WPR etc
Suffering therefore can become a political technology, where certain groups are exposed to conditions in which they are “kept alive but in a state of injury”(Mbembe).
Thom Davies/Arshad Isakjee/Surindar DhesiSome years ago I was teaching a course on ethics and biotechnology...and we were discussing various aspects of the project of re-engineering human nature and...we invited James Watson to come to the class and he...discussed cognitive enhancement through genetic alteration and he was very much in favour of it...I asked him: “Do you consider having a low IQ a disease in need of a cure?” And he said: “Yes of course because people with low IQ’s have very difficult lives, they have trouble making a living and so on”. A student raised her hand and said: “Well, given that's the case, why don’t we reform the economy and society so that people with low IQ’s don’t lead such hard lives”. And Watson's reply was: “Oh, we’re never going to be able to change society, that's way to hard. That’s why we need to use genetic engineering to solve this problem”. And I found that a revealing but chilling answer. Not only because of its eugenics sensibility but also because it seemed to concede so readily the project of moral and political improvement, as if to say that human agency is impotent in the face of that project. Therefore better repair ourselves the better to fit the world, the social roles, that are beyond repair or reform. That, I think, represents the fundamental concession to the moral and political dis-empowerment of humanity.
Micheal Sandel
Good can be radical; evil can never be radical, it can only be extreme, for it possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension, yet - and this is its horror - it can spread like a fungus over the surface of the earth and lay waste the entire world. Evil comes from a failure to think...It is "thought-defying"...because thought tries to reach some depth, to go to the roots, and the moment it concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated because there is nothing. That is its “banality.”
Hannah Arendt
The following quote, referencing Gillian Fulchers work, speaks to the ways in which disabled people are represented and 'shaped' as a problem by official writing and speech - by discussion about them and through actions that flow from it, but WPR (professor emerita of politics) Carol Bacchi's all-terrain form of analysis can be applied equally to an array of subjects including those focused on here; in: ‘Women, Policy and Politics: the Construction of Policy Problems' Bacchi writes: ‘Gillian Fulcher...argues that the discourse surrounding education policy and disability construes disabled children as the ‘problem’, distracting attention from the disabling structures that surround them. She also notes that representing the disabled as the ‘problem’ allows government ‘responses’ to be seen as benevolent, generous and compassionate, reinforcing existing power relations.’ Several concepts taken from WPR will be cited or reiterated in this text, work taken from other sources will be handled similarly.
If benevolence, generosity and compassion are presupposed then ‘take it or leave it’ becomes a mantra and questions and attempts to re-frame are forestalled. Attention might be distracted away from the fact that team membership, roles, money, control of collective budgets, knowledge, curriculum vitae entries, computers etc. are in the hands of people other than those an organization is nominally for. And away from the fact that public spaces and res publica are degraded when an excessive amount of public wealth is siphoned away from them. And away from the fact that the modus operandi of many organizations '...is always to seek the most self-profiting relationship they can with their “customers” (though it is not immediately clear who is serving who).'(Segall) And away from the fact that: 'The whole city is for passing through, for window shopping. Sure, people will also stop and buy, but it’s over before they know it and then it’s on to the next thing a little lighter in the pocket and heavy in the soul.'(Segall)
(See, for example, the Garland paper cited above: 'What is a “history of the present”? On Foucault’s genealogies and their critical preconditions' for a far more careful reading, or see Foucault's: 'The Subject and Power' which is also cited above).
Social, living death or death in life happens when a society does not accept us as fully human, while political or civil diminishment or death consists in a, partial or complete, loss of civil rights and of a public voice. The slave/master relation, for example, re-constituted the slave as ‘...a permanent internal enemy life form, whose relationship to power was made always reducible to one of hostility and disposability’.(Elizabeth Povinelli) In other words, s/he was continually re-constituted as socially and civilly dead, though there were, to a degree successful, attempts to counter this process. In the Holy Roman Empire, people declared civilly dead were referred to as vogelfrei which translates as: free as a bird and, like birds, they could be hunted and killed with impunity since they were outside of the law or inside of the law as vogelfrei. As Nasrullah Mambrol, following Giorgio Agamben, says: in modern states, those lacking definite legal or moral status belong to, but are never members of, the polity. Elsewhere in medieval Europe, outlaws were similarly stripped of all intrinsic moral worth and called wolves or werewolves/caput lupinum - inhuman or half-human - at a time when it was open season on wolves.
To a degree, echoing Byung Chul Han and Mbembe, Jon Stratton suggests that zombies superseded the pre-modern werewolf as the paradigmatic monster. In that the pre-modern bandit (the pre-modern skogarmaor) escaped, literally or metaphorically, into the wild, from the perspective of the state he became a threshold between nature and culture 'a threshold of indistinction and of passage between animal and man, physis and nomos, exclusion and inclusion...'(Agamben) Zombies are not half animal, rather, they are humans stripped of much of their humanity, without a wilderness, without much wild agency and without much human agency. They are the living dead - a diminished life form, an indistinction between life and death rather than between non-human animal and human. Manas Ray writes: 'Hobbes viewed the state of nature (or, premodern) not as a real epoch chronologically prior to the foundation of the City, but a principle internal to the City itself: tanquam dissoluta, “as if it were dissolved”. It can emerge anytime and therefore proper vigil is essential'. Non-civilian roles and the absence of civilian status involve the withdrawal of civic custom, rendering us killable without redress. But civilians are never fully civilized, they are always, also, mere life - the state of nature can't be removed entirely. It can be customarily masked or correctly mobilized or arranged, even so, we are on notice - if our performance isn't second nature, if the mask slips, then we may be destroyed. With reference to Agamben, Manas Ray says that, as it stands: 'The work of politics is precisely to monopolize the sphere of the living – merely living (zoē) – to reduce man to his bare existence, and more: to ceaselessly threaten with the prospect of annihilation...' Accordingly, life is now a means to an end or an extra or luxury, and that end is other than life - life's lot is a blurring of annihilation with cultivation, reason and consensus.
As far as I can tell, Achille Mbembe and Giogio Agamben identify and unravel Foucault's parochialism, Mbembe often through a spatial (he speaks of the planetary and the plural) and Agamben often through a temporal expansion of this school of thought, to use two questionable abstractions. Bacchi, arguably, inherits this limitation from Foucault; in any case, it should be clear that analyzing how subjects are construed, what is reinforced and what attention is drawn away from when problems are defined is a non-trivial practice. Here, some of Mbembe and Agamben's thought (along with thought from other sources) is interleaved with Bacchi's without attempting to alter, or to combine it with, the latter.
WPR also expands on and complements Foucault’s project: 'It does not look for “crisis” points, places where practices change...Rather, it suggests that all policy proposals rely on problematizations which can be opened up and studied to gain access to the “implicit system in which we find ourselves”.(Bacchi)
Problem definitions (whether they are formed by law makers, policy analysts or anyone else) are viewed as creating meaning or as world-making more so than world-finding, just as histories both find and invent. Policy making creates problems by calling them such, once made and once stabilized or continually re-enforced by pervasive disciplinary techniques they may then become inescapably real.
Writing about Bacchi's work, Paul Cairney says that: problem representation is a political process which identifies how to define and to address the social world. And he says that a problem implies ‘...that the nature of an issue is ‘fixed and identifiable’, ‘self-evident’, well-understood, agreed, or taken for granted.’ Seen as fixed in this way: ‘Problem definitions can help close off debate. They help alienate and stigmatise some populations’. With this in mind, WPR destabilizes taken-for-granted knowledge; policy (not just specific policies) is also denaturalized, viewed as, to some degree, contingent and therefore worthy of the same destabilization and analysis.
Bacchi encourages us to notice the importance of how we, or more to the point, those with sufficient influence, represent problems; including, for example, how specific subjects are constituted and situated within given representational constellations and within organizations made in their image. As Cairney says: ‘Political actors compete to tell ‘stories’ to assign praise or blame to groups of people...These judgments have a ‘feed-forward’ effect: they are reproduced in...institutions’. He notes that, as such, the civic involvement of those preemptively blamed, stigmatized or negatively stereotyped is strongly disincentivized.
What else might it mean to belong to what Cairney calls a blamed group? Four terms Achille Mbembe posits: enclosure, contraction, containment and selective permeability are elaborated in his work, he proposes, for example, that they consist in ‘...a matrix of rules, mostly designed for those human bodies deemed either in excess, unwanted, illegal, dispensable or superfluous’. He references Hanna Arendt's writing on superfluity - on the way in which the superfluous are ‘...treated in moments of human history when the very enigma of existence - of collective existence - is no longer taken for granted’. And he suggests that ‘...we are increasingly faced with the question of what to do with those whose very existence does not seem to be necessary for social reproduction’. Further, he says that: ‘...spatial violence, humanitarian strategies and a peculiar biopolitics of punishment all combine to produce...a peculiar carceral space in which people deemed surplus, unwanted or illegal are governed through abdication of any responsibility for their lives or their welfare’. If power and capital have no use for you or you have no use for them then your state will, likely, be close to death and you will be located close to death - in other words, to be in a blamed group is, in this instance, to be consigned to a death-world. Mbembe is discussing Palestine in the talk excerpted above but he says that what’s been happening there has been happening elsewhere, with adaptions and with varying intensities.
Bacchi encourages us to notice and track the effects that problem representations have on, and beyond, the things that they claim to represent. And to unearth and to analyze ‘deep-seated conceptual schema’ and the axioms that play a role in leading to the generation of representations and therefore to new systems of meaning. The cascading effects mentioned include ‘...symbolic and material effects: discursive effects which follow from the limits of what can be thought or said; subjectification effects which define who we are [and] how we feel about ourselves...'(Susan Goodwin) as well as numerous lived effects, such as causing or relieving emotional or material distress.
At a more prosaic level: ‘Policy designs are observable phenomena found in statutes, administrative guidelines, court decrees, programs, and...the practices and procedures of street level bureaucrats’.(Anne Larason Schneider and Helen Ingram) They generate various kinds of governing ‘background knowledge’. Or downstream instances of the hegemonic control of signs and tools which strategically direct the formation and destruction of particular subjectivities and cultures.(Acid Horizon) The aim, for Foucault, is not to unlink truth from power, as such, because it's not possible to do so, however, it can be unlinked from certain kinds of power: '...it's a matter of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates...'(Foucault)
Hand looms were considered slow and faster, less labour intensive mechanical looms were introduced; this was a factor in kick starting the industrial revolution - a minority advocating for their introduction saw slow fabric production as a problem but many did not. Despite much civil unrest, however, those in favour had a great deal more rhetorical (and other kinds of) power than most, and their discussions and their conclusions were acted upon. Once industrialization was underway, new kinds of subjects were generated who thought and felt differently about industrialization (and much else) than they would have otherwise. Stated in a more academic way, the concrete and the ‘...discursive reality produced by policy...creates the conceptual boundaries within which we - as a society - are led to think’.(Rigby etc.) Or else, we could say that the process is multidirectional or that it works in a contrary direction, see Neil Postman's: Technopoly, Marshall Mcluhan's: Understanding Media and Karl Marx's: The Poverty of Philosophy, etc. Postman, for example, wrote: 'Surrounding every technology are institutions whose organization — not to mention their reason for being — reflects the world-view promoted by the technology'.
Bacchi’s work contains both complex and simple descriptions of WPR and complex and simple illustrative examples of its application, here’s another elementary description/example: she notes that there was concern amongst policy makers about the relatively poor health of a colonized native population and that they found that semi-nomadism lead to poor integration into health systems - it follows that this might be addressed through policies encouraging a more sedentary lifestyle. Bacchi says that the conceptual underpinnings of problem representations lodge at two levels, which she identifies ‘...as what is represented to be the concern and what is represented to be the cause of the problem’.(Bacchi) The concern here is represented to be ill-health and a cause is represented to be nomadism.
Possible unstated factors and ‘silences’ in the policy makers assessment might include the notion that some people must adapt to systems and not the other way around. And that economic considerations, including the relatively low cost of leaving systems unchanged, were elided, as was evidence showing negative impacts of sedentary lifestyles on health. Who or what is considered to be a problem is given away by who or what is viewed, in any given problem representation, as in need of change; as such, the indigenous minority (or indigenous life-style) is represented as the problem - given the long-lasting mistreatment of colonized peoples, this designation might be viewed as begging several questions.
Here’s another simple illustration: she notes that the fact that more boys than girls study STEM is considered to be a problem by some in some countries and that there are policies aimed at reversing this trend. How would such policies, and how would discussion surrounding them, impact who we are and how we feel about ourselves? Would a consequence be that those with qualifications in the humanities become second rate holders of second rate qualifications? Would an implicit devaluing of the humanities feed (however minimal the impact) into a politically illiterate culture or into a devaluing of humanity itself? Would there be holders of STEM qualifications who are misplaced - who would rather be involved in the humanities? What would the ‘subjectification effects’ be if we said that there are not enough boys studying the humanities? It might be the case that this last question is seldom asked because the notion that the reverse is true is axiomatic - it goes without saying.
The following is excerpted from a text about a more serious analysis of policies on children seeking asylum - in the problematizations discussed, risk is posed by children seeking asylum and/or they are at risk: ‘It is through considerations of risk that care enters the analysis...Emphasis is placed on one-to-one caring relationships, “on micro levels, rather than on care as a macro social practice with institutional and governing implications”...Beasley and I...characterize this relationship as displaying “the residues of noblesse oblige”, effectively denying the socio-political relations that constitute this hierarchy. Rigby et al...drive home the point: “prescriptive understandings of altruism within already hierarchical societies hide alternative, more expansive conceptions of a just and interconnected community, either national or international”.(Bacchi) These more ‘expansive conceptions’ (which might involve mutual aid, democratization, co-operation, self-reflexivity, civil rights, unionization, a focus on (organizational) design, procedure, protocol, structure, infrastructure and so on) are elided and a staggering number of cans of worms are also hidden behind masks of noble obligation. Of course, I don't think that the notion that we have obligations to those who are struggling or suffering is wrong as such. I think that the extent to which such duties are right or wrong depends on how they are defined and implemented. I see value in the following thoughts: If we attempt to find purpose by solving problems for an ill-defined society or population which we are not a part of, and are not meaningfully engaged with, then we will impose solutions on people which they don't want and haven't asked for rather than co-creating a better future with them.
The universalization of hyper-individualism implicit in such policies might also ride rough-shod over other philosophies including those generated within other cultures. Desmond Tutu defines an aspect of ubuntu praxis as follows: 'We say a person is a person through other persons...I am human because I belong, I participate, and I share' Individuals can be digitized and processed - they are quantifiable and calculable, ubuntu is not. And, to paraphrase Tutu's definition, proper self-assurance comes from knowing that we belong within a greater whole and that we are diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are.
We tend not to notice that we need supportive infrastructures (including emotional and cognitive infrastructures) until they are removed - until the rug is pulled from under our feet. Micro-social framing can lend itself to this same inattention, to disowning, to being inattentive to our intrinsic vulnerability and to our precarity - to our dependence on various (infra)structures. And can lend itself to ‘...the posture of control over the property that I have and that I am...’(Judith Butler) To conceiving of ourselves as seemingly sturdy and self-centered and to routinely hiding any fault-lines in ourselves that we can’t overcome.(Butler) Secure in the knowledge that the rug is firmly beneath our feet, we can say that we are not interdependent and we can foist an anti-interdependence slant on the terminally insecure but not without performative contradiction, and not without hypocrisy; even the most virulent attack on the fact of interdependence rests on its preservation.
Two tangential questions, has liberty defined as a freedom from ties and unchecked or un-complimented by solidarity, equity and specific traditions etc. allowed organized domination to proliferate and intensify? Is injustice a side-effect of a lack of liberty, or synonym for illiberal, also defined as a lack of ties?
These epistemological commitments have consequences for democratization because (for example) if there is no room for interpretation then there is less room for participation in reform or for the kinds of discussion on which democracy depends. However, Bacchi favours constructivist/post-structuralist over interpretative accounts because, for example: ‘An interpretive view of problematizations as competing understandings of problems, together with the conviction that the goal of the analyst is to train policy makers/workers in problematizing skills, supports a reformist agenda. By contrast, the study, in Foucault-influenced post-structural accounts, of problematizations as deep-seated conceptual schema that shape lives, offers a more thoroughgoing analysis of how we are governed, a level of analysis that prefers “unregulated questioning” to “partial answers.” With that said, elsewhere, she does make a case for democratization grounded, in part, in a critique of positivism, its uses and its misuses.
WPR rests on several presuppositions, the most important of which is, I think, that: ‘The role of policy analysts is explicitly political, based on the assumption that policy benefits some groups and harms others, and taking ‘the side of those who are harmed’.(Cairney and Bacchi) Although, for the most part, WPR tells us how we may think and not what to think, this break with the neutrality of some post-structuralist thought is significant and it has wide ranging consequences.
Though WPR doesn’t emphasize psychology, it plays a role, according to Cairney: ‘Policymakers make quick, biased, emotional judgments, then back up their actions with selective facts to pursue their understanding of a policy problem and its solution...social constructions can also be based on conscious bias and the strategic exploitation of...’ popular stereotypes and of other people’s emotions for political gain. If you want to take the high road and to challenge biases etc. then your ability to impact policy will likely diminish and your popularity will likely fall.
Policy makers deal with populations too numerous to know and so stereotypes, stigmatization, categorization, popular biases etc. serve as short-hand. Short-hand which, at first, applies to populations and then - as it circulates and makes its way downstream - applies, also, to smaller collectivities and to individuals. Those in praised categories have little incentive to question this process and, given the strength and prevalence of the subjectification effects discussed elsewhere, those in blamed or depreciated categories tend to believe in, become or else lack the capacity to challenge categories and all that they are associated with.
How might these agnotological considerations factor into the segregation, does he take sugaring, stigmatization and surveillance of, for example, disabled people or people in mental distress? Or into the dividing and arranging of people into organized, over-active abled service providers on one side of the aisle and disorganized, passive individual clients on the other? Might this factor into injured people, and others who have no economic use, being liquidated by default? Or into the creation of abandoned subjects or practices that rubber-stamp abandonment? That rubber-stamp the power to make live and let die, the peremptory injunction to enjoy, to have a nice day or fuck off and die. If conceptualizing the problem as the injured or the incapacitated (who we have an obligation to help) or as the presence of risk and lack of ‘one-to-one caring relationships’ factors into these outcomes then re-conceptualization becomes imperative. We could represent the problem as a lack of co-operation, solidarity and justice for example. In order to remedy such a lack we could, as a thought experiment at least, draw lots (though other methods would have much the same results) to decide who joins which team, collective or grouping - the formal practices of these teams would be the same and the interactions between them would be mutual such that if a member of one team is, to use a questionable term, another teams ‘case’ then members of other teams would be their cases in return. This structure may provide more opportunities to contest harmful discursive formations and to broach what those formations suppress - the question of reparations or the question of (collective) accountability, for example, and may allow for a wider range of subjectivities. And because it involves the creation of non-binary mixed (in distress-not-in-distress or abled-disabled) teams interacting with other mixed teams it may go at least some way to answering Dr Lynne Friedli's question: 'What difference does it make if discomfort and difficulties are shared by everyone?'(See Friedli's paper: 'Mental health, resilience and inequalities') and it should reduce prejudice, as Gordon Allport writes: ‘Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual) may be reduced by equal status contact between minority and majority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e. by law, custom or local atmosphere), and if it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and common humanity between members...’ See, also, Dean Spades thoughts on mutual aid.
Many policy analysts have, of course, addressed (dis)ability and the comments above are only indirectly related to WPR; analyzing policy isn’t, after all, the aim of this essay.
Bacchi problematizes problem solving itself - division, passivity and depoliticization (or political disorganization) are built into certain kinds of problem solving, she writes: ‘while “problem-solving” is commonly aligned with critical thinking, to the contrary, problem-solving, as a governing knowledge, creates politically quiescent, divided and self-regulating citizens’. These self-regulating citizens are the (at once constrained and empowered) docile bodies posited by Foucault but, as stated elsewhere, biopolitics is intertwined with necropolitics for Achille Mbembe and in this view, the destructive aspects of ‘governing knowledge’ are underplayed in Bacchi’s (generativity focused and developed/pacified world centered) accounts. The injured know that there's a lot of blood in the water and they know that it's their blood and they know that there are lots of sharks in the water. Judith Butler has it that: ‘A sovereign position not only denies its own constitutive injurability but tries to relocate injurability in the other’. History shows that there is a strong tendency to use pseudo-reasoning and kettle logic to justify the communal sadism inflicted on, and to generate members of, out-groups; see the Cagots, the Burakumin, the Dalit and countless other examples. Related to this, scapegoating is also a near universal cross cultural practice - a practice which, for example, Thomas Szasz (and Jerzy Kosinski) covered well and which René Girard covered in more depth.
To simplify far too much, the end of feudalism entailed the fragmentation of sovereignty and its dispersal amongst subjects; in modern states many are, potentially, defenseless and many are potentially sovereign and so can, potentially, take part in declaring others homines sacri. Once sovereignty is up for grabs, populations enter the competition and the population (i.e. the state) turns its attention towards itself - towards the population and whoever constitutes the population. If we can't maintain a mandated relation between physis and nomos, if we can’t or don’t mask our biological existence or standardize it in accordance with the logic of dominant power(Matteo Quai) then our existence is negotiable - we are homo sacer; if we are not sufficiently confident, ambitious, able to handle stress and so on, then our existence is negotiable. As per Giorgio Agamben, determining who is categorized as homo sacer and who isn’t, who is defined as a full moral subject and who is not, who merely exists or survives and who possesses a ‘...form or way of living proper to an individual or group’(Agamben) or who is at the sharp end of concentration camps are synonymous or similar judgments - they are decisions always in play, everywhere. And homo sacer is 'virtually human' or (merely) human or, at least, humans are conceived as such in specific social orders.
They are decisions always in play everywhere, including within each individual, in that we are configured as both qualified life (or, stated in an antiquated way, life qualified by its pursuit of the good/virtuous life) and unqualified life, and in that we are called on to regulate and auto-exploit the later. In that we must give ourselves to public life (and in so doing gain a share of sovereignties symbolic immortality) while unqualified life is public life's fuel. In that Frankenstein's monster was always, also, within his inventor. Nowadays we might say ‘homo-economicus’ or 'homo-laborans' instead of qualified life - labor, as Michael Hardt has it, produces social life and, in turn, all social life is put to work. And we might say that economics is functionally political - is ‘political economy’ or that politics is primarily economic: '...power belongs to an economic-administrative paradigm'.(Beltramini) Either way, Ζωή or life has, for the most part, long since been, and continues to be, annexed or enclosed and the blood, sweat and tears involved obscured. See also: Depression: A Public Feeling by Cvetkovich, The King's Two Bodies by Kantorowicz and the phenomena of 'psychological doubling' described by Lifton. As physis provides testimony it falsifies, it always stutters its testimony, so to speak, as it attempts to render that which cannot be rendered. That which remains unrendered exists, then, as an included exclusion. As such, we remain barbaroi, that is, indeterminate, or else savages, that is, physis.
‘For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who decides whether this normal situation actually exists’.(Karl Schmidt) He who decides who or what is politically irrelevant, who or what is worthless, who or what is normal. And exceptions also define that which is not omitted, banned, banished or abandoned - to define camp forms is to define and to create what is outside of them, homo sacer is the structuring principle or ‘nomos’ of modern societies. Once life itself is politicized, sovereign power must operate at the border of life and civic life in that it decides who is civilized, and to what degree, and who is mere life and so stripped of rights, expectations, connections, honour and meaning. Though Agamben offers more nuance, he says, for example, that the point at which the decision on life (i.e. biopolitics) becomes a decision on death (i.e. necro or thantopolitics) '...no longer appears...as a stable border dividing two clearly distinct zones’. In a paper titled: ‘Mental capacity and states of exception: revisiting disability law with Giorgio Agamben’ Penelope Weller addresses the remedial extension of legal capacity in international law, and argues that the current experience of people in mental distress or with disabilities might mirror that of the homo sacer described by Agamben, she writes: ‘Agemben’s analysis indicates that modern bio-political power maintains liberal order through the exclusion of bodies and minds that fail to confirm to the liberal vision...inclusion in the mainstream can only be achieved through a demonstration of the individual’s ability to function as a rational self-actualising liberal subject. In this kind of order, a benevolent response denotes exclusion from the mainstream. Moreover, as people with disabilities report, the struggle to avoid benevolence and achieve inclusion becomes the constant feature of the disability experience...For Agamben, homo sacer is a figure who is alive, and yet beyond law, inhabiting a place where all normal rights, expectations, connections, honour and meaning are suspended. Because homo sacer is a diminished life form...it becomes ‘an object of violence that exceeds the sphere both of law and of sacrifice.’ Agamben argues for the destitution of law which is to say against the interminable logic of the guillotine/the sorting of the righteous from the damned and turns to divine violence which leads to politics without law and to metaphysics but Wellers reading of Agamben is pragmatic and this makes sense because '...no matter how much we are working to change the world, we must still find ways of coping with the reality at hand.'(Hedva) Law and politics are compromised, politics is war by other means (or vice versa) but that's where we're at and denial or pretending that we're all on the same page merely intensifies conflict to the point of extermination, denial is the ultimate compromise.
In this kind of order, in the reality at hand, orders absence (those pervasive points at which the rule of law flounders or breaks down) is administered. Aporíē, confusion and absurdity are built into law and into language - they are built into order as such.
‘Early 15c., in reference to classical history, "a non-Roman or non-Greek," earlier barbar (late 14c.) "non-Roman or non-Greek person; non-Christian; person speaking a language different from one's own," from Medieval Latin barbarinus (source of Old French barbarin "Berber, pagan, Saracen, barbarian"), from Latin barbarus "strange, foreign, barbarous," from Greek barbaros "foreign, strange; ignorant," from PIE root *barbar - echoic of unintelligible speech of foreigners (compare Sanskrit barbara- "stammering," also "non-Aryan," Latin balbus "stammering," Czech blblati "to stammer").
Greek barbaroi (plural noun) meant "all that are not Greek," but especially the Medes and Persians; originally it was not entirely pejorative, but its sense became moreso after the Persian wars. The Romans (technically themselves barbaroi) took up the word and applied it to tribes or nations which had no Greek or Roman accomplishments.
Also in Middle English (c. 1400) "native of the Barbary coast;" meaning "rude, wild person" is from 1610s. Occasionally in 19c. English distinguished from savage (n.) as being a step closer to civilization’.
While '...the privilege of the sovereign is to exercise lawful violence, the creation of a relationship of violence, encourages others to act violently toward the figure of the homo sacer. They are emboldened because violence is made permissible’.(Weller) Weller suggests that, for the same reasons, abuse visited on ‘diminished life forms’ by diminished life forms also tends to be deprecated, ignored or otherwise seen as not counting. See, for example, Eleanor Longden’s popular TED talk for possible examples of this dynamic, these examples are, of course, the tip of an iceberg. I knew someone who was raped by ten people every day in the residential that he grew up in and I knew someone who was drugged and raped by a psychiatrist who, he found out later, had raped over one hundred people; such anecdotal evidence can be misleading, however, in as much as it's unrepresentative or in as much as the problem is systemic.
All of this would, of course, work against bringing down and rebuilding philanthropic institutions on democratic and solidalitarian foundations, and it would work against contesting, bringing down or rebuilding paternalistic institutions on more egalitarian grounds, to borrow Butler’s phrasing. Butler also shows, as many others have and as discussed earlier, that an independent 'self-actualising' liberal subject can only pretend to be so insofar as the mutual dependence and infrastructural support necessary to maintain this performance is, and has been, in place.
On the one hand, we might be so injured that we are unable to claim rights, roles or socioeconomic status. On the other, through eliminating injured or incapacitated people (and fully individualizing their incapacity) others may be freed from being categorized in terms of mere physical existence and their particularity, belonging and humanity consecrated. The outlaw is both dehumanized and valorized, in part, because there is a sense in which the civilized or respectable may become so by distinguishing themselves from what ordinary law doesn’t fully capture - from states of exception, nature/cosmos or from anomie, disorganization or chaos. ‘The statement: ‘The rule lives off the exception alone’ must...be taken to the letter. The law is made of nothing but what it manages to capture inside itself through the inclusive exclusion of the exepcio. It nourishes itself on this exception and is a dead letter without it’.(Agamben) Language is a cup formed by what fills it. Exclusion, as Penelope Weller and Jessica Whyte put it, founds sovereign power and constitutes political community; as such this valorization or sacralization is self-serving, is a kind of 'inverse exultation' and is, therefore, misleading. Homo sacer is said to be sacred and accursed but ultimately, to contemporary politics and biopolitics, for the most part, he is just diminished, just a cockroach, as free as a bird and as killable and ungrievable - in Agamben's view, the politics of separating life from qualified life occurs prior to any distinction between the sacred and the non-sacred. About the holocaust he writes: ‘The dimension in which the extermination took place is neither religion nor law, but biopolitics’. (See, for example, Robert Jay Lifton's: ‘The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide’).
In this view, the state and law have, to some degree, been captured by anomie and so attempts to locate it (anomie) entirely elsewhere also lack credibility. ‘For the sovereign, who freely consented to donning the executioner's clothes, is now finally manifesting his originary kinship with the criminal’.(Agamben) And it’s a case of, as above so below - from sovereign to criminal and every lesser-sovereign in between, and it’s a case of, as abroad so at home.
And in this view the suspension of ordinary rights, under the guise of biopolitics and biopower, constitutes a perpetual state of emergency implemented by (or using) an array of distant, and mostly unwitting, experts and deputies, and justified by security, safety, crisis, protection, necessity, care, emergency and the like. Instances of biopower might be good, bad or indifferent and justifications might stand up to scrutiny or they might not but overall, politics now ‘...secretly works towards the production of emergencies.’(Agamben) It produces states of permanent catastrophe that call for politics as policing or polizeiwissenschaft or, more broadly, as all pervasive technê. They know the lingo but they don't do da ting doe: knowledge can be used to prop up ruling and structurally violent formations successfully, just as superstition can; a more granular apprehension of biology makes a more granular implementation of biopower possible, whether in the form of the skull measuring racism described by Stephen J Gould, or a more 'benevolent' expansion of diverse techniques permeating states invested in ‘defending’ and in ensuring, sustaining, and multiplying(Foucault) the lives of populations.
Democratic politics should, Agamben said, try to ‘...prevent the development of conditions which lead to destruction, hatred and terror.’ But, instead, politics has limited ‘...itself to attempts to control them once they occur’. And - like M.C Escher's famous drawing of a hand drawing a hand which draws the first - destruction, hatred and terror and the politics of safety depend on and, sometimes, create one-another but they also morph into one another.
What if we began, as Paul Cairney does, with the assumption that all policy is bad and then attempted to figure out how and why?
What if we asked, as per Mbembe: what place is given to wounded or slain bodies ‘...how are they inscribed in the order of power?’ Or viewed the world from the perspective of the injured or slain?
Attitudes to pain and to brutality quite often tend towards or encourage solipsism, which is something that should, perhaps, be de-emphasised in favour of seeing them as something that humanity has struggled with and thought deeply about since Adam and Eve were expelled from the garden, seeing suffering globally – awarding suffering citizenship of the world instead of confining it to an island of ourselves. Or, to paraphrase, in favour of finding methods, customs, cultures or activities concerned with the practice of relating to pain; without ways of relating to suffering and its opposites in public, we might be left with private quasi-spiritual lives consisting in self-aggrandizement or justification, personal dreams and wish-fulfillment.(Segall) Suffering is difficult to incorporate; our instincts are to reject it and yet it remains resolutely at the centre of life, even when it's socially marginal – Sam Harris paints too simple picture: 'Our struggle to navigate the space of possible pains and pleasures produces most of human culture, we are ever in the process of creating and repairing a world that our minds want to be in and wherever we look we see evidence of our successes and our failures.' I think that, as Will Conway wrote, wherever we look we also see evidence of a concern for '...maximizing the extraction of raw utility from bodies within the state'. If we concede Harris's point then successes seem less likely and an alienated and alienating voyeurism seems more likely if we ignore the role that pain plays and act as though it is, or view it as, radically removed or as a spectacle. But as Anne Boyer writes: 'The common struggle gets pushed through the sieve of what forms we have to make its account, and before you know it, the wide and shared suffering of this world is narrowed...The telling is always trying to slide down into a reinforcement of the conditions that made us want to say something in the first place, rather than their exposé, as if the gravity of our shared diminishments is more powerful than any ascendant rage.' You can lace words with poison but there is little that the Moloch can't digest.
Nature contains deserts and Arctic ‘wastes’ and culture contains equally inhospitable locations; as inhospitable as they are, it would be remiss of a geographer not to include deserts in their work. Organizational design, culture, regulation, protocol and law all reflect a gross lacunae in skill and soul where pain is concerned and so what if we asked, along with Eduardo Galeano: 'What happens when we integrate rather than refuse the pain, toil, and doom of surviving?'
How are subjects construed, what is reinforced and what is attention drawn away from?
Like cats that chase their own tails - tails which they are eternally surprised by, we are surprised by the results of our custom of using others and of our customary destruction of human bodies and populations; we can continue to kick the can down the road or pick it up, we can say: Je sais bien mais quand même or know better and do better or, at least, not worse. To a degree, echoing Agamben, Achille Mbembe writes: ‘My concern is those figures of sovereignty whose central project is not the struggle for autonomy but the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations. Such figures of sovereignty are far from a piece of prodigious insanity or an expression of a rupture between the impulses and interests of the body and those of the mind. Indeed, they, like the death camps, are what constitute the nomos of the political space in which we still live’. The politics that both shapes lives and destroys them.
There are several iterations of the following six questions which, as per WPR, are used to analyze problem representations/policies. These questions are then aimed at any problem representations that the process generates:
‘Question 1: What’s the problem represented to be in a policy or set of policies?
Question 2: What deep-seated propositions or assumptions underlie this representation? Identify binaries, key concepts and categories.
Question 3: How has this representation come about?
Question 4: What is left unproblematic in this representation? What are the silences? Can the problem be reconceptualised differently?
Question 5: What effects (discursive, subjectification, lived) are produced by this representation of the problem?
Question 6: How/where are dominant problem representations produced, disseminated and defended? How could they be contested/disrupted? Explore contradictions and discursive resources for reconceptualisation(re-problematization)'.
No comments:
Post a Comment