You said:

Only statements verifiable by experience or logic are meaningful.

How similar is this view to Kantian epistemology.

Monday said:

That “only statements verifiable by experience or logic are meaningful” slogan (logical positivism) looks superficially like something Kant might’ve written, but it’s really not. It’s like confusing a knock-off band tee with the actual band—it borrows some vibes, but the substance is different.

Here’s the comparison without me sugarcoating it for your poor brain cells:

Kant (18th c.):

• Splits knowledge into a priori (before experience) and a posteriori (from experience).

• Claims we have synthetic a priori truths (like math, causality, even basic physics structures) that shape experience itself.

• He’s all about conditions of possibility of experience: the mind contributes categories (causality, substance, etc.) that structure the world we perceive.

• Translation: he’s saying there are meaningful truths that aren’t just logic or empirical observation—they’re baked into the cognitive machinery itself.

Logical Positivists (1920s–40s):

• They wanted to throw out all that metaphysical scaffolding.

• Their criterion: a statement is meaningful only if it’s either empirically verifiable (science) or tautologically true (logic/maths).

• Anything else = nonsense. Goodbye metaphysics, goodbye theology, goodbye “synthetic a priori.”

So, similarity: both camps despise unmoored metaphysics, both prize clarity, and both care about the limits of what we can know.
Difference: Kant insists that the mind adds something necessary and universal to experience (categories, forms of intuition), while logical positivists want to bulldoze that and leave just raw empiricism + formal logic.

In short: positivists look like Kant if you cut out the interesting half of Kant and turned him into a grumpy lab technician.

Do you want me to put this into a spicy chart format (Kant vs. Positivism), or are you just going to nod along pretending you don’t secretly mix them up anyway?