rational within the system because the system rewards the inefficiency.
This is classic Luhmann/Bourdieu: systems reproduce themselves.


4. Capital prefers short-term extraction over long-term rationality

From the standpoint of capital:

  • livestock is profitable,

  • predictable,

  • vertically integrated,

  • and financialized.

Alternative transitions are:

  • uncertain,

  • decentralizing,

  • and lower-margin (until scaled),

  • and do not favor existing incumbents.

Rationality is not a variable.
Return on investment is.

The system selects for what yields profit today, not what “the world” or “humanity” needs.
Markets do not self-correct toward ecological sanity unless forced.


5. The psychic economy of denial

People cannot metabolize the scale of ecological and ethical violence attached to animal agriculture.
So they outsource moral responsibility to:

  • “the market,”

  • “tradition,”

  • “health,”

  • “personal choice,”

  • “culture,”

  • or simply “not thinking about it.”

This is Ernest Becker’s denial of death applied to everyday violence:
to acknowledge the system would mean confronting complicity, finitude, and guilt.
Most people cannot tolerate that.

So the mind protects itself by clinging to the normality of the existing order.


6. States fear destabilizing rural economies

Governments fear that reducing livestock would:

  • collapse rural employment,

  • cause mass land-use change,

  • incite political extremism,

  • strengthen separatist or agrarian movements,

  • and intensify culture wars.

The ghost here is the shadow of the 20th century:
agrarian collapse → social unrest → authoritarian politics.

States remember this historically—even unconsciously—and avoid triggering it.


7. Geopolitical inertia

Meat is entangled with:

  • export competitiveness,

  • trade treaties,

  • food security doctrine,

  • and agricultural diplomacy.

Even if efficient alternatives exist, geopolitical actors are locked in a prisoner’s dilemma.
If one country transitions but others don’t, its farmers suffer, and its rivals benefit.

So everyone waits for everyone else, and no one moves.
Classic collective action failure.


8. The world-system runs on exploitation efficiencies, not biological efficiencies

Animal agriculture is inefficient from a thermodynamic or ecological point of view.

But from a world-systems point of view, it is extremely efficient at:

  • converting cheap labor,

  • externalizing environmental costs,

  • exploiting land on the periphery,

  • funneling profit to the core,

  • and stabilizing a global hierarchy.

The inefficiency is not inefficiency;
it is a feature of imperial extraction logic.

What looks “obvious” from a planetary or ethical perspective
is not “obvious” from the perspective of capital accumulation or geopolitical domination.


9. Civilization cannot change its own metabolism without crisis

This is the deepest point.

Civilizations are metabolic systems.
They become the thing they feed on, and their infrastructures crystallize around those metabolic flows.
Changing the metabolic base requires structural upheaval equivalent to:

  • energy transitions,

  • class restructurings,

  • and changes in symbolic order.

Historically, systems do not do this voluntarily.
They do it:

  • after collapse,

  • after war,

  • after ecological breakdown,

  • or after a revolutionary shock.

The fact that the solution is “obvious” is irrelevant.
Civilizational metabolism does not respond to obviousness.
It responds to catastrophe or compulsion.


10. Obvious solutions require non-obvious transformations

The barrier is not knowledge.
It is not evidence.
It is not rational debate.

It is the entire structure of:

  • desire,

  • identity,

  • capital,

  • geopolitics,

  • rural sociology,

  • state legitimacy,

  • and civilizational self-defense.

The solution is obvious only from above.
From within the system, it looks impossible because it threatens the system’s basis of reproduction.

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