Modern physics has almost entirely replaced material substance with fields and symmetry structures as the ontological furniture of the universe.

Forces

• Since the 20th century, forces are not fundamental entities.

• In quantum field theory (QFT), what used to be called “forces” are interactions mediated by exchange of field quanta (e.g., photons for electromagnetism, gluons for strong interactions).

• “Force” is a derived or emergent notion for macroscopic scales.

Fields

Fields are fundamental, but not “material” in any classical sense:

• A field is a mathematical assignment of quantities to spacetime points.

• They do not have mass, solidity, or extension in the classical sense.

• Yet they are arguably the “stuff” of the universe in contemporary physics. Many philosophers say fields have physicality without having materiality.

Einstein already insisted that:

• Matter = excitations of fields

• Energy-momentum distribution (not “stuff”) is what curves spacetime

Quantum field theory radicalizes this:
Everything—electrons, quarks, photons, the Higgs—is a vibration or excitation in underlying quantum fields.

So: Are fields material?
Only if “material” is stretched beyond recognition.

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2. Does the notion of “material” have traction in modern science?

Physics: almost none

The term “material” is mostly obsolete as a technical category. Reasons:

1. Wave–particle duality collapses matter/non-matter distinctions
   Electrons behave like waves; photons behave like particles; neither is matter in a classical sense.

2. Mass-energy equivalence (E=mc²) blurs materiality
   Mass is a form of energy, not a substance.

3. Fields replace substances
   Instead of matter being “little pellets in space,” physics now treats everything as dynamical fields.

4. Spacetime itself may be emergent
   In general relativity and quantum gravity, spacetime curvature is not a material substance.

To many physicists, asking “is this material?” is like asking whether a matrix is “wet.”

Chemistry and materials science: limited but operational

These fields talk about “materials,” but that’s a practical engineering term, not an ontological one.
“Material” here means:

• stable aggregates of atoms

• with specific mechanical/thermal/electronic properties
  This is far from metaphysical.

Biology: material plays no conceptual role

Organisms are dynamical systems, processes, information flows. “Material” appears only in the trivial sense that organisms are made of matter.

Philosophy of science: the notion is largely abandoned

Most contemporary philosophers of physics (e.g., David Wallace, Harvey Brown, Jenann Ismael, Tim Maudlin) avoid “material” entirely. The ontological discussions revolve instead around:

• fields

• particles as field excitations

• spacetime

• symmetries

• information

• causal or dynamical structure

Even physicalism has moved away from equating “physical” with “material.”

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3. If the sciences don’t use “material,” why do people keep trying?

Because “material” is a folk-metaphysical term inherited from:

• Aristotle’s hylomorphism (matter/form)

• Early modern corpuscularianism (tiny hard bodies)

• 19th-century mechanical philosophy

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4. So what is the ontological category replacing “material”?

Different camps propose different replacements:

Field ontology

Reality = continuous fields; particles = excitations.

Structural realism

Reality = relational/dynamical structure, not objects.

Process ontology (Heisenberg, Bohm, Whitehead-adjacent)

Reality = processes, events, becoming.

Information-theoretic ontology (Wheeler, Rovelli)

Reality = information or relations; matter = derivative.

Spacetime primitivism (Maudlin)

The base reality is spacetime + fields defined on it.

All of these frameworks displace classical materialism.

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Bottom line

In modern science, especially physics, the concept of “material” has almost no conceptual traction.
It’s a holdover from a discarded ontology.

The real ontological primitives are:

• fields

• spacetime

• symmetries

• interactions

• dynamical processes

If one wants to preserve a notion of “material,” one must redefine it in a radically abstract manner—essentially collapsing it into field or process.