Isabelle Stengers is generally critical of instrumentalism, though her position is more nuanced than a simple rejection. Her work in the Philosophy of Science argues that reducing science to a mere instrument for prediction, control, or technological application misunderstands how scientific practices actually produce knowledge.
Below are the key elements of her view.
1. What “Instrumentalism” Means in This Context
Instrumentalism—here referring to the philosophical position Instrumentalism—treats scientific theories as tools for predicting and manipulating phenomena, rather than as attempts to describe reality.
In an instrumentalist view:
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Scientific theories are useful models.
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Their value lies in successful prediction or practical control.
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Whether they are “true” descriptions of the world is considered irrelevant.
2. Stengers’ Main Concern: Instrumentalism Flattens Science
Stengers argues that instrumentalism oversimplifies what scientists actually do.
For her, science is not merely about producing tools. It involves:
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creating new ways of posing problems
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establishing constraints imposed by phenomena
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developing experimental practices that force researchers to respond to the world
She often describes science as a process where nature “answers back.”
In other words, scientific practice is not purely instrumental manipulation; it involves being forced to acknowledge something real and resistant in the world.
3. Her Idea of “Reciprocal Capture”
A recurring idea in Stengers’ philosophy is that scientific knowledge emerges through what she calls reciprocal capture between:
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researchers
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instruments
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theories
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phenomena
Scientists attempt to control or isolate phenomena, but those phenomena also constrain and reshape the scientists’ theories.
This makes science neither:
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pure discovery of objective truth
nor -
mere instrumental manipulation.
Instead, it is a negotiated process between humans and the world.
4. The Political Problem with Instrumentalism
Stengers is also concerned about the political consequences of instrumental thinking.
If science is seen only as a tool for control, it becomes easy to justify:
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technocratic authority
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domination of nature
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disregard for alternative forms of knowledge
She argues that science should instead be understood as one practice among others that creates obligations to the phenomena it studies.
This connects to her collaborations with thinkers like Bruno Latour and her engagement with science studies.
5. Her Alternative: “Ecology of Practices”
Rather than instrumentalism, Stengers proposes an idea she calls an “ecology of practices.”
This means:
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different knowledge practices (science, politics, indigenous knowledge, activism) each have their own constraints and values
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none should simply dominate the others
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scientific knowledge should be understood within a pluralistic ecosystem of practices
Science remains powerful and valuable—but not merely as a tool of control.
In Short
Stengers’ position can be summarized as:
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Instrumentalism captures one aspect of science (its usefulness).
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But it misrepresents science if taken as the whole story.
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Scientific practice is better understood as a dynamic interaction between researchers and the world that constrains them.
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