The phenomenon that Lorde, Britto Schwartz, Morrison, and many others have identified and criticized is what I term epistemic exploitation. Epistemic exploitation occurs when privileged persons compel marginalized persons to produce an education or explanation about the nature of the oppression they face.[1] Epistemic exploitation is a variety of epistemic oppression marked by unrecognized, uncompensated, emotionally taxing, coerced epistemic labor. It maintains structures of oppression by centering the needs and desires of dominant groups and exploiting the emotional and cognitive labor of members of marginalized groups who are required to do the unpaid and often unacknowledged work of providing information, resources, and evidence of oppression to privileged persons who demand it—and who benefit from those very oppressive systems about which they demand to be educated.
Epistemic exploitation is ubiquitous. It is common within institutions of higher education, activist coalitions and alliances, and interpersonal relationships. Despite its pervasiveness, however, it is not widely recognized as a component of epistemic or social and political oppression. Rather, it masquerades as a necessary and even epistemically virtuous form of intellectual engagement, and it is often treated as an indispensable method of attaining knowledge. Epistemic exploitation goes by many other names. Standard conversational norms allow epistemic exploitation to masquerade as any number of acceptable and normalized practices—‘exercising harmless curiosity,’ ‘just asking a question,’ ‘making a well-intentioned effort to learn,’ ‘offering alternative explanations,’ and ‘playing devil’s advocate’ are a few of the labels used to describe epistemically exploitative interactions. These innocuous euphemisms all help to mask the oppressive power dynamics at play in instances of epistemic exploitation.
That many of these euphemistic covers frame epistemic exploitation as a virtuous epistemic practice related to the pursuit of truth is one reason that the practice is both widespread and vigorously defended. This creates a burden on the marginalized to educate and enlighten. Though the privileged demand the epistemic labor of the marginalized, they often perpetuate epistemic oppression by dismissing the knowledge produced. The marginalized are excluded from the realm of recognized knowledge creators despite contributing novel conceptual resources and epistemic frameworks.
Nora Berenstain
Consider the first harm: the potential opportunity costs faced by the oppressed due to the labor of producing an explanation. On Berenstain’s account, such costs include the fact that the labor will be “financially uncompensated, time-consuming, and mentally draining” (573). As the relevant acts of inquiry will always request explanations from marginalized persons, and all explanations will be time-consuming and mentally draining, any such act of inquiry will request the time and mental energy of marginalized persons. Given that 4 There is textual evidence to suggest that (E1) is a plausible interpretation of Berenstain’s position. First, in describing instances of epistemic exploitation, Berenstain frequently describes scenarios in which none of the three harms appear to be present. For example, she argues that epistemic exploitation “can be perpetrated through wellintentioned requests to help one learn about oppression” (571), and that epistemic exploitation occurs even when “upon being educated the privileged start pushing back in tangible ways against the oppressive systems” (575). Moreover, Berenstain explicitly states that what we generally think of as a virtuous act of inquiry by a privileged person into the conditions of a marginalized person’s disadvantage is, in fact, epistemic exploitation: “it (epistemic exploitation) masquerades as a necessary and even epistemically virtuous form of intellectual engagement, and it is often treated as an indispensable method of attaining knowledge” (570). Finally, within a list of the “many other names” of epistemic exploitation, Berenstain includes the phrase “making a well-intentioned effort to learn” (570- 571). While ‘a well-intentioned effort to learn’ might produce one of the three harms, none of the three harms can be plausibly held to be constitutive components of such an effort. Each of these points suggests that (E1) is a plausible interpretation of Berenstain’s position. 5 Berenstain considers the request of the time and mental energy of marginalized persons by the privileged to be indicative of an epistemically exploitative sense of entitlement (575, 576, 577), her account entails that the first harm of epistemic exploitation will accompany any act of inquiry by a privileged individual into the conditions of a marginalized individual’s oppression. Alternatively, consider the second harm: the double-bind produced by the presumed expectation of the privileged that an explanation will be given. Berenstain argues that such a double-bind is produced by the penalties which accompany any potential response to an inquiry: if the marginalized person gives into the pressure to provide an explanation she will be required to provide uncompensated labor, and if she does not give into the pressure to provide an explanation, then she will often be perceived as having committed an affront (576). However, such double-binds are produced by the complex interaction of systemic pressures, rather than the conduct of any one individual (Frye, 3). Moreover, as highlighted by Laurence Thomas, the social reality of marginalized individuals is such that when discussing the conditions of oppression with privileged individuals, there will always be an underlying vulnerability, even if the privileged individual is a trustworthy friend (366-367). This vulnerability stems from the fact that any response could elicit some form of penalty (367). As such, any act of inquiry into the conditions of a marginalized person’s oppression will confront her with a double-bind, forcing her to choose which penalty to risk subjecting herself to. All acts of inquiry will thus be accompanied by Berenstain’s second harm.
Berenstain is thus advancing a normative framework in which privileged individuals ought not to ask marginalized individuals about the conditions of their oppression. 3 Barriers to Resisting Oppression Berenstain’s restriction on inquiry might first appear to be a welcome outcome, as it prevents the isolated harms from occuring. However, the restriction ultimately sustains oppression, rather than preventing it. In particular, her restriction sustains hermeneutical marginalization, an epistemic injustice highlighted by Miranda Fricker in “Epistemic Injustice and the Preservation of Ignorance.” As defined by Fricker, hermeneutical marginalization occurs when some social groups are less able to contribute to the pool of conceptual and interpretive resources that are deemed as legitimate by broader society (2016, 158). Importantly, hermeneutical marginalization arises when the flow of information between social groups is restricted. This is a consequence of the mere fact that for conceptual and interpretive resources to be deemed legitimate by broader society, they must first be successfully communicated to broader society. Consider the process through which the concept of sexual harassment was legitimized (Siegal, 18). The concept was first developed by Carmita Wood and her contemporaries in 1975, yet it took nearly two decades before the concept was legally recognized, yet alone socially recognized (Fricker 2007, 150). If Wood had been unable to communicate to persons of privilege (i.e. men) about her experiences, then the concept of sexual 7 harassment would not have been legitimized within the pool of hermeneutical resources. At the time, men occupied a clear majority of the positions of legal authority, meaning that for the concept to be legally recognized, a critical mass of men would have to deem the concept as legitimate (Siegal, 18). Had Wood been unwilling or unable to communicate...her experiences, she would have been left hermeneutically marginalized, unable to contribute to the pool of hermeneutical resources. Berenstain, through the restrictions she places on inquiry, leaves disadvantaged social groups hermeneutically marginalized.
BRENNAN NEAL
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