Robert Chapman

"In proposing the ecological model I have aimed to show that there is room for a viable functional analysis on the neurodiversity paradigm that can be used as an alternative to comparatively individualistic, fitnessbased evolutionary models. To summarize, there are three key differences between evolutionary accounts and the ecological model. First, my account is oriented toward the future, whereas the respective accounts of Boorse and Wakefield are oriented toward the present or past. Second, the ecological model is multilevel in that it takes group propensities and niche contributions into account alongside individual propensities. Third, the ecological model has a relational conception of functions rather than taking them to be intrinsic. Framed in this manner, the claim that many minority ways of being associated with individual disability are natural human variations (rather than dysfunctions) is feasible. It is important to stress that I do not mean to present the ecological model as a rival to evolutionary models per se. After all, my model is specifically for understanding human mental functioning only, not for understanding biological functioning. It may also be that which model is preferable will be determined by the specific case. As Maung (2018) has argued, rather than there being a single “correct” model of health or functions, different models will be more or less useful in different instances. I suspect the ecological model will be more helpful for thinking about autism, dyslexia, and many other mental disabilities but much less so for thinking about, say, infant anencephaly, which in my view would be best framed as an inherently dysfunctional neurological disorder. By being able to take a range of functions that are obscured or overlooked by more individualistic evolutionary accounts, the ecological model allows us to recognize a greater variety of cognitive differences without unduly pathologizing them. It is also important to note that I do not claim to have solved all the problems I associated with the evolutionary models. For instance, I do not claim that I can precisely draw the line between function and dysfunction any more easily than the evolutionary accounts can. Whatever way function and dysfunction are measured, some reference class or another will be proposed, and it is hard to avoid at least some level of arbitrariness when determining the appropriate reference class, which makes the possibility of error impossible to wholly eliminate.5 Despite this, I take the possibility of error to be less of an issue for my approach. Being able to objectively demarcate exactly who is functional or dysfunctional is necessary for medical research projects that categorize humans on the basis of those who are mentally well and those who are mentally disordered. But because the ecological model rejects this approach and instead frames functions and dysfunctions as relational, then the issue of where we draw the line becomes far less pressing. Hence, although this issue is not solved on this account, it is dissolved to some extent, because the importance of getting the distinction exactly right stems from the high stakes involved in the medical approach. Beyond its theoretical benefits, part of my argument for the ecological model is a pragmatic one: It may serve as a useful basis for directing future scientific research, clinical understanding, and the public understanding of disability. For scientific researchers, adopting this analysis will lead them to ask not “What is wrong with this individual or group in relation to those who are normal?” but rather “How can we understand the strengths, limitations, struggles, or potential of this group or individual in the wider social context?” Arguably, this reorientation might help to capture the complexity of disability and ability in their broader social context in a way that is more nuanced than Neurodiversity and the Social Ecology of Mental Functions 1369 existing models. In turn, the ecological model might also allow great flexibility when it comes to psychotherapeutic practice or the development of individual self-understanding because it is better at capturing the complexity of psychological ability and disability in their broader contexts than the orthodox accounts. Finally, when it comes to public understanding, the shift away from individual pathology to relational dysfunction and function may help to alleviate the stigma surrounding disability. Although it is by no means necessary that an individual should benefit the community for their rights and value to be recognized—as mentioned above, it is a core component of the neurodiversity perspective to affirm the value and rights of disabled people regardless of functional propensities—a reorientation toward recognizing neurodivergence as part of humanity’s social ecology would be a positive one. The concept of neurodiversity, as Judy Singer (2020) has recently written, orients us toward seeing that “the more neurodiversity is respected and facilitated within a culture, the more stable, adaptable and sustainable that culture is''.

Chapman