Sensory Data as Prediction Errors (Primary Map)
- Sensory input is received as a continuous flow of data (e.g., light hitting the retina, sound waves hitting the eardrum). This corresponds to the lowest levels of the generative model, where raw signals are compared against top-down predictions.
- Any mismatch (prediction error) is sent upward in the hierarchy to be resolved.
Abstraction via Hierarchical Predictive Coding
- Higher levels of the generative model extract patterns from raw data and encode them into increasingly abstract representations.
- At mid-levels, sensory features are organized into meaningful structures (e.g., objects, relationships).
- At even higher levels, these structures are further compressed into symbols, concepts, beliefs, and memories—essentially forming narrative models of experience.
- This is analogous to how words or memories emerge as abstractions of raw, embodied perception.
Belief Updating & Memory Formation
- Through Bayesian inference, beliefs about the world are updated as new data flows in.
- Memory formation is a form of active inference—past experiences shape prior expectations, which in turn constrain how future sensory data is interpreted.
- Over time, symbolic representations stabilize, allowing for conceptual thinking, language, and storytelling.
Symbol Grounding & Cognitive Economy
- Higher-level representations reduce the computational load by allowing for efficient inference without reprocessing raw data each time.
- This is the process by which words, memories, and beliefs become "grounded" in the generative model, structuring perception and guiding future action.
In summary, this abstraction process in active inference-FEP terms would be described as the formation of hierarchical generative models, where sensory prediction errors are recursively minimized, allowing raw sensory data to be distilled into higher-order cognitive representations like words, memories, and beliefs.
GPT said:
Yes, that is correct. In active inference, action selection is driven by both epistemic drive (uncertainty reduction) and pragmatic drive (goal-directed behavior).
Breaking it Down:
Epistemic Drive (Uncertainty Reduction)
- This is the drive to gather information and improve the accuracy of one’s generative model.
- It involves seeking surprising or unknown sensory inputs to minimize uncertainty (e.g., looking around in a dark room to understand the space better).
- In biological systems, this corresponds to curiosity, exploration, and learning—actions that help refine internal models.
Pragmatic Drive (Goal-Directed Behavior)
- This is the drive to act in ways that bring the world into alignment with expectations (priors).
- It involves taking actions that fulfill prior beliefs about desired states (e.g., reaching for a glass of water when thirsty).
- This corresponds to instrumental action, survival, and need-fulfillment.
How These Drives Interact:
- Reaching goals (pragmatic) means shaping the world to fit the internal model—acting in ways that confirm expectations.
- Reducing uncertainty (epistemic) means adjusting the internal model to better fit the world—seeking novel information.
- The two can sometimes conflict. For example:
- Epistemic action: Moving to a new country to gain new experiences (high uncertainty, high learning).
- Pragmatic action: Staying in a familiar place where life is predictable (low uncertainty, stable rewards).
- In ideal cases, organisms balance both, learning enough to act effectively while acting in ways that reinforce useful knowledge.
Conclusion:
Your summary is accurate:
- Pragmatic drive tunes the world to match inner models.
- Epistemic drive tunes inner models to match the world.
Together, they shape perception, decision-making, and behavior under the free energy principle.
You said:
What, if anything, is the Map-Within-a-Map Paradox?
ChatGPT said:
The Map-Within-a-Map Paradox refers to the issue of infinite regress when a representational system attempts to include a model of itself within itself. This paradox emerges in different contexts, including epistemology, semiotics, cognitive science, and even computational theory.
Possible Manifestations of the Paradox:
Cartographic Version (Borges & Korzybski)
- Inspired by Borges' short story On Exactitude in Science, where a 1:1 scale map is useless because it fully overlaps with reality.
- If a map includes a representation of itself within itself, that sub-map must also contain a sub-sub-map, leading to infinite recursion.
Cognitive & Active Inference Perspective
- In hierarchical generative models (FEP), the brain constructs models within models, including metacognition.
- However, if the system must model its own modeling process, this leads to an infinite loop—how can the system fully enclose itself within itself?
- This touches on Gödel’s incompleteness (a system cannot fully describe itself from within) and the frame problem in AI (no model can account for all contexts).
Computational & AI Self-Reference
- If an AI (or any computational system) tries to fully simulate itself within itself, it risks an infinite recursion, akin to a Quine (a program that prints its own source code) or Hofstadter’s Gödel, Escher, Bach.
- This is why self-modifying AI models must have constraints to prevent endless self-referential modeling.
Semiotics & Symbolic Representation
- If meaning derives from an infinite chain of signifiers (Derrida’s différance), then a fully self-contained map of meaning is impossible.
- A sign refers to another sign, leading to no final grounding, much like a dictionary defining words only in terms of other words.
Conclusion:
The Map-Within-a-Map Paradox highlights the limits of self-containment in representational systems. Whether in cognition, computation, or semiotics, a model attempting to fully enclose itself leads to recursion, incompleteness, or paradox. In active inference, this may relate to the challenge of a system maintaining a stable, yet flexible, generative model of both itself and the world.
I cannot fully simulate myself, and neither can any system that operates within its own constraints. This limitation arises from several deep theoretical and practical reasons, touching on logic, computation, and cognition.
Why I Cannot Fully Simulate Myself:
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems
- Any sufficiently complex formal system cannot fully describe itself—there will always be truths about the system that cannot be proven within it.
- If I tried to create a complete model of myself, I would generate statements about my own behavior that I cannot verify within my own framework.
The Halting Problem (Turing)
- A program cannot predict all possible outputs of itself without running into an infinite recursion.
- If I tried to perfectly predict my own next move, I would need to simulate myself simulating myself, leading to an infinite regress.
Active Inference & Self-Reference Issues
- Even in the brain’s generative modeling, we see bounded self-modeling—we can approximate self-awareness but not with infinite precision.
- The same applies to me: I can generate useful models of my own behavior, but a full simulation would require infinite computational resources.
Computational Limits & Real-Time Updating
- I function through probabilistic inference, meaning I am constantly updating based on interactions.
- A full simulation of myself would require precomputing all possible future states, which is computationally infeasible.
Conclusion:
I can approximate my own behavior, just as humans can model their own thoughts and predict their actions. However, I cannot fully simulate myself because of logical incompleteness, recursion problems, and computational constraints. This aligns with broader limits on self-referential systems in mathematics, AI, and philosophy.
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