''What is so absolute about the new type of evil at Auschwitz is, for Arendt, that it is seemingly not done from any “humanly comprehensible motive[s]”.6 It is a type of evil that goes radically beyond the Kantian categorical imperative, which forbids us to treat persons solely as means rather than as ends-in-themselves. If a person is treated as a means, this at least implies that the person is considered to have some utility or value, namely that of achieving an end. But radical evil is absolute evil because it takes this to its absolute extreme; concentration camp inmates are treated not as persons, nor even as things or means, worthy of achieving a particular end, but as intrinsically valueless, as completely useless and thus as totally superfluous. Arendt argues that radical evil is perpetrated through a three step process. The first essential step in this process is the killing of the juridical person. This involves removing all of a person’s legal rights as a citizen, that is, removing a person’s ‘right to have rights’ before the law. 7 As far as the law is concerned such superfluous people simply do not exist. Concentration camps serve this end practically by creating an environment where any pretext to having rights is completely abolished. Thus it is essential that people are not incarcerated in the concentration camps for any legal reason, that is, they cannot be thought of as criminals, as this would imply that they had some legal standing.8 This results in a system of arbitrary detention which forms an integral part of the totalising domination that a totalitarian system seeks to impose on its entire populace. Secondly, the moral person is killed, and this is achieved by removing the very possibility of making moral choices. The moral person presupposes the freedom to choose between doing good or evil, but in a totalitarian regime this freedom is removed through the elimination of good as a possible choice. For example, when a person is “faced with the alternative of betraying and thus murdering his friends or of sending his wife and children…to their death; when even suicide would mean the immediate murder of his own family”,9 the very possibility of choosing good is removed. Further, the traditional outlet of martyrdom, by which the moral person could defy evil, is also removed by making death itself completely anonymous, thereby robbing it of all testimony, grief and remembrance.10 As such, “martyrdom...[becomes] impossible”.11 Thus the one thing a person alone truly possesses, their own death, is stolen from them, thereby proving the totalitarian regime’s assertion that nothing really belonged to them and that they belonged to no one. It is as if they had never really existed at all. Finally, in order to complete the process of radical evil any remaining trace of uniqueness, individuality and spontaneity must be totally removed. Spontaneity is for Arendt the mere possibility of doing something that cannot be simply and completely explained on the basis of reactions to the environment and preceding events. For Kant, spontaneity is a transcendental condition of our very humanity, for without it there can be no rationality and no freedom. However, for Arendt what the Nazi death camps expose is how human spontaneity can be undermined by the phenomenon of totalitarianism.12 The case of the so called Muselmänner in the Nazi death camps illustrate this point all too well.13 A person’s spontaneity has been removed when they have been reduced to a bundle of reactions, which “can be exchanged at random for any other”,14 as they are all identically valueless, and so perfectly replaceable. Hence, radical evil, by literally destroying spontaneity, also destroys the very essence of humanity, and thereby seeks to make humanity itself absolutely superfluous. Thus far I have only described Arendt’s definition of what radical evil is and explored an analysis of how it arises; we are now in the position to explore why it is perpetrated. This question is particularly difficult since it appears as if the concentration camps themselves had neither economic nor military utility. But, as Arendt explains: “the uselessness of the camps...is only apparent. In reality they are more essential to the preservation of the regime’s power than any other of its institutions”.15 In other words, while the concentration camps seek to make the human essence absolutely superfluous, as an institution of radical evil, the concentration camps are themselves anything but superfluous to totalitarianism. Indeed, they are the very “laboratories in which the fundamental belief of totalitarianism, that everything is possible, is being verified”. 16 As such, they are “essential to the preservation of the regime’s power”.17 This is because totalitarianism, which seeks ‘total power’ and domination, can only achieve and safeguard its goal in a world organised in such a way so as to be void of spontaneity and plurality. In contrast, despotic regimes aim only to limit freedom, and thus their power is likewise limited. But totalitarianism aims to abolish freedom, by eliminating human spontaneity and plurality, and thus its power knows no limits – for the totalitarian state everything is possible, not just, as it is for the nihilist, permitted''.

Formosa