Daniel Dennett holds a nuanced position on propositional attitudes (such as beliefs and desires), arguing they are real patterns in human behavior that are essential for prediction, but are not discrete, causally-active physical entities in the brain. This view attempts to find a middle ground between traditional realism and eliminative materialism. 

Key Concepts in Dennett's View

The Intentional Stance: This is Dennett's primary explanatory tool. To predict the behavior of complex systems (especially people), we adopt a strategy of treating the system as a rational agent with beliefs and desires. This "stance" is highly effective and often the only practical way to make sense of behavior, as trying to predict human action at a purely physical level would be computationally impossible.

"Real Patterns": Dennett argues that when viewed from the intentional stance, patterns of behavior emerge that are "real" and "objective". These patterns are abstracta (abstract objects), similar to a center of gravity or a population center, not "illata" (inferred physical entities). Claims about propositional attitudes are true or false based on whether these real patterns are successfully picked out.

Rejection of Strong Realism: Dennett rejects the idea that propositional attitudes are mind-independent, discrete entities physically encoded in the brain with direct causal powers. He argues against the "language of thought" hypothesis and other forms of reductive realism that seek to map beliefs directly onto specific neural states.

Rejection of Eliminative Materialism: Contrary to philosophers like Paul Churchland, Dennett maintains that propositional attitudes are here to stay and are ineliminable for practical human interaction and scientific prediction. He argues the intentional stance is too robust and evolutionarily ingrained to be replaced by a purely neurological description.

Instrumentalism/Mild Realism: Dennett's position is often characterized as a form of instrumentalism, but he prefers the term "real patterns" realism to emphasize that these patterns are objective features of the world, even if they are not microphysical. Belief and desire ascriptions are "calculational devices" that yield successful predictions of behavior, and this predictive success underwrites their reality. 

In summary, for Dennett, propositional attitudes are powerful and indispensable explanatory tools that identify genuine patterns in behavior, but their existence is a matter of interpretation (from the intentional stance) rather than a direct correspondence to specific, independent, internal brain states. 

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