The Fallacy of Simple Location and the Ontologies of Substance and Event (Abstract)

"The term “simple location” was coined by Alfred North Whitehead, in his book Science and the Modern World.1 It is a fallacy of simple location to attempt to locate concrete particulars in definite portions of space and time. According to Whitehead, there are three characteristics of space and time.2 First, entities are separated in space and separated in time. He calls this the “separative” character of space-time. Second, entities are also together in space and together in time, even if they are not contemporaneous. This is space-time’s “prehensive” character. Third, each entity in space has a definite limitation, which is why it has its own peculiar shape and none other and why it is in its specific locus and in none other’s. The temporal analogue of such characteristic is that an entity is said to endure through a defined period and in no other. This third characteristic of space-time, taken by itself, gives rise to the idea of simple location, which then holds that each bit of matter is individually independent. Hence, it is regarded as fully describable, apart from any reference to any other portion of matter. An entity could very well be the sole occupant of uniform space; but it would nonetheless remain the entity that it is. Any relation that may be held between itself and any of the other entities, should these other entities in fact exist, becomes of secondary importance and cannot constitute an explanation for its internal constitution.3 What is true of space is likewise true of time. Thus, any bit of matter could be adequately described without any reference to the past or the future. The bit of matter in question is fully itself in any subperiod, however short, and is equally itself at any instant of time. However, as Whitehead likewise points out: “This gives no more than an accidental character to the passage of time, as the bit of matter in question is itself indifferent to the division of time. Temporality cannot thus constitute the essence of the entity; it has nothing to do with the character of the material.”

Ferdinand Santos & Santiago Sia